battle of Albuera

 

Coordinates: 38°43′N 6°49′W / 38.717, -6.817

Battle of Albuera
Part of the Peninsular War
Marshal Beresford disarming a Polish lancer at the Battle of Albuera. Print by T. Sutherland, 1831.
Date May 16, 1811 Location Albuera, south of Badajoz, Spain Result Indecisive
Combatants
Kingdom of Spain Kingdom of Portugal United Kingdom	French Empire Duchy of Warsaw
Commanders
William Beresford, Joaquin Blake	Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult
Strength
35,284: 14,634 Spanish, 10,449 British, 10,201 Portuguese,[1] 50 guns	24,260,[2] 40 guns
Casualties
5,916 dead or wounded	5,936–7,000 dead or wounded

Peninsular War Castile, 1811–1812
1st Badajoz (Gebora) – 2nd Badajoz – Albuera – Fuentes de Oñoro – Tarifa – Orbigo – Cuidad Rodrigo – 3rd Badajoz – Salamanca – Burgos – Venta del Pozo

In the Battle of Albuera (May 16 1811), a British, Spanish, and Portuguese Allied corps faced a French Army at Albuera, about 12 miles (20 km) south of Badajoz, Spain.

Marshal Soult had led a French expedition from Andalusia into Extremadura in a bid to draw Allied forces away from the Lines of Torres Vedras and ease the plight of Marshal Masséna. Having captured the strong fortress at Badajoz, Soult was forced to return to Andalusia following the Battle of Barrosa, leaving a sizeable garrison behind. Following Masséna's retreat from Portugal, Wellington sent a strong Anglo–Portuguese corps, commanded by Sir William Beresford, to retake the town and the Allies drove off most of the French garrison and laid siege to Badajoz.

Soult gathered a new army from the French Andalusian corps and, joining with the retreating Badajoz garrison, marched to relieve the siege. Aware of an approaching Spanish force under General Joaquín Blake, he tried to turn the Beresford's flank and interpose his army between the British and Blake. Unbeknownst to Soult though, the Spaniards had already converged with the Anglo–Portuguese corps, and 24,000 French troops faced a 35,000 strong Allied army.

Both sides suffered horrifically in the ensuing struggle, but the French were eventually forced to retreat. Beresford's army was too battered and exhausted to pursue, but were able to resume the investment of Badajoz. Despite Soult's failure to relieve the town, the battle had little strategic effect on the on-going Peninsular War—the Allies were forced to abandon the siege, just a month later, by the approach of the combined French Armies of Portugal and Andalusia.

Background

Following the victory at the Battle of Bussaco, Sir Arthur Wellesley, Viscount of Wellington was forced, by Marshal Masséna's manoeuvring, to retreat behind the Lines of Torres Vedras. By 10 October 1810, only the British light division and some cavalry patrols remained outside the defensive Lines.^[3] Masséna's Army of Portugal concentrated around Sobral, seemingly preparing to attack the Lines. After a fierce skirmish on 14 October, the French dug themselves in rather than launch a full-scale assault. They remained entrenched for a month before withdrawing to a position between Santarém and Rio Maior.^[4]

Wellington left the defence of the Lines to "secondary troops"—25,000 Portuguese militia, 8,000 Spaniards and 2,500 British marines and artillerymen. He kept his main field army of British and Portuguese regulars dispersed such that they could concentrate against a French assault on any point of the Lines.^[5] Once Masséna had pulled back, Wellington moved the 2nd Division under Lieutenant General Hill, along with two Portuguese brigades and an attachment of Dragoons, across the Tagus to protect the plains of Alentejo, both from Masséna and a possible attack from the French Army of Andalusia.^[6]

Meanwhile, Napoleon sent dispatches to Marshal Soult, commander of the Army of Andalusia, urging him to send assistance to Masséna.^[7] The Emperor's orders, however, were based on outdated intelligence; by the time Soult received them, the situation had changed considerably.^[8] Soult knew he could not launch an attack against Lisbon—there were 30,000 Allied troops and six major fortresses between his army and the Portuguese capital—but he felt obliged to do something.^[7] Soult therefore gathered an army of 20,000 men, mainly from V Corps, and launched an expedition into Extremadura with the aim of capturing the fortress at Badajoz and drawing some of the Allied forces away from the Lines of Torres Vedras.^[9] This expedition pulled both infantry and cavalry from Marshal Victor's I Corps who were besieging Cádiz. Soult ordered more of Victor's men to fill the gaps left by V Corps; this weakening of the siege lines at Cádiz was bitterly opposed by Victor, since it left him with only 15,000 men besieging a city garrisoned by around 26,000 Allied troops.^[10]

