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Of or relating to a warning given by police to a criminal suspect advising of the constitutional right against self-incrimination and of the right to have a lawyer present during any interrogation.
[After Ernesto A. Miranda(1940?–1976), petitioner in the case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966).]
In one of its most famous decisions, the Warren Court required police to advise criminal suspects of particular constitutional rights prior to interrogation. These Miranda warnings consisted of four items: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the reminder that anything said could be used against the suspect; (3) the right to counsel; and (4) the related reminder that counsel would be provided for indigents.
Miranda warnings apply when suspects are in police custody and under interrogation. In decisions subsequent to Miranda, the Court has emphasized that custody consists of the restriction of freedom of movement by police. This can occur in one's home (Orozco v. Texas, 1969), or in jail on an unrelated offense (Mathis v. United States, 1968). Public safety concerns, however, constitute an exemption to this requirement as the Court emphasized in New York v. Quarles (1984) when it ruled that emergency circumstances (e.g., the officer's immediate protection) do not require Miranda warnings, even if these situations could be describe as interrogations. Suspects who voluntarily go to a police station are not entitled to Miranda warnings unless arrested and drivers who are stopped by police for a routine traffic violation are also not entitled to Miranda warnings (California v. Beheler, 1983, and Berkemer v. McCarty, 1984).
Under Miranda, an interrogation exists whenever police reasonably expect that a suspect is likely to offer incriminating information (Rhode Island v. Innis, 1980). Although most interrogations are carried out by law enforcement officers, some psychiatric examinations (e.g., those related to competency to stand trial) constitute interrogations (Estelle v. Smith, 1981). Grand jury proceedings, however, are not included (United States v. Wong, 1977). Witnesses in grand jury proceedings may, of course, assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination, but they do not need to be advised of these rights in Miranda fashion. Some lower courts have applied Miranda to grand jury proceedings in a departure from this pattern, but the majority do not, citing United States v. Dionisio (1973) where the Court argued that grand jury subpoenas are not unreasonable searches and seizures in the context of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, not custodial in Fifth Amendment terms.
Related to the scope of interrogation are more subtle means of eliciting incriminating information from criminal defendants. In 1977 the Supreme Court concluded that police comments to each other in the presence of a suspect could be designed to elicit incriminating evidence (Brewer v. Williams). In this decision, however, the Court relied more on Sixth Amendment right to counsel protection than the Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination. Several states filed amicus briefs in the Brewer case and explicitly asked the Court to overrule its decision in Miranda. A similar issue was raised in a 1987 case where the Court accepted a tape‐recorded conversation between a couple suspected of murdering their son where the husband had been advised of his Miranda rights but the wife initiated the conversation (Arizona v. Mauro, 1987).
Another question related to Miranda warnings is the admissibility of evidence obtained in involuntary physical tests. In Schmerber v. California (1966), the Court distinguished testimonial evidence that required Fifth Amendment protection and physical evidence that did not, thereby accepting the admissibility of an involuntary blood test.
Similarly, the Court has considered the degree to which incomplete warnings violate Miranda. In Michigan v. Tucker (1974), the Court upheld a conviction where police failed to advise the suspect that counsel would be provided if he were indigent. This reluctance to require police to warn suspects in an unequivocal manner has been upheld in other decisions. In Duckworth v. Eagan (1989), the Court accepted a confession where police indicated that they did not have any way of providing a lawyer but did assure the defendant that one would be provided if and when he went to court. Although Eagan argued that this set of warnings did not conform to the Court's own precedent (California v. Prysock, 1981), the Court concluded that Miranda warnings did not have to be issued in an exact form and that police were not obligated to produce defense lawyers “on call.”
