Argumentation ethics, is an apriori, value-free praxeological argument for deontological libertarian ethics, developed by economist Hans-Hermann Hoppe.[1] The argument builds on the approach of discourse ethics developed by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, Misesian praxeology and the political philosophy of economist Murray Rothbard. Argumentation ethics asserts the non-aggression principle is a presupposition of argumentation and so cannot be rationally denied.
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Hoppe notes that since scarcity exists, conflicts arise over the use of rivalrous goods between moral agents. Agents can then choose to resolve their conflicts in a non-violent way by engaging in argumentation. Therefore presupposed in the act of political argumentation are norms contingent to the grundnorm of non-violent conflict resolution. Examples are "language has accepted intersubjective meaning", "Argumentative propositions need to be justifiable as true", ext. Such norms Hoppe terms the apriori of argumentation (APoA). The denial of these norms presupposed in the act of argumentation constitutes a performative contradiction, thereby voiding the argument of any meaning. Such norms underly any moral justification as any moral justification must take place in argument, as even to deny this would imply the denier is thus engaged in an argument.
Argumentation ethics aims to show the non-aggression principle follows from the APoA and so is a logical presupposition of argumentation. Hoppe argues that only universal norms are consistent with the APoA, as arbitrary categorical distinctions, have no intersubjective justification. Hoppe then argues that since argumentation requires the active use of one's body, all universal norms for resolving conflicts over the human body aside from self-ownership are inconsistent with argumentation.[2] Hoppe then argues that since the resolution of conflicts over external resources must also be objectively justifiable, only the physical establishment of an objective link by original appropriation (i.e. homesteading) is a norm compatible with argumentation. From these Hoppe concludes that only the non-aggression principle of self ownership and Lockean homesteading can be justified in an argument without contradiction.[3]
Bearing reference to the legal doctrine of estoppel, Stephan Kinsella's "Dialogical Estoppel" theory extends argumentation ethics by considering an argument between a victim and aggressor. Kinsella argues that an aggressor cannot consistently object to being proportionally punished for his act of aggression, by the victim or by the victim's representatives, because by committing aggression he commits himself to the proposition that the use of force is legitimate, and therefore, his withholding consent based on a normative right not to be physically harmed contradicts his aggressive legitimation of force, i.e. he is "estopped" from withholding consent.[1]
Argumentation ethics is incompatible with intellectual property, as it defines property rights over concepts, which are inherently non-scarce. Property rights in non-scarce, superabundant goods are not conflict avoiding but rather conflict seeking.[4] Furthermore since concepts are abstractions no objective conflict over their use can arise.[5]
Responses to argumentation ethics have been varied.[6] Many modern libertarian theorists have accepted Hoppe's argument, among them Walter Block, David Gordon, Stephan Kinsella, and Murray Rothbard,[7], who said:
In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison.[8]
Other libertarian theorists have not accepted Hoppe's argument. Roderick Long had written:
I don’t think there’s any reason to reject out of hand the kind of argument that Hoppe tries to give; on the contrary, the idea that there might be some deep connection between libertarian rights and the requirements of rational discourse is one I find attractive and eminently plausible. [...] But I am not convinced that the specific argument Hoppe gives us is successful.[9]
Economists Bob Murphy and Gene Callahan have expressed criticism.[10] Stephan Kinsella has responded to their criticism.[11] Professor David Osterfeld has also expressed criticism, which was responded to by Hoppe.[12]
Question: I have a question for Professor Hoppe. Does the idea of personal sovereignty extend to knowledge? Am I sovereign over my thoughts, ideas, and theories? Hoppe: ... in order to have a thought you must have property rights over your body. That doesn’t imply that you own your thoughts. The thoughts can be used by anybody who is capable of understanding them.
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