Anglo-Irish agreement

The Anglo-Irish Agreement was an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland which aimed to bring an end to the Troubles in Northern Ireland. The treaty gave the Irish Government an advisory role in Northern Ireland's government while confirming that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK unless a majority of its citizens agreed to join the Republic. It also set out conditions for the establishment of a devolved consensus government in the region.

The agreement was signed on 15 November 1985 at Hillsborough Castle, by the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald.

The Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference

The agreement established the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, made up of officials from the British and Irish governments. This body was concerned with political, legal and security matters in Northern Ireland, as well as "the promotion of cross-border co-operation". It had a consultative role only — no powers to make decisions or change laws were given to it. The Conference would only have power to make proposals "in so far as those matters are not the responsibility of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland". This provision was intended to encourage the unionists (who opposed Irish government involvement in Northern Ireland through the Conference) into power-sharing devolved government. The conference had a permanent secretariat, including officials from the republic's Department of Foreign Affairs, based in the Belfast suburb of Maryfield. The presence of civil servants from the Republic particularly incensed unionists.

Reaction to the Agreement

The agreement was rejected by republicans because it confirmed Northern Ireland's status as a part of the UK. The Provisional IRA continued their violent campaign and did not endorse the agreement.

The nationalist Fianna Fáil political party, the main opposition party in the Republic of Ireland, also rejected the agreement. The Fianna Fáil leader, Charles Haughey, claimed the agreement was in conflict with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland because it officially recognized British jurisdiction in Northern Ireland. Despite this opposition, all the other main parties in the Republic supported the agreement, and it was ratified comfortably by the Oireachtas.

Prominent Irish Labour Party member Mary Robinson, who subsequently became President of Ireland, resigned from the Irish Labour Party because she objected to the exclusion of unionists from the talks that led to the agreement.

On the other side, it was rejected by unionists because it gave the Republic of Ireland a role in the governance of Northern Ireland for the first time ever, and because they had been excluded from the agreement negotiations. The Ulster Unionist Party and Democratic Unionist Party led the campaign against the agreement, including mass rallies, strikes, civil disobedience and the mass resignation from the British House of Commons of all the unionist MPs. The DUP and UUP collectively organised 400,000 signatures in a petition against the Agreement, and there was also a mass rally outside Belfast City Hall on 23 November against the Agreement. Between 100,000 and 200,000 people attended this rally, and the DUP leader Ian Paisley addressed the crowd:

Where do the terrorists return to for sanctuary? To the Irish Republic. And yet Mrs. Thatcher tells us that that Republic must have some say in our Province. We say never, never, never, never.

The UUP MP Enoch Powell asked Thatcher in the Commons: "Does the right hon. Lady understand — if she does not yet understand she soon will — that the penalty for treachery is to fall into public contempt?". The UUP leader James Molyneaux spoke of "universal cold fury" at the Agreement such as he had not experienced in forty years of public life.^[1] Her close friend and former Parliamentary Private Secretary Ian Gow resigned from his Treasury post in protest at the Agreement. Thatcher was taken aback by the ferocity of the unionist response and in her memoirs she said their reaction was "worse than anyone had predicted to me".^[2] She furthermore claimed that the Agreement was in the tradition of British governments refraining "from security policies that might alienate the Irish Government and Irish nationalist opinion in Ulster, in the hope of winning their support against the IRA". However Thatcher perceived the results of this to be disappointing because "our concessions alienated the Unionists without gaining the level of security co-operation we had a right to expect. In the light of this experience it is surely time to consider an alternative approach".^[3]

UUP politicians Christopher and Michael McGimpsey even brought a suit against the Irish government in the High Court of the Republic of Ireland, arguing that the Agreement was invalid because it contradicted Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Ireland. (This argument was unusual coming from a unionist because of the traditional unionist opposition to these two articles.) The case failed in the High Court, and again on appeal to the Supreme Court.

