Law Encyclopedia:
Automobile Searches
This entry contains information applicable to United States law only. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees U.S. citizens freedom from "unreasonable searches and seizures." In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), the Supreme Court established the principle that a warrant issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate" must be obtained before a government authority may breach the individual privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment. The Katz decision held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Over the years, the Court has recognized a number of exceptions to this rule that allow the police in certain situations to legally conduct a search without a warrant. One of these exceptions is for automobile searches.
Warrantless Searches
The automobile exception was first announced in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925), where the Court held that federal Prohibition agents were justified in searching, without a warrant, an automobile they stopped on a public highway because they had probable cause to believe that it contained contraband. The Court found that the search was justified by the exigency of the circumstances, noting that, unlike a dwelling, store, or other structure, an automobile can be "quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
After the Carroll decision, the Court embarked on a long and often confusing line of decisions that interpreted the automobile exception as it applied not only to automobiles but also to containers found in automobiles, to mobile homes, and to sobriety checkpoints. For several decades, the Court rarely cited Carroll in vehicle search cases. Instead, it relied on the "search-incident-to-arrest" doctrine, which allowed the police to search, without a warrant, areas surrounding an arrest site. Originally, the police could search areas that were outside the control of the arrested person (see, e.g., Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 [8th Cir. 1966], cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 [1967], in which the Court let stand a ruling by the Eighth Circuit that the search of a car parked in a driveway while the suspect was arrested at the front door of his house was valid). However, the Court restricted the search-incident-to-arrest standard in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969), which held that a warrantless search must be limited to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.
After the Chimel decision, the Court abandoned this line of reasoning and returned to the "probable-cause-accompanied-by-exigent-circumstances" rationale in Carroll. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970), the justices found that Carroll supported a warrantless search of an impounded car. They based this finding on the theory that had the search been conducted at the time of the arrest, it would have been valid because of the exigent circumstances existing at that time. The fact that the car was impounded, and therefore immobile, by the time the search was conducted did not affect the Court's decision. A year later, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion), the Court held that a search conducted with a warrant that was later found to be invalid fell outside the automobile exception. The Court stated that the police in Coolidge could not have legally conducted a warrantless search at the arrest scene because no exigent circumstances existed: at the time of arrest, the arrestee did not have access to the car and therefore could not have moved it. The Coolidge decision firmly established that the police must show both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order for a warrantless search to be valid.
The Court then added an alternative rationale to support automobile searches, with its decision in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion). In Cardwell, the police made an impression of the tires of the suspect's car and took paint samples from the car, without a warrant. The Court held that the search was permissible because the police had probable cause and the search was conducted in a reasonable manner. No exigency existed in this case, but the Court found justification in the principle that individuals have a "lower expectation of privacy" in their automobiles. Writing for the plurality, Justice Harry A. Blackmun stated, "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects."
This "lesser-expectation-of-privacy" rationale was not sufficient to support a warrantless search in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1977). In Chadwick, the defendants were arrested immediately after they had placed a footlocker in their trunk. Federal agents, who had probable cause to believe that the footlocker contained marijuana, impounded the car and opened the footlocker without a warrant. The Court found that although the agents did have probable cause to search the footlocker, they had not proved that they had probable cause to search the car in order to find the footlocker. Since the car was impounded, no exigent circumstances existed. Furthermore, the Court held that the defendants had a greater expectation of privacy in the closed footlocker than in an automobile, which is open to public view. "The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to the (defendants') footlocker," the Court concluded. Therefore, the lesser-expectation-of-privacy rationale did not support an extension of the automobile exception to the closed footlocker.
Armed with the Carroll-Chambers line of cases (the probable-cause-accompanied-by-exigent-circumstances rationale) and the Chadwick decision (the lower-expectation-of-privacy rationale), the Court tackled the question of whether a warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a taxi fell under either justification. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979), the police had probable cause to believe that a suitcase picked up by the defendant at an airport contained contraband. After the defendant placed the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi and left the airport, the police stopped the taxi, opened the trunk, and searched the suitcase, which contained the contraband they expected to find. The Court evaluated the facts under each rationale and found that (a) once the taxi had been stopped, no exigency existed; and, (b) an individual's privacy expectations in a suitcase, which "serve[s] as a repository for personal items," are greater than his or her privacy expectations in an automobile. For these reasons, the Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amend- ment.
Later cases, however, extended the automobile exception to containers located in an automobile, where authorities have probable cause to search the automobile. For example, in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), the police stopped a car that they had probable cause to believe contained contraband. Without a warrant, they opened a closed paper bag they found inside the car's trunk, and discovered heroin. The Court held that the search was valid, reasoning that if the police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, they also had justification to search the bag.
