Crime is any activity for which the law prescribes punishment, such as a monetary fine or a term of imprisonment. Many other activities are prohibited by law in a different way. For example, businesses are subject to a variety of regulations and may be fined or otherwise disciplined for violations. More generally, anyone who negligently harms a neighbor or breaches a contract violates the law and may be held to pay damages if the victim files a lawsuit. Those violations are said to be "civil" in nature in order to distinguish them from "criminal" infractions. A person who commits a crime may be charged by a public prosecutor regardless of whether any individual victim complains. Conceptually, the public at large is the victim of criminal lawbreaking.
Crimes are specified by statutes that are enacted by Congress or by state and local legislative bodies. Legislatures often change statutes according to contemporaneous attitudes about the activities that should be punished as criminal. Conduct that was criminal in one era may not be so in the next. The classic example is the Volstead Act, the short-lived federal statute in 1919 that made it a federal offense to sell or transport intoxicating liquor.
The Colonial Era
The idea that criminal law is a matter of legislative policy did not always prevail. The colonists understood deviant behavior to be a feature of divine order and acted in light of their religious beliefs. They expected individuals to misbehave and entertained no thought that they could or should determine for themselves what should be criminal and punish only that behavior. The colonists drew no clear distinction between crime and sin, and when they adopted criminal statutes they typically included religious offenses like blasphemy and witchcraft. They found it difficult to distinguish, in turn, between serious offenses and minor transgressions. All were of a piece; all were sins against God. By some accounts the colonists' sense of the unity of all crime led them to prescribe the same harsh punishments for widely divergent activities. Some offenders were fined, but many were put to death—or, if not hanged, were tortured, banished, or both. The point was neither to give offenders what they deserved nor to achieve some utilitarian objective. It was merely to vindicate God's will.
Colonial views and practices regarding crime and slavery were appalling by twenty-first-century standards. Slaveholders were permitted to whip and mutilate slaves as they saw fit, without concern that abuses would be regarded as criminal. By contrast, slaves themselves were routinely charged with crimes. Often they were punished summarily by their masters. In many instances slaves accused of crimes were brought before local boards composed of magistrates and slaveholders. The slaveholders participated to ensure that corporal punishments were not so harsh as to permanently damage their property. When states hanged slaves as punishment for crime, the slave owners were typically entitled to compensation for the loss of their assets.
The Nineteenth Century
American thinking about crime changed dramatically after the Revolution. Southern states perpetuated the harsh treatment of slaves. But apart from slavery, most states adopted new statutes specifying as criminal various activities that are still considered crimes. For example, nineteenth-century criminal statutes condemned homicide, assault, robbery, and other offenses against the person. They also identified a wide variety of property crimes such as larceny, embezzlement, and receiving stolen goods. The states did not regulate commercial affairs in the pervasive manner that later became common. But when they did regulate business, they often did it by making objectionable practices criminal. Individual states typically focused on the industries that were most important to their economies. For example, Maryland and Virginia used criminal law to regulate the production and sale of tobacco. Mississippi did the same with respect to cotton and the states in New England with respect to shellfish. Many states also used criminal sanctions to control hunting, to enforce public health regulations, and, in the last years of the nineteenth century, to limit monopoly power in the marketplace.
The growing mobility of Americans made it possible for itinerant rascals to cheat unsuspecting dupes by tricking them into surrendering cash. Schemes of that kind typically entailed gaining the victim's trust—hence the familiar term "confidence man." In some celebrated cases of the period swindlers from the lower classes represented themselves to be gentlemen and ran up extraordinary bills before they absconded. Many states responded by enacting new criminal statutes condemning rackets by which "con men" obtained money by false pretenses.
