Incorporated: 1986
NAIC: 541613 Marketing Consulting Services; 541810 Advertising Agencies; 541820 Public Relations Agencies; 541830 Media Buying Agencies; 541840 Media Representatives; 541850 Display Advertising; 541890 Other Services Related to Advertising
SIC: 7311 Advertising Agencies; 8743 Public Relations Services; 7313 Radio, T.V. & Publisher Representatives; 7312 Outdoor Advertising Services
The largest advertising group in the world, Omnicom Group Inc. operates as the parent company for three separate, independent advertising networks: BBDO Worldwide, DDB Worldwide Communications Group, and TBWA Worldwide. Omnicom also operates numerous independent agencies, interactive marketing firms, and public relations companies around the globe to offer clients a wide range of marketing or communications services. Omnicom was created in 1986 as a holding company, but its history stretches much further back, to the influential roles each of its three major subsidiary agencies played in the growth and development of the U.S. advertising industry.
Origins of Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn
The agency known as BBDO was the product of a merger. In 1919 Bruce Barton, Roy Durstine, and Alex Osborn opened an advertising agency on West 45th Street in New York City. A few years later, as its business grew, Barton, Durstine & Osborn moved to the seventh floor of a building on 383 Madison Avenue. Three floors above BDO was another advertising agency, the George Batten Company. It seemed odd having competing firms sharing the same address, so a merger was proposed. On May 16, 1928, the George Batten Company joined with BDO to form Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn.
The most important man at the Batten agency was William Johns. Johns was more experienced and considerably older than Barton, Durstine, or Osborn. He was therefore made president of BBDO while the job of chairman went to Bruce Barton. Durstine was vice-president and general manager, and Osborn ran a separate BBDO office in his hometown of Buffalo, New York.
Bruce Barton was not a typical advertising man. He admitted on numerous occasions that he and the profession were not well suited. Barton was trained in theology and philosophy, attracted to politics, and committed to his personal writing projects. He wrote two extremely popular books, The Man Nobody Knew (a reappraisal of the life of Jesus Christ) and The Book Nobody Knew (a similar reappraisal of the Bible). Then, in the mid-1930s, Barton ran for Congress. He was elected and held office for two consecutive terms. In 1940 he ran for senator but lost by 400,000 votes. Barton was involved only in the creative aspects of BBDO's enterprises.
Durstine was the opposite of Barton. He was in love with the advertising business and what it could obtain for him. Like a number of other agency heads trying to make money during the Depression, Durstine's workaholism became self-destructive. He began drinking heavily, lost his wife and Long Island estate, and was forced to retire from BBDO in 1939.
The vacancy left by Durstine's departure caused some reshuffling of BBDO's management. William Johns was now too old to handle the day to day operations of the agency. He was "promoted" to chairman, but relieved of all administrative duties. Osborn and Barton were then required to run the agency themselves. The readjustment proved beneficial, for BBDO was in need of a new approach to its advertising. Osborn in particular was instrumental in reorganizing the agency and directing it toward the packaged goods advertising business. From the very beginning BBDO had primarily handled accounts for "institutional" clients such as Du Pont Chemical, Consolidated Edison, and Liberty Mutual. Although they were consistent customers, these companies neither needed nor wanted extensive advertising. If BBDO was going to grow rapidly enough to compete with large and established agencies, it would have to do advertising for packaged goods. Not only were new packaged goods constantly introduced to the market, but also those already on the shelves were always being improved to keep up with the competition. In this environment advertising flourished and it proved to be Osborn's most important insight.
Between 1939 and 1945 BBDO gained a number of important accounts: Lever Brothers, B.F. Goodrich, Chrysler (Dodge Division), MJB Coffee, and the 3M Company. Not even the upheaval of World War II kept BBDO from growing. Billings increased from $20 million at the height of the Depression to $50 million at the end of the war. In 1946 management changes again took place at BBDO. Ben Duffy, a veteran account man with over 15 years experience, was elected president; and Charlie Brower, who was to lead BBDO in the 1950s and 1960s, became executive vice-president in charge of copywriting. Duffy was an excellent salesman who could close a deal quickly. When Foote, Cone & Belding resigned the $11 million American Tobacco Company account in 1948, Duffy went directly to see American Tobacco's George Hill and secured the account after one meeting. In Duffy's ten years at the helm of BBDO, the agency increased its billings from $50 million to over $200 million.