Following a successful campaign in Extremadura, Soult began his investment of Badajoz on 27 January 1811. Almost immediately the Spanish Army of Extremadura, some 15,000 men strong and under the command of General Mendizabel, arrived; Soult's army, too small to surround Badajoz, was unable to prevent 3,000 of Mendizabel's men reinforcing the fortress and the remainder of the Spaniards occupying the heights of San Cristobal. The Spanish field army was a major threat to the French, and so Soult resolved to destroy it. In the ensuing Battle of the Gebora, the French killed 1,000 Spaniards and took 4,000 prisoners at a cost of only 400 casualties; the remainder of Mendizabel's army fled towards Badajoz or Portugal.^[11]

The garrison of Badajoz, ably commanded by General Rafael Menacho, initially put up a strong fight, and by 3 March, the French had made little progress in taking the fortress. On that day, however, Menacho was killed on the ramparts by a chance shot; command of the garrison fell to Brigadier José Imaz and the defences started to slacken.^[12] The walls of the fortress were finally breached on 10 March. Soult was, by then, anxious to press the siege, since he had heard that Masséna had retreated from Portugal. Soult was concerned that the British would now be able to send a contingent to relieve the town, so he sent a deputation into Barrosa to demand that the garrison surrender – Imaz duly capitulated, and the French took possession of the strong fortress on 11 March.^[13]

On 12 March, news of the French defeat at the Battle of Barrosa reached Soult, and he left Badajoz to return to Andalusia, anxious that Victor had been forced to lift the siege of Cádiz; reaching Seville on 20 March, he was relieved to find that Victor still held Cádiz, and Andalusia remained under French control.^[14] Soult left Badajoz garrisoned by 11,000 French troops under the command of Marshal Édouard Mortier.^[15]

Prelude to battle

When he learnt of Soult's investment of Badajoz, Wellington prepared to send the 2nd and 4th divisions, now under the command of General William Beresford, to relieve the siege. The orders were first given on 8 March, but countermanded the next day due to false reports of Masséna offering battle at Tomar.^[16] Following further delays as Beresford's two divisions regrouped, the relieving force set off on 15 March and was immediately halted – Wellington had just received news of the surrender of Badajoz.^[17]

Mortier keeps busy

Mortier, in the meantime, had not been idle. Leaving a detachment of six battalions to hold Badajoz, he marched against Campo Maior with around 7,000 men and three batteries from the siege-train at Badajoz. The French captured the outlying Fort São João on 14 March, the night of their arrival, but the Campo Maior fortress would prove a harder proposition. Despite being manned by only 800 militia and Ordenanças, commanded by Major José Talaya, the town held out for seven days, surrendering only when an entire face of the bastion crumbled under the French artillery barrage.^[18] Mortier also sent two cavalry regiments, under General Marie-Charles Latour-Maubourg, to invest Alburquerque; the 6,000 strong garrison there surrendered before French reinforcements needed to be brought up.^[19]

The defence of Campo Maior gave Beresford's army time to arrive before the fortress had been slighted. Mortier had taken the majority of his expedition into Portugal back to Badajoz, leaving only one infantry and three cavalry regiments in Campo Maior, under Latour-Maubourg, to destroy the defences. Beresford's arrival on 25 March caught the French by surprise; despite the Allies having 18,000 troops at their disposal, Latour-Maubourg calmly formed up his command and retreated towards Badajoz.^[20] Beresford sent 1,500 cavalry after the French contingent but the Allied cavalry commander, Brigadier General Robert Long, lost control of the action: the British 13th Light Dragoons chased the French 26th Dragoons all the way to the gates of Badajoz, where Mortier's garrison drove them off. A suicidal charge by Long's heavy cavalry against Latour-Maubourg's infantry, formed in square, was only halted by Beresford's timely arrival. Latour-Maubourg was subsequently able to complete his withdrawal to Badajoz.^[20]

