The idea behind the notion of an analytic proposition is that at least some of our concepts can be represented as complexes of simpler concepts and that a proposition may state nothing more than what an analysis would reveal, namely a relation between a simple concept and a complex concept of which it forms a part. Thus
Kant, taking judgements expressed by propositions to have the form '
A is
B', defined an analytic judgement as one where 'the predicate
B belongs to the subject
A as something which is (covertly) contained in the concept
A'. In more linguistic terms, if the criteria for calling something 'a body' include the criterion 'being extended', then the latter is 'contained in' the former and the proposition 'a body is extended' is analytic. An analytic statement thus cannot be denied without contradiction and is a logically necessary possibility. That this necessity can be seen simply from a grasp of the concepts or words involved leads to speaking of analytic propositions as true in virtue of the meanings of words.
Gottlob Frege freed the notion of analytic proposition from the assumption that the logical structure of all concepts is based upon conjunction of criteria, by taking as analytic any proposition whose proof rested only on general logical laws and definitions. This also made clear that whether a proposition is regarded as analytic is relative to what are recognized as legitimate means of definition and what general logical laws are accepted as valid.
A proposition that is not analytic is synthetic. The arguments of W. V. Quine showed that the analytic/synthetic distinction is not as sharp as had previously been assumed, but not that the distinction is wholly without foundation.
(Published 1987)— J. E. Tiles
Bibliography- Frege, G. (1959). The Foundations of Arithmetic. Trans. J. L. Austin, section 3.
- Kant, I. (1929). The Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. N. Kemp-Smith, Preface and Introduction.
- Quine, W. V. (1953). From a Logical Point of View, ch. 2.