States in the nineteenth century formally recognized numerous "morals" offenses. They routinely condemned any kind of sexual activity outside the traditional monogamous, heterosexual marriage—namely, fornication, adultery, cohabitation without marriage, incest, prostitution, and bigamy. They also barred forms of sexual pleasure thought to be immoral. The "unspeakable crime against nature" (sodomy) was the chief illustration. Apart from sexual offenses, most states made gambling a crime, and some flatly barred the manufacture and sale of liquor. In the latter half of the century many states also banned obscenity (variously defined) as yet another vice threatening moral decay. Evidence regarding actual prosecutions for morals offenses is incomplete. By most accounts, however, prosecutions were (or at least became) sporadic, and the punishments upon conviction were relatively modest by comparison to the penalties meted out in the colonial period.
The criminal regulation of abortion followed its own special path. Abortion was long formally condemned as criminal. Yet abortions performed prior to quickening (when fetal motion is felt) were typically treated as misdemeanors. Moreover, the evidence suggests that anti-abortion statutes often were not enforced.
The Development of Federal Criminal Statutes
Congress established very few federal crimes prior to the modern era. One reason was a perceived lack of authority to do so. The United States Constitution did not give the federal government power to create criminal law simply as a matter of legislative judgment. State legislatures had that authority, but not Congress. If Congress enacted a criminal statute, it had to be in service of some peculiarly federal interest.
Famous early criminal statutes were easy enough to justify. The Crimes Act of 1790 made it a federal crime to commit murder, but only if the offense occurred at a site under the control of federal authorities. Similarly, the Post Office Act of 1872 made it a federal criminal offense to use the federal postal service to deliver objectionable materials (like lottery tickets or obscene literature).
In time, Congress enacted federal criminal statutes under its authority to regulate commerce among the states. That was the theory underlying the Sherman Anti-trust Act of 1890 and the majority of federal criminal laws enacted in the twentieth century. The commercial regulatory basis of federal criminal jurisdiction was not disingenuous. As the interstate character of business activity grew, Congress's authority to use criminal law to enforce federal regulation of that activity grew in direct proportion. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exemplified the kind of national criminal law needed to police commercial activities that no single state could manage. In addition, however, Congress exploited its authority to control the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in order to advance noneconomic objectives. The chief examples were the Mann Act in 1910, which made it a federal crime to transport a woman across a state boundary for the purpose of prostitution, and the Dyer Act in 1919, which made it a federal offense to drive or deliver a stolen car across state lines. Those statutes engaged the federal government in policing activities that previously had been left to the states.
Crime Rates in the Twentieth Century
By common account, the rate of violent crime in the United States increased significantly during the early part of the twentieth century. Violent offenses include murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, robbery, forcible rape, and aggravated assault. Reliable data are unavailable for most offenses during those years, but homicides (for which data were kept) rose dramatically. The reasons for the upsurge are elusive. The immediate spur may have been the conclusion of World War I. Soldiers returning from Europe often had difficulty finding work and may have become frustrated and, in some instances, violent. Prohibition offered organized crime the opportunity to profit from distributing illicit liquor. Crime "families" contributed to violence in major cities, particularly New York and Chicago. The exigencies of the Great Depression may have driven impoverished people to property crimes ending in violence. As the depression drew to a close, by contrast, the rate of violent crime leveled off and remained comparatively stable for roughly the next twenty years, albeit with shifts downward during the three wartime periods of World War I, World War II, and Vietnam and upward again when each group of troops came home.
There was, however, another significant increase in the rate of violent crime during the 1960s and 1970s. The homicide rate reached an all-time high in 1980, when there were more than ten homicidal deaths per 100,000 residents. Again, the underlying reasons for the increase are debatable. Certainly the acceleration of violence tracked the sharp increase in the number of young people. In the fifteen-year period from 1960 to 1975, the population of men and women aged from fourteen to twenty-four increased by 63 percent, more than six times the rate of all other age groups. That cohort of young people, known as the baby boom, had been born immediately following World War II, the sons and daughters of soldiers eager to resume their lives. In 1960 persons aged from fourteen to twenty-four accounted for 69 percent of all arrests for serious crimes. Many youths may have found it difficult to adjust to life as adults, especially if their economic prospects were bleak. Their frustrations may have played out in rebellious activities that ultimately led to violence.