Beresford invests Badajoz

Beresford now attempted to move his army to invest Badajoz, but a series of mishaps delayed the advance. Wellington had promised a stock of Spanish pontoon boats so that a bridge could be thrown over the Guadiana, but these were not forthcoming; instead, a bridge had to be fashioned in situ, a task that would take until 3 April to complete. Furthermore, the rations promised to Beresford, to be taken from Estremos, had been consumed by the remnants of Mendizabel's army – the troops eventually had to draw on the rations at the fortress of Elvas in order to feed themselves. Finally, the shoes of the 4th Division had completely worn out following two weeks of solid marching; replacements from Lisbon would take a week to arrive. These delays meant that the French could repair the fortifications at Badajoz, taking them from a state of serious disrepair on 25 March to being tenable on 3 April.^[21] At last, Beresford began to bring his army forward on 4 April, but an abrupt flood swept away the makeshift bridge across the Guidiana, trapping the Allied vanguard on the eastern bank. The French, however, did not take advantage of this – Mortier had been recalled to Paris, leaving Latour-Maubourg in command, and he was more concerned with repairing the Badajoz defences than confronting the Allied army.^[22]

By 8 April, new bridges had been thrown across the Guadiana and Beresford's army moved to Olivenza on 9 April. It took three days for the British 4th Division to defeat the small garrison there, during which time the main Allied army moved on to Valverde and Albuera.^[23] In the meantime, Latour-Maubourg had retired to the Andalusian border, leaving only 3,000 men garrisoning Badajoz.^[22] At about this time, Beresford was joined by the remnants of the Spanish Army of Extremadura, now under the command of General Castaños, adding 3,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to the Allied numbers. On 16 April two brigades of the 4th Division, having taken Olivienza, also rejoined the main army.^[24] Since Beresford did not have a siege-train available to him, the ancient artillery pieces at Elvas (some dating from before 1640) were brought forward, and Beresford took the opportunity presented by the delay this caused to clear southern Extremadura of French forces.^[25]

Meanwhile, the Spanish Regency at Cádiz had sent General Joaquín Blake, with the two divisions of Zayas and Lardizabal, by sea to Ayamonte, on the mouth of the Guadiana. Landing on 25 April, Blake's army moved to join General Francisco Ballesteros at Xeres.^[26]

Armies gather

By 9 May, Beresford was back at Badajoz where he was joined by Ballesteros's Spanish division, and Major General Charles Alten's brigade of King's German Legion (KGL) light troops. The Allied army investing Badajoz now numbered around 27,000 men.^[22] Blake's two divisions had moved to Barcarrota and awaited instructions. Beresford had left a brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel John Colborne, along with a detachment of Spanish cavalry, to watch Latour-Maubourg's movements and to dissuade him from bringing his force back into Extremadura.^[27]

In the meantime, the French had also been mustering their strength. General Jean-Pierre Maransin, who had been pursuing Ballesteros, joined Latour-Maubourg on the Andalusian border, bringing the French presence there to 10,000 men. Soult brought a further 15,000 men from I Corps and V Corps to join them, and by 13 May, there were 21,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 48 cannon moving towards Badajoz.^[28]

Beresford had been forewarned of the French movements by reports, received on 12 May, from Spanish patriots in Seville, who had sent word of the departure of Soult's 15,000 men. The Spanish cavalry attached to Colborne's brigade came into contact with the combined French army on 13 May and, in accordance with orders given by Wellington in April, they withdrew, sending word of Soult's position to Beresford. Later that day Long's British cavalry also encountered the French advance, and hastily pulled back—although Long was following Wellington's orders not to engage the enemy, Beresford considered the withdrawal somewhat too hasty, and thought Long could have delayed the French by forcing them to deploy.^[29]

On that same day, Beresford moved the 2nd Division, Major General John Hamilton's Portuguese division and three artillery batteries from Badajoz to Valverde, an ideal position to observe the three routes open for Soult's approach. The two Spanish commanding officers, Blake and Castaños, met Beresford there, and ceded overall command of the Allied army to him.^[30]

By 15 May, it was clear to Beresford that Soult was taking the central route, through Albuera, to Badajoz. Therefore, he marched the 2nd Division and Hamilton's Portuguese to defend the village, where they were joined by Alten's KGL brigade and a further provisional brigade of Portuguese.^[31] Soult's movements became even clearer when his horse chasseurs and hussars engaged Long's cavalry at Santa Marta; Long again retreated in haste, leading Beresford to replace him as the Allied cavalry commander with Major General William Lumley.^[32] There were no further engagements that day, so Beresford was able to complete the disposition of his troops: Hamilton's division was moved, along with most of the Portuguese cavalry, to the Allied left wing; Major General William Stewart's 2nd Division and Lowry Cole's 4th Division, supported by Alten's KGL, formed up on Albuera itself; and the southern section was left for Castaños's and Blake's four Spanish infantry divisions, to be supported by Allied cavalry and several batteries of artillery.^[33] For some reason, Blake's divisions were delayed in coming forward to the lines, and only arrived at around midnight 15–16 May. Nevertheless, they had formed their lines in time for the commencement of battle.^[34]