In Miranda, the Court acknowledged that criminal defendants could waive their Miranda rights and talk to police. Questions about police judgments that a defendant voluntarily offered information, however, remain. In the 1994 decision, Davis v. United States, for example, the Court concluded that a suspect's comment that “maybe I should talk to a lawyer” did not constitute a request for an attorney under the Miranda warnings requirement. Moreover, in a series of cases the Court has ruled that a written waiver form is not essential (North Carolina v. Butler, 1979), that a waiver cannot be presumed from the suspect's failure to complain after warning (Tague v. Louisiana, 1980), that the suspect does not have to be notified of the specific offense under investigation (Colorado v. Spring, 1987), that a post‐warning waiver is not invalidated by a pre‐warning confession (Oregon v. Elstad, 1985), and that all the ramifications of a waiver need to be appreciated by the suspect for constitutional validity (Moran v. Burbine, 1986).
The Court has also ruled on the conditions that may render a suspect's confession and waiver of Miranda invalid. For example, mental illness on the part of a defendant who confessed to police in the absence of coercion does not invalidate a confession (Colorado v. Connelly, 1986), but the confessions of injured suspects on medication and in severe pain who are questioned in the hospital should be excluded (Beecher v. Alabama, 1972, and Mincey v. Arizona, 1978). So general are the Court's waiver standards that suspects who explicitly refuse to offer a written statement without counsel may be regarded as having waived their Miranda rights (Connecticut v. Barrett, 1987).
During the 2004 term, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the applicability of Miranda to juveniles. Of central interest in Yarborough Warden v. Alvarado, was the use at trial of testimony obtained in a two‐hour interview that police in Los Angeles conducted with a seventeen‐year‐old who was implicated in an attempted robbery and murder case. At trial, Alvarado moved to suppress the interview on the grounds that no Miranda warnings were issued, a claim unchallenged by the prosecution. The trial court and the state appellate court concluded that Alvarado was not in custody at the time of the interview, citing Thompson v. Keohane. The Ninth Circuit reversed in Alvarado v. Hickman, took issue with the application of the custody test, and called particular attention to Alvarado's youth and inexperience. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling and concluded that Alvarado was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and that the trial court's application of the custody test was not unreasonable.
One of the most important questions related to the continued validity of Miranda is the indirect use of information obtained in violation of the warning requirement. In 1971 the Burger Court concluded that statements made in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach the credibility of the defendant if s/he took the stand in his/her own defense. This decision in Harris v. New York has sometimes been described as a “back‐door” reversal of the famous 1966 precedent. However, the U.S. Supreme Court continues to uphold the constitutionality of the Court's famous 1966 decision and the warnings requirement that it set out. An appropriate illustration is the 2000 decision in Dickerson v. United States where the Court rejected a 1999 Fourth Circuit ruling that upheld the admissibility of a voluntary confession in the face of an acknowledged failure of police to issue Miranda warnings. In this decision, the Court emphasized, among other arguments, that “the (Miranda) warnings have become part of our national culture.”
— Susette M. Talarico
[WARNINGS] the requirement that a person receive certain warnings relating to his privilege against self-incrimination (right to remain silent) and his right to the presence and advice of an attorney before any custodial interrogation by law enforcement authorities takes place. The actual rule was enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona: "[t]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." 384 U.S. 436, 444-45. An explicit statement of waiver of rights is not always necessary to support a finding of waiver; waiver can be inferred from the circumstances of the interrogation. 441 U.S. 369.
Unless being used to cross-examine the defendant, 401 U.S. 222, statements and evidence obtained in violation of this rule are not admissible in the defendant's criminal trial and are grounds for federal constitutional challenge to any conviction obtained thereby.