In the mid-1980s the rate of violent offenses began to decline just as the baby boom generation passed beyond its most crime-prone years. The rate of violent offenses by teenagers continued to rise for some time before dropping; the analog rate for persons in their twenties fell more steadily. In 1985 the homicide rate diminished to just under eight deaths per 100,000 residents. That rate rose for a few years, reaching more than nine per 100,000 in 1991. Thereafter, however, the homicide rate steadily dropped to a low of less than seven per 100,000 in 1998. The rate of robberies followed roughly the same pattern.
Violent crime in the United States is necessarily associated with firearms (especially handguns) for the obvious reason that firearms are often the instruments by which violent offenses are committed. The data reveal, moreover, that the use of firearms varies according to offender characteristics. After 1985, when the homicide rate for adult offenders declined, the rate at which adults employed handguns to kill dropped proportionately. During the same period, when the homicide rate for young offenders initially increased and then declined, the rate at which young people used handguns to kill increased dramatically. In 1993, 90 percent of the homicides committed by offenders under twenty-five years of age involved firearms. The rate of gun violence was particularly pronounced among young male African Americans in depressed urban areas. The rate of firearm homicides in that group was twenty-one times higher than the rate for the American population as a whole. After 1993 the rate of firearm violence among all offender groups fell along with the general decline in the rate of violent crime.
Even considering the diminution at the end of the twentieth century, the incidence of violent crime is still much higher in the United States than in any comparable developed nation. The rate of deaths or serious bodily injury from personal attacks is four to eighteen times higher in this country than in the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, or Japan. The rate of non-violent crime in the United States has always been high, but not markedly higher than in comparable nations. In the 1990s, for example, the general crime rate in this country was higher than in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, but not grossly higher than in Italy and about the same as the general crime rate in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.
Changes in Criminal Law Policy
By most accounts, the increase in the rate of violent crime that occurred in the 1960s deeply affected American attitudes about crime in general. Americans came to regard crime as an extremely serious problem meriting extraordinary efforts at control. That public sentiment persisted through the end of the twentieth century. According to a poll taken in 1994, when the rates of both violent and nonviolent crime had been declining for nearly a decade, more than 40 percent of Americans nonetheless viewed crime as the nation's most pressing social problem. Concomitantly, Americans came to regard criminal sanctions as the appropriate means by which to address an expanding variety of activities thought to threaten society. Many academicians contended that actual experience did not warrant the public insistence on anticrime measures, much less the wider use of criminal sanctions as a tool of social control. By some accounts, citizens who were concerned that they might become victims of violent assaults failed to distinguish between the violence they feared and other forms of criminal behavior. Accordingly, they supported a sweeping expansion of criminal law and its enforcement that bore fundamental implications for the prevailing social order.
Five developments illustrate the changes that have occurred in modern American criminal law policy: the adoption of lengthy terms of imprisonment as a routine punishment for all serious criminal offenses; the prosecution of juveniles as though they were adults; the expansion of the federal government's role in the making and enforcement of criminal law; the accelerating use of criminal law to regulate corporate behavior; and the escalating use of criminal law to address the social problems associated with drugs.
Longer sentences. Beginning in the 1980s, most states enacted arrangements under which persons convicted of crimes received much longer terms of imprisonment than had previously been prescribed. The shift in policy was deliberate and explicit. Legislatures largely abandoned the rehabilitative ideal that had dominated penal policy for more than a century and, in its place, recognized retribution and incapacitation as the primary purposes of punishment. Today convicts are chiefly punished with lengthy prison terms on the theory that they deserve it and because, during the period in which they are incarcerated, they are unable to commit more crimes. The terms of incarceration are extremely long. Life sentences have become common and terms of twenty or thirty years routine. Moreover, multiple-offender sentencing schemes often double or triple the sentences for offenders found guilty of more than one violation. So-called "three strikes and you're out" laws are not typically limited to violent offenders; anyone who commits three offenses of any kind may be sentenced to an extraordinarily long period behind bars.