Meanwhile, Soult was making his own plans. He knew that Blake had landed from Cádiz, but was unaware that the Spanish divisions had joined with Beresford. Therefore, he decided that the best course of action would be to turn the Allies' southern flank, cutting Blake off from Beresford's army. With luck, he thought, the French army would be able to defeat Beresford's force and then turn south to deal with Blake's divisions.^[35]

Organization

Beresford commanded the 2nd Division (5,500) led by Major-General William Stewart, the 4th Division (4,500) under Maj-Gen Lowry Cole, a Portuguese Division (4,800) led by Maj-Gen John Hamilton, a Portuguese brigade (1,400) under Colonel Richard Collins and Maj-Gen Charles Alten's King's German Legion (KGL) brigade (1,100). Maj-Gen William Lumley led the Allied cavalry, three British regiments (1,250) and 850 Portuguese horsemen. There were two British, two KGL and two Portuguese artillery batteries under the command of Major Alexander Dickson. Blake's army consisted of the infantry divisions of Lardizabal (2,400), Ballasteros (3,500) and José Zayas (4,900), the cavalry brigades of Loy and Penne Villemur (1,900), and two batteries. Carlos de España also led an independent brigade (1,800) of Spaniards.

Soult's army included the infantry divisions of Jean-Baptiste Girard (4,200) and Honoré Gazan (4,200), the division-sized "brigades" of Werlé (5,600) and Godinot (3,900), the dragoon division of Latour-Maubourg (2,800), 1,200 additional light cavalry, and 48 artillery pieces under Charles Ruty.

Battle

On the morning of 16 May 1811, Soult was still unaware that Blake's divisions had come up during the night—Beresford had deployed his troops on the reverse slopes of what hills exist on the battlefield, out of French sight. The Marshal therefore proceeded with his plan of turning the Allied right flank.^[35] First, he launched a strong feint attack against Albuera, sending Godinot's infantry brigade, flanked by Briche's light cavalry and supported by artillery, across the bridge leading to the village. Four platoons of Vistula Uhlans crossed the Albuera River, but were driven back by the 3rd Dragoon Guards; meanwhile a Portuguese battery swept the approaches to the bridge, and Godinot's skirmishers became engaged with Alten's KGL battalions.^[36]

At the same time, two brigades of dragoons and Werlé's infantry brigade showed themselves on Godinot's left, advancing out of an olive wood in front of Blake's position.^[37] The Allied commanders took the bait, exactly as Soult had planned, and sent reinforcements to Alten's aid.^[35]

French flank attack

While the Allies were bracing themselves for a frontal assault on their centre and right, Soult was preparing his real thrust. The two V Corps divisions of Generals Girard and Gazan, preceded by a cavalry brigade, swung through the olive trees, out of sight of Beresford's army, in a flanking move. The first the Allies knew of the impending attack was when four French cavalry regiments burst from the woods, crossed two brooks, and scattered Loy's Spanish cavalry.^[38] Alarmed, Beresford rode forward to observe the French manoeuvres, and when Godinot's cavalry support and Werlé's brigade began to move to Girard's rear, Soult's intentions became clear.^[39]

Beresford immediately directed Blake to swing his forward line around to face the approaching French.^[40] Lumley's cavalry was sent to support Loy's horse and hold Blake's right flank, while Stewart's 2nd Division was sent south to form up behind the Spanish lines, in position to provide support if needed. Cole's 4th Division was sent to form up behind the cavalry, and Hamilton's Portuguese moved to the Allied centre to hold Albuera and act as a reserve.^[41]

Blake, however, did not follow Beresford's orders; he still believed that the French attack would come at his front. Therefore, he only moved four battalions from Zayas's division to form the new southern-facing front.^[42] Zayas deployed these battalions, from the Spanish second line, in two groups. Two battalions of Spanish Guards were formed up, in line, at the top of a steep incline while the remaining two formed close column behind them; a single battery of Spanish artillery supported the whole position.^[43]