The automobile exception was also extended to searches of some mobile homes, in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 85 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1985). In Carney, the police searched a motor home parked in a public lot. The Court found the search to be valid, stating that the mobile home was being used for transportation and therefore was as readily movable as an automobile. In addition, the Court noted a reduced expectation of privacy in a mobile home, as contrasted with an ordinary residence, since mobile homes, like cars, are regulated by the state. In this case, where the mobile home was parked in a public parking lot rather than a mobile home park, and was not anchored in any way, it resembled a vehicle more than a residence. Therefore, the automobile exception applied. Carney established not only that the automobile exception applies to some mobile homes but also that it applies to parked vehicles as well.
Another extension of the automobile exception, called the inventory exception, was recognized by the Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). Donald Opperman's illegally parked vehicle was ticketed and towed to an impound lot, where the police inventoried its contents. In an unlocked glove compartment, they found marijuana. The Court held that once a vehicle has been legally impounded, its contents can be inventoried. Three justifications were given: protection of the owner's property while it is in police custody, protection of the police against claims, and protection of the police against danger. Likewise, in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987), the Court found that marijuana discovered in a closed backpack during an inventory of an impounded vehicle was legally seized because there was no showing that "the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." The Court concluded that "reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment."
This patchwork of decisions led many, including Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to conclude that "the law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing" (Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 69 L. Ed. 2d 744 [1981] [Powell, J., concurring]). The Court attempted to put the confusion to rest with its decision in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). In Acevedo, federal drug agents tracked a bag that they knew contained marijuana, as it was in transit to the defendant. They then notified police officers, who watched as the defendant put the bag into the trunk of a car and drove away. The police officers stopped the car, opened the trunk, and searched the bag, finding the marijuana. The Court held that the search was legal, stating that it is not necessary for an officer to obtain a warrant before searching a container located in an automobile when the officer has probable cause to believe that the container holds contraband or evidence. After analyzing the long and ambiguous line of automobile exception cases, the Court decided that the distinction between the Ross situation (where the police had probable cause to search the car) and the Sanders situation (where the police had probable cause only to search the container) was not supported by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Discarding the reasoning in Sanders as unworkable and an unjustified impingement on legitimate police activity, the justices announced a new and unequivocal rule: "The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained."
The Acevedo decision was met with harsh criticism by some legal analysts, who saw it as an excessive retreat from Fourth Amendment guarantees. Supporters, however, pointed out that the police must still establish that they have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search before such a search will be found valid. Probable cause can be shown in a variety of ways, but generally it follows from a chain of events that raise police suspicions from the level of mere conjecture to the level of reasonable grounds. For example, in Acevedo, federal drug enforcement agents had previously seized and inspected the package that was eventually delivered to the defendant, and knew that it contained marijuana. In Sanders, a reliable informant had told the police that the defendant would arrive at the airport carrying a green suitcase containing marijuana. And in Ross, an informant had told the police that someone known as Bandit was selling drugs from the trunk of his car; when the police located the car described by the informant, they discovered through a computer check that the driver, the defendant, Albert Ross, Jr., used the alias Bandit. From these cases, the Court has shown that arbitrary searches or searches based on mere suspicion will not be supported by a spurious claim of probable cause.
Sobriety Checkpoints
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Court dealt with a new line of cases, in which the automobile exception has been used to justify sobriety checkpoint programs. Under such programs, police stop motorists, typically along an interstate highway, for the purpose of apprehending drivers impaired by alcohol. One such program was challenged and found to be constitutional in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990). The Court applied a somewhat more stringent test than that used in automobile search cases, citing as relevant authority a line of cases involving highway checkpoints for discovering illegal aliens (see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116 [1976]; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 [1979]). Brown required "a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Applying that balancing test, the majority in Sitz found that the intrusion on individual liberty imposed by Michigan's sobriety checkpoint program was outweighed by the advancement of the state's interest in preventing drunk driving. Therefore, it concluded that the program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Similar sobriety checkpoint programs have been used in other states, and, since the Sitz decision, all have passed constitutional muster. Less certain is the constitutionality of narcotics checkpoints. In 1992, Minnesota instituted a random narcotics checkpoint on an interstate highway exit ramp. The police stopped every third or fourth car and asked several questions of the occupants. If the answers or demeanor of the occupants aroused suspicion, the car was diverted for further investigation. A number of individuals were cited when police found marijuana, either in plain view or after a consensual search of the vehicle.
The Minnesota scheme raises serious constitutional questions. The state has a legitimate interest in curbing the use of illegal drugs. However, it is not clear that a narcotics checkpoint program is a valid means of promoting this interest, in light of the privacy interest violated by random questioning for investigation of drug possession or use. Similarly, it is unclear whether the Minnesota scheme is the type of minimal intrusion sanctioned by the Court in Sitz. Still, the Sitz and Acevedo decisions, both of which have been criticized as giving too much discretion to the police, indicate that the Court intends to allow a great deal of latitude to law enforcement officials in stopping and searching automobiles under most conditions.
See: Privacy; Drugs and Narcotics; Fourth Amendment; Probable Cause; Search Warrant.