The noun has one meaning:
Meaning #1:
the rule that police (when interrogating you after an arrest) are obliged to warn you that anything you say may be used as evidence and to read you your constitutional rights (the right to a lawyer and the right to remain silent until advised by a lawyer)
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| Criminal procedure |
|---|
| Investigating and charging crimes |
| Criminal investigation |
| Arrest warrant · Search warrant |
| Probable cause · Knock-and-announce |
| Exigent circumstance |
| Search and seizure · Arrest |
| Grand jury |
| Criminal prosecution |
| Statute of limitations · Nolle prosequi |
| Bill of attainder · Ex post facto law |
| Criminal jurisdiction · Extradition |
| Habeas corpus · Bail |
| Inquisitorial system · Adversarial system |
| Charges and pleas |
| Arraignment · Indictment |
| Plea · Peremptory plea |
| Nolo contendere (U.S.) · Plea bargain |
| Presentence Investigation |
| Related areas of law |
| Criminal defenses |
| Criminal law · Evidence |
| Civil procedure |
| Portals |
| Law · Criminal justice |
In the United States, the Miranda warning is a
The Miranda warnings were mandated by the 1966 United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Miranda v. Arizona as a means of protecting a criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment right to avoid coercive self-incrimination (see
In 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested for kidnapping and rape. He made a confession without having been told of his
constitutional right to remain silent, and his right to have an attorney present during police questioning. At trial, prosecutors offered only his confession as evidence and he was
When Miranda was later killed in a knife fight, his killer received the Miranda warnings; he invoked his rights and declined to give a statement. [1]
In 2000, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether Miranda had been superseded by the enactment of the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. A 5-4 majority ruled that the answer was no, because Miranda had articulated a constitutional rule which only the Court itself (or a constitutional amendment) could reverse. Dickerson v. United States, .
The Supreme Court did not specify the exact wording to be used when informing a suspect of his or her rights. However, the Court did create a set of guidelines which must be followed. The ruling states:
| “ | ...The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he or
she has the |
” |
As a result, American English has acquired the verb Mirandize, meaning to read to a suspect his or her Miranda rights (when that suspect is taken into custody for the purpose of questioning).[2]
Notably, the Miranda rights do not have to be read in any particular order, and they do not have to precisely match the language of the Miranda decision, as long as they are adequately and fully conveyed. California v. Prysock, .
Though every U.S. jurisdiction has its own regulations regarding what, precisely, must be said to a person when they are arrested or placed in a custodial situation, the typical warning is as follows:
| “ | You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to have an attorney present during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you. | ” |
The courts have since ruled that the warning must be "meaningful", so it is usually required that the suspect be asked if he understands his rights. Sometimes, firm answers of "yes" are required. An arrestee's silence is not a waiver. Evidence has been ruled inadmissible because of an arrestee's poor knowledge of English and the failure of arresting officers to provide the warning in the arrestee's language.
Also because of various education levels, officers must make sure the suspect understands what the officer is saying. It may be necessary to "translate" to the suspect's level of understanding. Courts have ruled this admissible as long as the original waiver is said and the "translation" is recorded either on paper or on tape.
The right of a juvenile to remain silent without his or her parent or guardian present is provided in some jurisdictions.
Some departments in New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Alaska add the following sentence:
| “ | We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court. | ” |
Even though this sentence can be somewhat ambiguous to some hapless laypersons — who can, and who have, interpreted it to mean that "you will not get a lawyer until you confess and are arraigned in court" — the U.S. Supreme Court has approved of it as an accurate description of the procedure in those states. Duckworth v. Eagan, (upholding use of sentence by Hammond, Indiana police).
In border states, including Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, suspects who are not United States citizens are given an additional warning:
| “ | If you are not a United States citizen, you may contact your country's consulate prior to any questioning. | ” |
California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania also add the following questions:
| “ | Do you understand the rights I have just read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me? | ” |
A "yes" answer to both completes the waiver. A "no" to either invokes the right. Once Miranda rights have been invoked, and a suspect then remains silent, the prosecutor cannot punish him for exercising his Miranda rights by commenting on his silence at trial and insinuating that it amounted to an implicit admission of guilt. Wainwright v. Greenfield , .
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31 provides for the right against self-incrimination. Interrogation subjects under Army jurisdiction must first be given Department of the Army Form 3881(PDF), which informs them of the charges and their rights, and sign it. Other services likely have similar forms.
