Arctic and mountain warfare (see also mountain troops) makes the most extreme demands on a soldier, who must at all times combat a lethal environment while only sporadically engaging his human enemy. The polar regions have not, of course, been fought over, and ‘arctic’ refers to conditions of extreme cold. A combination of the two factors creates almost unimaginably demanding conditions, yet there are peoples with a long tradition of arctic and mountain warfare and the major powers have developed highly specialized troops for that purpose. The more extreme possible or actual areas of deployment are in northern Scandinavia, the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Andes, southern Arabia, and the northernmost parts of the Indian subcontinent.
Mountainous regions of military significance are generally characterized by rugged, often compartmentalized terrain, with steep slopes and few if any natural or man-made lines of communication. Weather is usually seasonal varying from extreme cold to temperate. Dramatic and sudden weather changes are not uncommon and wind, where accelerated over ridges or when converged under pressure through passes and narrow valleys, can quickly reach gale force. In cold weather, the wind-chill factor significantly increases the chance of frostbite and other disabling injuries. Troops operating in such terrain need to be exceptionally fit, experienced, and equipped.
At altitudes in excess of 8, 202 feet (2, 500 metres), a period of acclimatization is required. As with professional mountaineers, this acclimatization phase is only complete when personnel fully understand the limitations imposed on both them and their equipment. For example it is only after months spent at high altitude that 70 per cent of sea-level work-capacity standards can be achieved. This is a fact understood by the trainers of world class athletes and taken for granted by indigenous populations, and an important factor to be considered in planning operations. The effects of high altitude on unacclimatized troops include increased errors in performing simple mental operations; decreased ability for sustained concentration, memory deterioration, decreasing awareness, increased irritability, and self-evaluation impairment.
In addition there are several health hazards that exist in mountainous climates. Due to the thinner atmosphere at higher altitudes, more direct sunlight reaches the earth than at lower levels and in snowy conditions common in such areas, ‘snow blindness’ becomes a risk, because about 75 per cent of the sun's rays are reflected and can quickly overload the eyes. Although snow blindness is normally temporary, troops affected may be completely disabled for several days. Other health conditions associated with mountainous climates include sunburn and potentially fatal dehydration and hypothermia, while heat transference may bond naked flesh to weapons or vehicles. These, in turn, require special oils and an elevated amount of maintenance, while the greater demand for heating and transport fuel (motors must be kept running or at least ‘turned over’ regularly), as well as spare parts, imposes greater demands on logistics that may already be dangerously stretched over extremely limited and vulnerable lines of communication.
Command of the heights is crucial for successful mountain operations, as seen most recently (1999) in the India-Pakistan clash in Kashmir, because it means controlling the valleys. Soviet forces rediscovered to their cost in Afghanistan that even main arterial routes through broad valleys cannot be kept open when nearby mountainous terrain harbours a determined enemy, especially when he is equipped with man-portable artillery. At higher altitudes, narrow mountain roads are often restricted to single-line traffic, especially for wide-bodied military vehicles, with little room for passing. One disabled vehicle may stop an entire column. It then becomes a matter of boxing in the target and destroying it piece by piece. This consideration is central to Swiss defence planning and may be the reason why Chile and Argentina have never gone to war. Mountain chains make excellent borders.
Prior to this century mountains were often seen as an almost impenetrable defence against invading armies. However, the advent of modern skis and skiing techniques has changed this assumption and almost all modern armies whose existing or possible theatre of operations includes such areas, have some ski-warfare capability. Such theatres include NATO's northern flank, where its forces have conducted extensive annual or biennial manoeuvres over recent years; and the alpine regions of Europe. The origins and development of skiing lie both in Scandinavia and the Alps. Scandinavian or ‘Nordic’ skiing originated in what are now Finland and Sweden some 4, 000 years ago on skis made from wood and leather, curved bow-like front and rear, designed to support and spread the wearer's weight and allowing him to glide along the surface of the snow aided by hand-held poles. The equipment remained little changed until the 1880s, when the introduction of flat skis in Austria first caught the attention of British sportsmen, who explored and chartered alpine regions with a view to winter recreation. The concept spread to Germany and later France and by the turn of the century both countries had established national ski clubs. Alpine or downhill skiing was born.
The military spin-off was most dramatically revealed during the Finno-Soviet war of 1939-40, where well-trained and equipped Finnish ski troops initially trounced a Soviet force which outnumbered them five to one. Following their own revealed deficiencies in Norway early in WW II, the British began to train specialist mountain troops, and the Americans and Canadians were to combine their training to produce the famous ‘Devil's Brigade’.
Following WW II recreational skiing became even more popular and widespread. This has had the effect of introducing a ‘normality’ to the concept of skiing and increasing facilities associated with it. Lest the military connection should be forgotten, the Biathlon was introduced in the winter Olympics of 1960, in which competitors cross-country ski for 12 miles (20 km), stopping to engage targets with single-shot rifles at combat range (110-273 yards (100-250 metres) ) every 2.5 miles (4 km). The event illustrates how skiing ability alone does not make a ski-soldier. Fitness, stamina, and care of equipment are vital, as are the qualities and knowledge that enable him to survive and fight in a bitterly hostile environment. Arctic and mountain warfare, although a relatively recent variant in armed conflict, remains one of the most challenging.
— Peter MacDonald