Long terms of incarceration have significant effects throughout the system of American law. State courts send far more convicts to state prisons than existing institutions can accommodate. The crowding that ensues makes prison life, already harsh, more oppressive. Even before the flood of new prisoners in the 1980s, federal courts had held the poor conditions found in many state prisons to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution. Those courts ordered prison officials to make numerous adjustments and to eliminate crowding. With the subsequent flow of prisoners increasing so dramatically, most states have responded by constructing more penal facilities. New prisons, in turn, are little more than human warehouses confining prisoners for ever increasing periods of time at the least possible cost.
Treating juveniles as adults. The prosecution of juveniles as adults began in earnest in the 1990s. Previously, under juvenile justice codes adopted earlier in the twentieth century, persons under a certain age (typically eighteen) were formally regarded as unable to commit a serious criminal offense. They might engage in conduct that would be criminal if committed by an adult, but because of their immaturity (and thus their diminished culpability) they were treated differently. Young people were typically held to appear before special juvenile courts, which adjudicated them to be delinquent and, on that basis, specified remedial programs thought to be appropriate. In some instances, juveniles were sent to reformatories for vocational training; more often, they were channeled into some form of community supervision and counseling. In the 1990s, however, the extreme violence of which juveniles proved to be capable prompted many states to subject at least some of them to ordinary criminal charges, trial in ordinary criminal courts, and, if convicted, punishment of the ordinary (enhanced) kind.
The treatment of juveniles as adults also has important effects on the system as a whole. Tens of thousands of teenagers have received lengthy sentences, ostensibly to be served in one of the prisons designed to confine adults. Most penal authorities recognize that young offenders cannot easily be mixed with older convicts and have established special units for teenagers within larger institutions. Yet the length of the sentences imposed on young prisoners guarantees that they will eventually be assimilated into the adult prisoner population.
Expansion of the federal role. The idea that crime is a serious problem has led to the (quite different) idea that it is a national problem as well. Congress has responded by extending federal criminal jurisdiction on a host of fronts. In most instances Congress continues to base federal criminal statutes on its authority to regulate commerce among the states. Yet modern enactments dramatically extend that authority to activities with little demonstrable connection to interstate commerce. Toward the end of the twentieth century Congress enacted federal criminal legislation in virtually every session. Examples include the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1968 and 1988, the Crime Control Act of 1990, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Those statutes did not consolidate federal crimes in a coherent code but rather added numerous freestanding offenses to the sprawling body of federal law. By the year 2000 there were more than three thousand separate federal offenses. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, not only were more activities considered federal crimes than ever, but those crimes, like their state counterparts, typically carried extremely long prison sentences as well.
The federalization of American criminal law has significance for a variety of other governmental agencies and functions. Certainly the growth of federal crimes demands a consequent growth in federal law enforcement agencies and personnel: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the United States Marshal Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and related organizations. For the first time in its history, the United States has commissioned a powerful central police force. The introduction of federal criminal law into spheres of local affairs also creates conflicts with state authorities. In many instances, suspects can be charged with violating a federal criminal statute, a similar state statute, or both. That overlap demands cooperation between federal and state law enforcement officials that was unnecessary before the 1990s. Federal criminal cases dominate the dockets of federal trial courts, forcing other judicial business to be postponed. The courts, in turn, sentence large numbers of convicts to lengthy terms of imprisonment at federal penal facilities that have no room for them. Thus the federal government, like many states, has launched a major prison-building campaign. Where once the Federal Bureau of Prisons operated only a few federal prisons like Leavenworth and Alcatraz, in 2002 the Bureau controlled 102 institutions.
Regulating corporate behavior. The use of criminal law as a means of regulating corporate behavior is a twentieth-century innovation. So-called white-collar crime, committed by comparatively wealthy people holding positions of trust, has substantial historical footing in American law. In many cases individual perpetrators commit familiar offenses for their own benefit: offenses like embezzlement, tax evasion, and fraud. In other cases, however, corporate officers and employees implicate their companies in criminal offenses like restraints of trade, unlawful manipulations of stocks and bonds, and violations of environmental protection statutes. Corporate crime thrives in the complexities of the modern technological economy and is characteristically difficult to detect and prosecute. The demand for effective enforcement has prompted the federal government to bring its considerable resources to bear on the problem. Congress has enacted a variety of statutes to contend with white-collar and corporate crime, most prominently the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970.