Unfortunately for BBDO, Duffy was prone to ill health. In 1956 he suffered a stroke in Minneapolis while visiting the chairman of General Foods. He could not continue as the head of the agency, and Charlie Brower replaced him as president. Brower had a "no-nonsense" approach to advertising. He felt as president of BBDO he had to do four things: 1) add $1 million to the payroll; 2) hire talent from the outside; 3) fire many of his best friends; and 4) do away with company time clocks, which he thought made the agency a factory instead of a creative enterprise.
When Duffy retired there was confusion at BBDO. Until Charlie Brower established himself as president of the company no one had actually been in charge. Revlon, a $6 million customer, canceled its account as soon as it heard of Duffy's retirement. Other clients followed Revlon's example. The agency was headed toward disaster when Brower won the most lucrative account in its history, Pepsi Cola. Within a matter of weeks BBDO was financially healthy once again.
For BBDO the 1950s and early 1960s was a period marked by more than management readjustments and client shuffling. It was also a period in which BBDO became extensively involved in political advertising. Many agencies avoided politics altogether, but BBDO considered it as a normal part of its business. In 1948 BBDO ran its first ad campaign for a political candidate, Republican Thomas Dewey. Both candidate and agency lost the close election but, though Dewey left the political foreground, BBDO simply waited for the next election and a more marketable candidate. It found one in Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1952 BBDO signed the Republican National Committee as a regular account, and did the advertising in Eisenhower's successful bid for the presidency. The firm was hired again four years later to handle Eisenhower's re-election campaign. Unfortunately for the Republican Party, and Richard Nixon in particular, BBDO's success ended with Eisenhower.
Outside the political realm BBDO continued to expand and sign new clients. Not only did it increase the number of its institutional customers such as CBS Broadcasting (1959) and the SCM Corporation (1961), but it also won product-oriented accounts such as Tupperware (1959), Autolite (1961), McGregor Sporting Goods (1964), and Pepperidge Farms (1964). To match this domestic growth BBDO began to expand internationally in 1959, opening up offices in London, Paris, Milan, Frankfurt, and Vienna. In 1964 BBDO acquired the Atlanta-based firm of Burke Dowling Adams and with it the accounts of Delta Air Lines and the various governmental agencies of the state of Georgia. The Clyne Maxon firm of New York, with its $60 million in billings, was also merged with BBDO in 1966.
By the time of the worldwide recession during the 1970s, Charlie Brower had retired as president of BBDO. His successor was Tom Dillon, who had been the agency's treasurer since the late 1950s. Like most ad agencies BBDO suffered considerable losses in domestic billings during these years of economic stagnation. Yet because of the way the company was structured, BBDO was able to endure this period without undue strain. By opening offices in new places around the world, the agency entered advertising markets which had previously been closed to it. This international expansion served to offset losses incurred in the domestic market. In addition, BBDO began selling shares to the public in an effort to diffuse operating costs.
In 1976 Bruce Crawford was named president of BBDO. He had been head of the agency's foreign operations. During his eight-year tenure billings at BBDO tripled to $2.3 billion, and his cost management measures kept the company from misusing the benefits of this growth. As one analyst said of BBDO in 1981, "I've never seen a company so conscious of cost controls."
Crawford retired in 1985 and was succeeded by Allen Rosenshine. Under his tutelage BBDO continued to expand by acquiring subsidiaries, creating a worldwide network. Though BBDO traditionally allowed local entrepreneurs the freedom to run their own offices, this practice came to an end under Rosenshine. A number of foreign and international clients expressed concern over these "local" shops. They thought there was too little direction coming from top management, and became wary of giving business to BBDO subsidiaries. To remedy the problem Rosenshine attempted to tighten the connections within the BBDO network and provide more centralized leadership.
