499 U.S. 279 (1991), argued 10 Oct. 1990, decided 26 Mar. 1991 by vote of 5 to 4; Rehnquist for the Court, White in dissent. For many decades, the “rule of automatic reversal” governed coerced confession cases. Under this rule, if a coerced or “involuntary” confession had been erroneously admitted at the trial, the conviction had to be reversed regardless of how much untainted evidence of guilt remained to support the conviction. In Fulminante, however, the Court held that an erroneously admitted coerced confession was subject to “harmless‐error” analysis.
Noting that confessions obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona (1966) had already been subject to “harmless‐error” analysis, the Court emphasized that “the evidentiary impact” of a coerced confession and its effect upon the trial was indistinguishable from that of a confession inadmissible for any other reason. The erroneous admission of a coerced confession may often be “devastating” to a defendant, but that may be said of any inadmissible confession. There is nothing inherent in a confession obtained in violation of Massiah or Miranda that gives it a lesser impact on a jury than a coerced confession.
The dissenters argued that because a coerced confession is a constitutional error of great magnitude it should be treated differently than confessions inadmissible on other grounds. They emphasized that the methods used to extract coerced confessions offend a fundamental principle: “ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system” (p. 1256).
— Yale Kamisar
| Arizona v. Fulminante | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued October 10, 1990 Decided March 26, 1991 |
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| Full case name | Arizona v. Fulminante | |||||
| Citations | 499 U.S. 279 (more) | |||||
| Prior history | 161 Ariz. 237, 778 P.2d 602 | |||||
| Holding | ||||||
| The harmless error rule is applicable to the admission of involuntary confessions. Violations of this rule are grounds for granting the defendant a new trial. | ||||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | White (Parts I, II, and IV), joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia (Parts I and II only), Kennedy (Parts I and IV only) | |||||
| Majority | Rehnquist (Part II), joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter | |||||
| Concurrence | Kennedy (concurring in the court's judgment) | |||||
| Dissent | White (Part III), joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens | |||||
| Dissent | Rehnquist (Parts I and III), joined by O'Connor, Scalia (Part III only), Kennedy and Souter (Part I only) | |||||
| Laws applied | ||||||
| U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV | ||||||
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) was a decision issued by the United States Supreme Court clarifying the standard of review of a criminal defendant's allegedly coerced confession.
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In 1982, the 11-year-old stepdaughter of one Oreste Fulminante was murdered in Arizona. Later, Fulminante was incarcerated for an unrelated crime. While in prison, Fulminante met Anthony Sarivola, a fellow inmate, who was also a confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Sarivola offered Fulminante protection from "tough treatment" in prison in exchange for a confession to the murder of Fulminante's stepdaughter. Fulminante agreed, confessing to Sarivola that he murdered his stepdaughter. As a result, Fulminante was charged with the murder, and his confession to Sarivola was used against him at trial.
The trial court denied Fulminante's motion to suppress the confession on the basis that it was coerced because Fulminante might have been subject to violence in prison had he not confessed. Fulminante was convicted and sentenced to death, and appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which held that the confession was indeed coerced. Reasoning that a harmless error analysis was inappropriate in the case of involuntary confessions, the court ordered a new trial.
In a divided opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the state supreme court's finding that the threat of violence aimed at Fulminante was credible enough to establish a finding of coercion, and therefore affirmed the reversal. In addition, the Court held that a harmless error analysis should nonetheless be applied to any allegedly coerced confession. In either case, the Court held that a new trial was warranted.
Interpretation of the Fulminante Decision is a major plot element in the Law & Order episode "Confession" [1]
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