It has been discussed if a Miranda warning — if spoken or in writing — could be appropriately given to disabled persons. For example, "the right to remain silent" means little to a deaf individual and the word "constitutional" may not be understood by people with only an elementary education. The content of a Miranda warning can be understood by a 6th- to 8th-grade pupil while only 10 to 15 percent of prelingually deaf people have been found to be that competent. Police departments have been advised not to say Miranda warnings to deaf people if a lawyer is not present, and videotaping both the Miranda warning and its waiver has also been suggested. In one case, a deaf murderer was kept at a therapy station until he is able to understand the meaning of the Miranda warning and other judicial proceedings.[3]
Due to the prevalence of American television programs and motion pictures in which the police characters frequently read suspects their rights, it has become an expected element of arrest procedure. In the 2000 Dickerson decision, Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote that Miranda warnings had "become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture." Dickerson v. United States . However, police are only required to warn an individual whom they intend to subject to custodial interrogation at the police station, in a police vehicle or when detained. Arrests can occur without questioning and without the Miranda warning — although if the police do change their mind and decide to interrogate the suspect, the warning must then be given. Furthermore, if public safety (see New York v. Quarles) warrants such action, the police may ask questions prior to a reading of the Miranda warning, and the evidence thus obtained can sometimes still be used against the defendant.
Because Miranda only applies to custodial interrogations, it does not protect detainees from standard booking questions: name, date of birth, address, and the like. Because it is a prophylactic measure intended to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, it does not prevent the police from taking blood from persons suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol without a warrant.[vague]
Currently there is a question about corrections and Miranda. If an inmate is in jail and invoked Miranda on one case, it is unclear whether this extends to any other cases that he or she may be charged with while in custody.
Within Australia, the right to silence derives from common law. The uniform position amongst the states is that neither the judge nor the jury is permitted to draw any adverse inference about the defendant's culpability, where he/she does not answer police questions. While this is the common law position, it is buttressed by various legislative provisions within the states. For instance s.464J of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) and s.89 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).
It has also been upheld by the High Court in the case of Petty v R (1991) 173 CLR 95. However, where a defendant answers some police questions, but not others, an inference may sometimes be drawn about the questions he refused to answer. (See Coldrey, below.)
The current caution used in New South Wales is:
| “ | You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand? | ” |
Where a defendant refuses to speak to the police, but then speaks to an undercover member of the police, that evidence is likely to be excluded so as to ensure that the police do not avoid their limitations. However, if a defendant speaks to a person who is not a member of the police and who is fitted with a listening device, that evidence would be admitted.
Australian research indicates that very few suspects actually refuse to speak. Stevenson’s research (see below for citation) indicates that only 4% of suspects who are subsequently charged and tried in the Sydney District Court remain silent during interviews. The Victorian DPP found that 7-9% of suspects refused to answer police questions.
A number of states have conducted Enquiries into the adoption of the English changes set out in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. See here, here or here All states have rejected such change. As the NSW Report said:
| “ | It is reasonable that innocent persons faced with a serious accusation might wish to consider their situations carefully before making any disclosure, especially where the circumstances appear suspicious but it cannot be assumed that they are rational and articulate. In many cases, suspects may be emotional, perhaps panicked, inarticulate, unintelligent, easily influenced, confused or frightened or a combination of these. They may be unable to do themselves justice. Such persons may be well advised to hold their peace, at least at an early stage. They may, of course, have something to hide, but that something may simply be shameful and not a crime, or it may implicate others for whom they feel responsible. The supposition that only a guilty person has a reason for not speaking freely to investigating police is an unreasonable assumption. | ” |
It is also important to note that anything said to an Australian police officer should be corroborated, especially by way of video or audio tape. If it is not so corroborated it will be admitted only under exceptional circumstances, S.464H (2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), and where the circumstances, on the balance of probabilites, justify the reception of the evidence, S.464H (2)(b) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). While initially the police were insulted by this ruling most have now come to find it useful as a way of proving that they did not "verbal" an accused.