When the question of a merger with Needham Harper Worldwide and Doyle Dane Bernbach came up, many wondered why BBDO was interested particularly when the other two were experiencing financial difficulty. What BBDO had to gain, however, was consistent international growth, something the other two had mastered. A merger with Needham and Doyle Dane Bernbach would provide BBDO with greater international presence, particularly in France, Canada, and Great Britain. According to the policy planning heads at BBDO, this improvement of the agency's foreign business was necessary for BBDO to maintain itself as a formidable worldwide advertising competitor.
Origins of Doyle Dane Bernbach
When those within the advertising industry are asked which agency most exemplifies innovation and creativity, one firm above all others is mentioned, Doyle Dane Bernbach (DDB). In the world of advertising, where imitation is the rule, the Doyle Dane Bernbach agency has made itself an exception. Most ad firms follow familiar schools of thought, but not DDB. In the words of David Ogilvy, "They just sort of created an original school out of air."
In 1949 Ned Doyle and William Bernbach joined Maxwell Dane in the formation of a new advertising agency. Bernbach and Doyle had been trained at Grey Advertising, and Dane had owned his small ad company for a number of years. DDB's first year billings came to just $500,000, but something about its advertising style suggested it would soon be a major force in the industry. It hired the most creative people it could find, no matter where they came from. Among Max Dane, Ned Doyle, and Bill Bernbach there existed a well-defined division of labor. Doyle was the account executive in charge of winning and retaining clients; Dane took care of administration and financial matters; and Bernbach handled the creative concerns. Rarely did they cross into each other's designated spheres.
What made the firm unique in the ad industry was Bill Bernbach and his preoccupation with the "road not taken." His ideas were fresh, striking, and more often than not, couched in subtle humor. He sympathized with the public at large, which found most advertisements boring. His quest was to make ad campaigns exciting and fun while still focusing on the product's attributes. For him, advertising was an art, and as an artist he was primarily concerned with imagery, impression, and point of view.
Bernbach was also a good teacher. He was patient, precise but gentle in his criticisms, and had the ability to nurture natural ability. His "students" formed the firm's Creative Team: a small group of copywriters, artists, art directors, and photographers who produced the agency's campaigns. Bernbach led the group but not in an authoritarian manner. It was what he called a "horizontal hierarchy."
In the 1950s DDB displayed its style of advertising in four notable campaigns for four nearly unknown companies: Polaroid Cameras, Levy Bakery Goods, Ohrbach's Department Store, and El Al Israel Air Lines. These companies, like DDB, were attempting to establish themselves in their respective markets. Polaroid was overshadowed by Kodak, Ohrbach's by Macy's, and few people had ever heard of Levy's Bread or El Al Air. To compensate for this lack of public recognition, the agency created strikingly different ads featuring everything from a cat dressed in a woman's hat to an American Indian claiming "you don't have to be Jewish to enjoy Levy's real Jewish rye." Not only did the campaigns sell large quantities of cameras, clothes, bread, and airline tickets, they sold DDB advertising as well. In 1954 the Agency's billings were $8 million; by 1959 that figure had increased to $27.5 million.
In the early 1960s the agency won two new accounts that enhanced its reputation: Avis Car Rental Service and Volkswagen. In the rent-a-car business Hertz held the dominant market share. Far behind in second place, Avis wanted to increase its own market share. Most advertising portrayed a client in as favorable and strong a position as possible. DDB, however, disregarded this tradition; its campaign stressed Avis's weak position vis-a-vis Hertz. "We're number two," said the ads, "We try harder. We have to." This strategy worked. In two years Avis increased its market share by over 25 percent.
The Volkswagen advertising campaign was a similar story. These small German cars were not what the American consumer wanted, or so it appeared. Again, DDB converted a liability into a saleable asset. Hoping people had tired of the large and overly embellished American-made cars of the 1950s, the ad simply said: "Think small." The art of the ads was minimalist, usually showing a small picture of the car against a blank white backdrop. The text was equally odd. The short, simple copy was blocked in paragraphs that looked, in the words of copywriter Helmut Krone, "Gertrude Steiny." Not only did Americans purchase these "ugly" Volkswagens by the thousands, but the car became a symbol for an entire nonconformist generation.