In Britain, the Conservative Monday Club constantly spoke out against the Agreement, and their spokesman was quoted^{[citation needed]} in The Sun newspaper as late as the 7th September 1989 still publicly condemning it.

Of the main parties in Northern Ireland, only the moderate nationalist SDLP and the cross community Alliance supported the agreement. The by-elections called after the Unionist MPs resigned did not quite offer the electorate a clear-cut choice on the agreement due to the reluctance of the other parties to contest them. No unionist candidate opposed another, whilst both the SDLP and Sinn Féin only contested the four seats where at the previous election there had been a majority of votes cast for nationalist candidates. In the process the SDLP gained the Newry and Armagh seat. The Alliance formally committed to fighting all the seats on a platform of support for the Agreement, but some local branches declined to select candidates. The Workers' Party stood in a few seats. In four constituencies where no party would oppose the Unionist MP a man called Wesley Robert Williamson changed his name by deed poll to "Peter Barry" (the name of the Irish Foreign Minister) and stood on the label "For the Anglo-Irish Agreement" but did not campaign. Despite this he garnered nearly 7000 votes and saved three deposits. The unionist parties between them garnered over 400,000 votes and over 71% of the total poll, but as no by-elections took place in the staunch nationalist seats of West Belfast and Foyle this latter figure is skewed. Nevertheless the unionists trumpeted^{[citation needed]} the results as a rejection of the Agreement by the electorate.

The signing of the Agreement, by a nominally Unionist Prime Minister, led to a collapse in the Scottish vote for the Conservative party in the subsequent election, which it has never recovered.^{[citation needed]} The Orange Order in Scotland claimed that one thousand people left the Conservative Party in protest against the Agreement.^[4] In 1990 Thatcher said that "The Anglo-Irish Agreement had alienated some pro-Ulster supporters in crucial constituencies" in Scotland.^[5]

Long-term effects

The agreement failed to bring an immediate end to political violence in Northern Ireland, nor did it reconcile the two communities. The devolved power-sharing government envisaged by the agreement would not be a reality for many years, and in quite a different form. However, it did improve cooperation between the British and Irish governments, which was key to the creation of the Good Friday Agreement a decade later. As such it can be seen as a major stepping-stone in the Peace Process, of which the intergovernmental component was crucial.

At a strategic level, the agreement demonstrated that the British recognised as legitimate the wishes of the Republic to have a direct interest in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It also demonstrated to unionists that they could not veto political progress as, in the end, the British state was stronger than they. Unlike the Sunningdale Agreement, the Anglo-Irish Agreement withstood a much more concerted campaign of violence and intimidation, as well as political hostility, from the loyalists.

Republicans were left in the position of rejecting the only piece of constitutional progress (in the eyes of many nationalists or republicans) since the downfall of Stormont a decade earlier. Within ten years, however, the IRA announced a ceasefire, and both governments engaged in negotiation with the sides, which eventually bore fruit in the Belfast Agreement.

See also

Other treaties between Britain and Ireland:

• Treaty of Limerick (1691)
• Anglo-Irish Treaty (1922)
• Sunningdale Agreement (1973)
• Belfast Agreement (1998)
• St Andrews Agreement (2006)

Notes

1. ^ John Campbell, Margaret Thatcher. The Iron Lady (London: Jonathan Cape, 2003), p. 437.
2. ^ Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (HarperCollins, 1993), p. 403.
3. ^ Ibid., p. 415.
4. ^ Joseph M. Bradley, Orangeism in Scotland: Unionism, Politics, Identity, and Football, Éire-Ireland - Volume 39:1&2, Earrach/Samhradh / Spring/Summer 2004, p. 245.
5. ^ The Scottish Daily Express, 25 April 1990, quoted in Ibid., p. 246.

External links

• The CAIN project archive on the Anglo-Irish Agreement
• Text of the Agreement
• McGimpsey v. Ireland — Irish Supreme Court judgement in the case brought by Michael and Christopher McGimpsey

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