In Canada, equivalent rights exist pursuant to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Under the Charter, an arrested person has the right:
(See: R. v. Hebert [1990] 2 S.C.R. 15)
Section 11 of the Charter further provides that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness in a proceeding against them (s. 11(c) - protection against self-incrimination) and is presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal (s. 11(d)). Section 14 of the Charter further provides that a translator must be made available so that the person can understand the proceedings against them. This right to a translator extends to the deaf.
While Section 7 of the Charter guarantees the right to remain silent, Canadian law does not entitle the criminal suspect to have Counsel present during the course of an interrogation. Once a suspect has asserted their right to Counsel, the Police are obliged to hold off in attempting to obtain evidence until the suspect has had a reasonable opportunity to contact legal counsel, however suspects do not have the right to have Counsel present during the questioning.
Warnings regarding the right against self-incrimination may have originated in England and Wales. In 1912, the judges of the Kings Bench issued the Judges Rules. These provided that, when a police member wished to question a suspect about an offence, the officer should first caution the person that he was entitled to remain silent. The pre-trial operation of the privilege against self-incrimination was further buttressed by the decision in Ibrahim v R [1914] AC 599 that an admission or confession made by the accused to the police would only be admissible in evidence if the prosecution could establish that it had been voluntary. An admission or confession is only voluntary if made in the exercise of a free choice about whether to speak or remain silent:
In R v Leckey (1943) CAR 128 the Court of Criminal Appeal said:
| “ | ... an innocent person might well, either from excessive caution or for some other reason, decline to say anything when charged and cautioned, and if it were possible to hold that out to a jury as a ground on which they might find a man guilty, it is obvious that innocent persons might be in great peril. | ” |
Therefore a caution of the form
was used. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act
1994 amended (some say abolished) the
or
or even (in circumstances where no adverse inference can be drawn from silence)
The caution in England and Wales does not explicitly require that a suspect affirms that he or she understands the caution, and many law enforcement officers do not ask this to prevent a recalcitrant suspect from delaying the investigation by falsely claiming not to understand the caution.
In France, any person brought in police custody (garde à vue) must be informed of the maximal duration of the custody, and a number of rights, in a language that this person understands. Among these rights are: the possibility of warning a relative or employer of the custody, that of asking to be examined by a physician, that of discussing the case with an attorney. Witnesses against whom there exist indictments (or who are cited as suspects) cannot be heard under oath, and thus do not risk prosecution for perjury. Such witnesses must be assisted by an attorney, and must be informed of these rights when heard by the judiciary. Suspects (any person against whom exist plausible causes of suspicion) must be informed of their right to remain silent, to make statements, or to answer questions. In all cases, an attorney can be designated by the head of the bar if necessary.
According to § 136 StPO (Strafprozessordnung = Criminal Procedure Code) a suspect, arrested or not, has to be informed before any interrogation:
It is not allowed to draw any inference from the complete silence of the accused in any stage of the criminal proceedings. However, it is allowed to draw conclusions if the accused remains silent only to certain questions about the same crime.
Foreign suspects have the following additional rights:
Within the European Union, a gradual process of harmonising the laws of individual countries has resulted in calls for a common letter of rights which would apply to all EU citizens. [1] The proposed common standard would protect:
These would be contained in a "letter of rights" which would be a printed document to be given to suspects after they are
detained and before interrogation[2]. The
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 | Dictionary. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition Copyright © 2007, 2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2007. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| US Supreme Court. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Law Dictionary. Law Dictionary. Copyright © 2003 by Barron's Educational Series, Inc. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| WordNet. WordNet 1.7.1 Copyright © 2001 by Princeton University. All rights reserved. Read more |
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| Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the GNU Free Documentation License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Miranda warning". Read more |
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