Following these successes the agency won accounts from American Airlines, Seagram, International Silver, Heinz Ketchup, Sony, Uniroyal, Gillette, Bristol-Myers, and Mobil Oil. The 1960s were the golden age of advertising and DDB was at its forefront. As the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, the industry witnessed a return to conventional advertising techniques. This trend and the recession spelled trouble for the company. In 1970 DDB lost the $20 million Alka-Seltzer account, even though the "that's a spicy meat-ball" commercial was extremely popular and a favorite of the critics. Other agency clients quickly followed Alka-Seltzer's lead: Lever Brothers, Whirlpool, Sara Lee, Quaker Oats, Cracker Jack, Uniroyal, and Life Cereal canceled their accounts.
Fortunately for the agency, its growth during the 1960s provided it with enough revenue to absorb these losses, at least in the short run. Nonetheless, a company reorganization and reorientation was in order. In 1974 Neil Austrian joined the company as executive vice-president. He gradually transformed the company into a more orderly advertising network. Subsidiaries were acquired to strengthen DDB's worldwide presence and offer more comprehensive client services. In 1975 the agency's billings rose for the first time in the new decade, and this trend continued for seven years.
In October 1982, William Bernbach died of leukemia. His absence left a void at the agency. This raised a difficult question: could DDB continue without Bill Bernbach?
The question haunted the firm and earnings fell 30 percent during the year. This loss was compounded in the next two years by the resignation of important accounts. American Airlines canceled its account in 1983, its spot temporarily filled by Pan Am, which then left the agency itself. In 1984 Polaroid announced it would be taking its business elsewhere. The agency was particularly shocked by this resignation. Its commercials had helped make Polaroid the world's top-selling camera.
In the first half of 1986 Doyle Dane Bernbach was forced to lay off 24 staff members; it had lost almost $113 million in net earnings. The merger with BBDO and Needham Harper Worldwide represented a necessary business decision. The security afforded by the Omnicom umbrella would relieve the agency of its financial difficulties, and allow it to concentrate on what it did best, innovative advertising.
Origins of Needham Harper Worldwide
In 1924 Maurice Needham opened up his own advertising agency in Illinois. It was named The Maurice H. Needham Company. This title was changed in 1929 to Needham, Louis & Brorby, Inc. The firm then merged with Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. in 1964 to become Needham, Harper & Steers. In 1984 the company name was again changed, this time to Needham Harper Worldwide.
As a Chicago-based agency, it traditionally avoided Madison Avenue-type advertising and was generally considered to have a stronger presence in the Midwest than the East. Until becoming part of Omnicom, Needham & Harper had not ranked among the largest worldwide agencies. Its size, however, had contributed to its success as smaller companies, feeling neglected and disrespected by large advertising agencies, often turned to Needham &
Harper. These clients were the foundation of the firm's business.
In addition to that of Maurice Needham, the other name associated with the agency was Paul Harper. He came to the company in 1945 when it was Needham, Louis & Brorby. Harper had been educated at Yale and spent four years in the Marine Corps. After his discharge, he walked into Needham's Chicago office looking for employment. He had no resume, no writing experience, and no civilian clothes. Despite his scant qualifications Needham gave him a job as a copywriter, and Harper had soon made a name for himself, primarily in broadcast advertising. Harper gradually moved from copywriter to manager. In 1964 he became president of the company and supervised the acquisition by Needham of Doherty, Clifford, Steers and Shenfield in 1965. At this time the name of the agency was changed to Needham, Harper & Steers. In 1967 he became chairman and chief executive of the agency, and retained this position until his retirement in 1984.
During the late 1950s and 1960s when companies were substantially increasing their expenditures on advertising, Needham, Harper & Steers, though still only a mid-sized agency, grew along with the industry. It concentrated on smaller accounts but also retained a number of large Midwest clients, such as the Household Finance Corporation and the Oklahoma Oil Company.