Individuals convicted of white-collar offenses are sentenced to some form of incarceration at about the same rate that street criminals are sentenced to prison. However, the terms for white-collar criminals are substantially shorter, measured in months rather than years. Of course, corporations cannot be given prison sentences for their crimes (though the individuals who act for corporations certainly can be). Accordingly, corporations are typically fined or subjected to some other form of economic penalty. Some academics contend that it is a mistake to subject corporations to criminal liability at all, because "civil" fines can achieve the same objective: the creation of economic disincentives to behave in a socially disadvantageous way.
Addressing drug problems. The policy of making it a crime to possess, manufacture, or sell hallucinogenic and addictive drugs has contributed significantly to the developing nature of American criminal law. By some accounts the criminalization of drugs increases the price that drug dealers can charge for their product and thus increases the resulting profits. Those high profits, in turn, perversely foster the very behavior that antidrug laws are meant to discourage. Certainly drug dealing has developed into a massive industry, stretching from source points both in this country and in foreign nations (principally South American states) through manufacturing facilities to "retail" sales on the streets. One-third of all state criminal prosecutions are for drug-related offenses, and one-fourth of the inmates serving terms in state prisons are there for possessing or selling drugs. A disproportionate number of those prisoners are young African Americans from inner-city areas.
The criminalization of drugs is also intimately linked with the expanding role of the federal government in crime control. Early in the twentieth century Congress enacted numerous federal criminal statutes regarding drugs, among them the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act of 1914, the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, and the Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942. Subsequently, the growth of the drug industry, with its many international connections, prompted Congress to expand the federal "war on drugs" to much larger dimensions. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 organized federal criminal drug laws, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established mandatory minimum prison sentences for many violators. Between 1980 and 1990, when the general rate of criminal prosecutions in the federal courts rose by 69 percent, the rate of federal prosecutions for drug offenses rose by 300 percent. Drug cases in 2000 accounted for nearly half the criminal trials in federal court. The federal government's commitment to antidrug laws generated a corresponding expansion in the federal bureaucracy. The DEA was established in 1973 to take primary responsibility for federal enforcement efforts. Not only the DEA and the FBI but many other agencies (including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the navy, and the Coast Guard) are also engaged in interdicting the drug trade in this country, in foreign nations, and on the high seas.
All these features of modern criminal law have evoked intense controversy. With the exception of the prosecution of corporate crime, the practical consequence of each development has been the long-term imprisonment of a large and increasing population of Americans, a disproportionate number of whom are young, poor people of color. There is no discounting the profound social (and moral) implications of a system that incarcerates so many of its dispossessed members. Nevertheless, public concerns about crime, particularly violent crime, continue to drive American policy toward more (and more punitive) uses of criminal sanctions.
Bibliography
Blumstein, Alfred, and Joel Wallman, eds. The Crime Drop in America. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Friedman, Lawrence M. Crime and Punishment in American History. New York: Basic Books, 1993.
Geis, Gilbert, and Robert F. Meier, comps. White-Collar Crime: Offenses in Business and the Professions. New York: Free Press, 1977.
Gray, James P. Why Our Drug Laws Have Failed and What We Can Do About It: A Judicial Indictment of the War on Drugs. Philadelphia: Temple University, 2001.
Robinson, Paul H., and John M. Darley. Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995.
Silberman, Charles E. Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice. New York: Random House, 1978.
U.S. Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice. 2d ed. 2 vols. Washington, D.C.: Justice Statistics Clearinghouse, 1988.
Zimring, Franklin E., and Gordon Hawkins. Crime Is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America. New York: Oxford University, 1997.
—Larry Yackle