In 1972 the firm followed the industry trend of publicly trading its shares. Unlike the larger agencies such as Ogilvy & Mather and Interpublic, Needham, Harper & Steers was unsuccessful in drawing a strong investment interest. Four years after going public Needham & Harper "went private" again. Although it serviced many small and mid-size accounts, Needham & Harper was primarily known for its "blue chip" clients. It won Xerox in 1968, McDonald's in 1970, Honda in 1977, and Sears in 1982. The agency produced the famous "Brother Dominic" commercials for Xerox, and the "you deserve a break today" slogan for McDonald's. Unfortunately for the agency, in 1984 McDonald's took its domestic business away from Needham and turned it over to Leo Burnett. The bad news continued in 1986, when Needham lost the $40 million Xerox account.
Many believed a merger with BBDO and Doyle Dane Bernbach would alter the "personality" of Needham. Even if the three agencies continued to operate as separate divisions of Omnicom, there was more to the merger than a simple name change. Some clients were not happy with the prospect of sharing Needham with competitors and the old conflict of interest problem became particularly pronounced when Campbell's Soup, a Needham client, would not stay with Omnicom if Heinz, a DDB client, remained. Similar difficulties arose between Stroh's and Busch beer, and Honda and Volkswagen automobiles.
The most important question among Needham customers was whether they would continue to receive the same attention to which they had been accustomed. Keith Reinhard, chairman and CEO of Needham Harper Worldwide, maintained the merger with Omnicom would help Needham attract and retain large clients, but claimed the agency would not treat its smaller customers any differently than it had in the past. Reinhard also hoped Omnicom would restore Needham's presence in the New York advertising market, something it had lacked since Xerox withdrew its account.
The Formation of Omnicom: 1986
When the final documents were signed and Omnicom was formally created, the task of making sense and profits out of the amalgamation fell to BBDO head Allen Rosenshine. As some had anticipated, the process of combining three competing agencies under one umbrella corporation was a tiresome and fitful chore, sparking further speculation about the prudence of the merger in the first place. Omnicom limped from the starting block. More than $40 million was spent on merger and restructuring-related costs, leaving the company essentially profitless for its first year. Several clients were wholly opposed to the merger, and expressed their displeasure by taking their business elsewhere. One such client was RJR Nabisco, whose chairman stated, "As a client, I see disruption but little value. With very few exceptions, the wave of mergers has benefited the shareholders and managers of the agencies."
By the time the dust had settled after the merger, the three Omnicom agencies lost $184 million in billings directly attributable to the act of the merger itself. The assimilation process did not get any easier after the end of 1986. When Omnicom's 1987 financial totals were announced, they were depressingly low. For the year, the company earned only $32 million from commissions and fees of $785 million, or 4.1 percent in what traditionally was a double-digit margin business. The year did have its highlights, however, including the gain of several large accounts. Omnicom agencies landed a U.S. Navy account, a large portion of new Pepsi business, including Slice soft drinks and Pizza Hut, and the account for NEC Home Electronics. In all, Omnicom registered $280 million in new business during 1987, but this was not enough to offset other difficulties.
Bruce Crawford, who had departed BBDO in 1985, returned to the advertising world and signed on as Omnicom's chief executive officer. He took the helm in early 1989 and immediately began paring away superfluous managerial layers and divesting businesses. "With every merger," Crawford announced, "everybody talks about all these wonderful economies of scale, but it usually amounts to small potatoes. I believe the idea is to build businesses, not worry about the economies of scale to be realized by the joint buying of erasers. My belief is that the management structure is a little too complicated. I believe it is necessary to keep it simple, fast, and that corporate structure and overhead need to be minimized."
Omnicom in the 1990s
Crawford made good on his words, divesting a number of Omnicom businesses while shuttering others. He developed a more concentrated presence in Britain and Europe, where Omnicom lagged behind other U.S.-based, international advertising agencies. By the beginning of the 1990s Crawford's strategy was beginning to work wonders, and Omnicom, after a torpid start, was demonstrating the vitality its creators had envisioned prior to the merger. Despite the effects of a stifling economic recession during the early part of the decade, Omnicom registered robust financial gains. In 1991 revenues increased to $1.2 billion and profits grew consistently. This growth trend continued after the recession, when the company increased revenues to $2.3 billion in 1995.
By mid-decade, any lingering doubt about the prudence of the merger had been thoroughly washed away. Omnicom held sway as a powerful and creative force, buying a number of firms both large and small to integrate into its network. In 1996 Omnicom bought Ketchum Communications, which had three strong business segments: traditional advertising, telephone directory advertising, and public relations. Rather than integrate Ketchum into TBWA, DDB Needham, or BBDO, its three units were divided among the subsidiaries. The company finished 1996 with robust sales of $2.64 billion and net income of $176.3 million. In January 1997 Crawford stepped down as chief executive but remained chairman. He was succeeded as CEO by Omnicom's president, John D. Wren, who would continue Crawford's legacy of success, growth, and creativity in Omnicom's second decade of business.
Wren had barely added the title of chief executive when Omnicom moved decisively into high-tech interactive marketing. Razorfish, Think New Ideas, Agency.com Ltd., Red Sky Interactive, Organic Online, Eagle Interactive, and Interactive Solutions all became part of Omnicom's Diversified Agency Services unit. In addition, Gaskell Associates, Fleishman-Hillard, and Meridian Technology Marketing were bought within a few months. Throughout the acquisition spree Omnicom's three major advertising units earned numerous awards and recognition, but in 1997 it was Omnicom's turn when it was selected as Fortune magazine's most respected advertising group. More good news was DDB Needham's winning of the coveted McDonald's account in 1997, which it had lost more than a decade earlier.
Omnicom continued to buy firms in line with its expansion plans in 1998, including London's GGT Group. GGT had been wooed by rival WPP Group, but chose Omnicom. The acquisition helped topple WPP Group from its perch as the world's largest advertising organization as ranked by Advertising Age (April 27, 1998). Omnicom's revenues climbed to just under $4.2 billion for 1997 with WPP trailing at $3.7 billion and Interpublic Group coming in at $3.4 billion. New York City, home to both Omnicom and Interpublic, remained the world's advertising hub.
Omnicom scored another coup in 1998 with its majority stake in I&S Corporation, one of Japan's top ten advertising agencies. Omnicom was the first Western firm to invest in Japan's top agencies, and its purchase of I&S Corporation, ranked eighth, opened the door for further opportunities in Asia. To maintain its edge in the global advertising market and retain its number one ranking ahead of WPP Group, Interpublic Group, and Publicis, Omnicom needed to offer an ever wider array of services to its clients, to be a "full-service" provider. To this end, Wren continued to consolidate some operations while expanding others. In 1999 Omnicom jumped into the burgeoning healthcare marketing field with the creation of Accel Healthcare Communications, part of its Diversified Agency Services division. Omnicom also bought half of the Alberta, Canada-based Critical Mass, all of the Irving, Texas-based M/A/R/C agency, the remaining interest in the United Kingdom's Abbot Mead Vickers for $600 million and merged it into BBDO, while DDB Needham reorganized and christened itself DDB Worldwide Communications Group.
A New Era: 2000s
As the new century took hold, Omnicom lost its rank as the world's largest advertising group in revenues when WPP Group earned the top spot after its acquisition of the mighty Young & Rubicam agency. WPP Group's revenues spiked to over $7.9 billion for 2000, topping Omnicom's $6.9 billion. To its credit, Omnicom had been no slouch in the acquisitions department, buying majority stakes or all of 19 firms during the year. In addition, while WPP Group may have ended its reign, albeit temporarily, Omnicom had the last laugh earning most honors at the International Advertising Festival in Cannes for the third year in a row, and winning the prestigious DaimlerChysler account.
In the fall of 2001 Omnicom bought the Santa Monica-based David Brown Entertainment, a Hollywood product-placement firm, right before the terrorist attacks of September 11. While the U.S. economy, including advertising, went into a tailspin after the attacks, Omnicom weathered the storm. Wren did not slow down but aggressively pursued such goals as further immersion in Hollywood and its entertainment marketing services, as Omnicom's ad networks continued to create popular, award-winning ads. In the wake of the Enron mess and Arthur Anderson's troubles, Omnicom's board of directors underwent a major shakeup as seven members were ousted. Omnicom termed the shift as better corporate governance, but an insider cried foul calling it a "board clearance."
Despite a few lawsuits and a temporary stock tumble, Omnicom remained in good shape when its rivals were restructuring and laying off employees. Omnicom finished 2002 with revenues of $7.5 billion and net income of $643.5 million for the year.
In the mid-2000s Omnicom carried on with business as usual, acquiring companies with potential and churning out original, creative advertising. The company had regained its status as the world's largest advertising group, ahead of rivals WPP Group (second), Interpublic gaining ground at third, and Publicis S.A. at fourth. Each conglomerate housed some of the best and brightest advertising agencies, but had branched out to include a myriad of related communication services. Though Interpublic was Omnicom's only major U.S.-based rival, both continually sought international clients closer to the Paris, France-based Publicis and London's WPP Group. Revenues for Omnicom reached a remarkable $9.7 billion for 2004 and net income climbed to an all-time high of $723.5 million.
In 2005 Omnicom continued to best its competitors by gaining blue-chip accounts including Disney, Bank of America, and 7-Eleven stores. The sky truly seemed the limit for this "full-service" marketing and communications behemoth.
Principal Competitors
Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.; Publicis Groupe S.A.; WPP Group Plc.
Further Reading
Alden, Robert, "Bernbach's Advertising: A Formula or Delicate Art?," New York Times, May 7, 1961.
Baar, Aaron, "Bright Beginnings," ADWEEK, January 9, 2006, p. 4.
Bidlake, Suzanne, "Omnicom Wants All of UK's Abbot Mead Vickers," Advertising Age, November 30, 1998, p. 2.
Comiteau, Jennifer, "Omnicom Continues to Build Empire," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, December 9, 1996, p. 5.
"An Empire of Happy Fiefdoms," Business Week, April 3, 2000, p. 68.
Endicott, Craig, "Omnicom Storms Past WPP," Advertising Age, April 27, 1998, p. S1.
Fahey, Allison, "True Snit," ADWEEK Southwest, November 27, 2000, p. 15.
Feuer, Jack, "Omnicom and IPG: A Continental Divide," ADWEEK, May 26, 2003, p. 18.
Garcia, Shelly, "Ketchum Brings Diversified Assets to Omnicom," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, January 15, 1996, p. 9.
Gleason, Mark, "Big Bang of '86 Is Still Shaping the Ad World," Advertising Age, April 22, 1996, p. 3.
Irwin, Tanya, "Maximum Overdrive," ADWEEK New England Edition, November 13, 2000, p. 14.
Kilburn, David, "Getting a Foot in the Door," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, June 29, 1998, p. 12.
Kindel, Stephen, "It Looked Good on Paper," Financial World, March 8, 1988, p. 36.
MacDougall, A. Kent, "Doyle Dane Bernbach: Ad Alley Upstart," Wall Street Journal, August 1965.
McCarthy, Michael, "Omnicom-Fleishman Deal Precursor to Mega PR Unit," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, April 7, 1997, p. 2.
McCormack, Kevin, "Crawford Managing Omnicom Like the Met: Playing a Leaner Tune," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, January 15, 1990, p. 1.
Petrecca, Laura, "Omnicom Group Gains Critical Mass," Advertising Age, October 18, 1999, p. 1.
------, "Omnicom Stalks More Acquisitions," Advertising Age, February 2, 1998, p. 2.
Rich, Laura, "Mucho Communicado," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, October 20, 1997, p. 64.
------, "Omnicom Grows Organically," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, February 10, 1997, p. 6.
------, "The Omnicom Shopping Spree: How Wren and Co. Picked Their Targets," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, October 14, 1996, p. 32.
Santoli, Michael, "Too Much Hype? Ad Giant Omnicom Is a Good Company with Very Pricey Stock," Barron's, June 14, 1999, p. 19.
Sharkey, Betsy, "Omnicom's Operatics," ADWEEK Eastern Edition, April 20, 1992, p. 20.
Thomaselli, Rich, "Shakeup at Omnicom," Advertising Age, April 15, 2002, p. 1.
Wood, James P., The Story of Advertising, New York: Ronald Press, 1958.
— Updated by Jeffrey L. Covell, Nelson Rhodes