Beresford, on hearing of Blake's limited redeployment, rode back to personally supervise the change of front. He first brought Zayas's rear column forward, forming a front line four battalions strong. Next, he sent orders for Lardizabal to bring three battalions to support Zayas's right, and for Ballesteros to bring a further two in support of the left.^[43] These reinforcements, however, did not arrive in time to meet the first French attack, and so Zayas faced two entire French divisions with only four battalions.^[44]

Thin Spanish line holds

While Beresford had been redeploying his army, a "majestic movement changed the whole aspect of the French front".^[45] Two brigades of dragoons galloped from the French right-centre, passed behind V Corps, and joined Latour-Maubourg's cavalry on the left. At the same time, Werlé's division had closed with the rear of V Corps, becoming the French reserve. Soult had concentrated his entire infantry, except for Godinot's 3,500 men, and all his cavalry save Briche's light horse, into one front marching on Blake's right flank.^[45]

The two divisions of V Corps advanced, one behind the other, against Zayas's position. The first of these divisions, that of Girard, moved in ordre mixte—four battalions in column, flanked on either side by a battalion in line, and further flanked by a battalion and a half in column—while Gazan's division moved in battalion column.^[46] Girard's forward line of tirailleurs engaged Zayas first, and gradually thinned the Spanish front rank.^[47] When Girard's main column came within about 55 yards (50 m) of the Spaniards, the skirmishers split to the left and right, and the battalions behind them opened fire. The Spaniards held their line, exchanging volleys with the French, and repelled Girard's first attack.^[48]

Zayas's line, possibly the best troops in the Spanish army at the time,^[44] were slowly forced back, but they held long enough for Ballesteros and Lardizabal to come up, and for Stewart's 2nd Division to advance in their support.^[49] Stewart brought John Colborne's 1st Brigade up first, followed by the Division's two other brigades. The 3rd Regiment of Foot (the Buffs) took the lead, followed by the 48th and the 66th, and Colborne's brigade formed up on the French left flank. Supported by a battery of KGL cannon, the British opened fire on the French, forcing the outer two battalions to face outwards to return fire.^[50]

Destruction of Colborne's brigade

The musketry duel between Colborne's brigade and Girard's left flank was so intense that both sides wavered. The French began to break, and were only held in place, with some difficulty, by their officers beating them back with swords.^[50] The British left, assailed by both musket fire and grape, made a bayonet charge and were driven back. Gradually though, the British gained the upper hand, and Stewart ordered the advance.^[51]

As Colborne's brigade charged the French, a blinding shower of rain and hail hit the battlefield, rendering both sides' muskets useless.^[52] Meanwhile, Latour-Maubourg had launched two cavalry regiments at Colborne's exposed right flank; the 1st Vistula Uhlans and the 2nd Hussars virtually annihilated the first three British regiments, and only the fourth, the 31st Regiment of Foot, was able to save itself by forming into square.^[49] The French cavalry pressed on against the KGL supporting battery, and captured the artillery pieces; all but the howitzer were subsequently recovered.^[53]

Having captured five regimental flags and the cannon from the KGL battery, the Uhlans swept past the 31st Regiment's square, scattering Beresford and his staff, and attacked the rear of Zayas's line.^[54] Zayas, to his credit, met the new assault unflinchingly while continuing to direct fire at Girard.^[55] The rainstorm had, by this time, cleared, and Lumley could finally make out the devastation caused by the French and Polish cavalry; he sent two squadrons of the 4th Dragoons to disperse the Uhlans. The Poles scattered, but the British troopers were, in turn, driven off by a fresh French hussar regiment that Latour-Maubourg had sent to cover the lancer's retreat.^[56] Stewart's second brigade, Daniel Hoghton's, had now closed on the action, and its leading regiment—the 29th Regiment of Foot—opened fire on the scattered Vistula lancers.^[57] Most of this fusillade actually missed the horsemen and struck the rear ranks of Zayas's men instead. Nevertheless, the Spaniards continued to stand firm, and their actions very likely saved the allied army from destruction.^[55]

British sources state that the Polish cavalrymen refused to accept surrender by the infantry, and deliberately speared the wounded as they lay. Tradition reports that the British 2nd Division swore to give no quarter to Poles following Albuera. In fact, of the 1,250 men lost by Colborne's first three regiments, 479 were taken prisoner.^[58]

Hoghton's ordeal

The battle now entered something of a hiatus as both sides sought to regroup. Throughout the previous actions, Girard had kept up his assault, and his division had suffered considerably in the battle with Zayas and from Colborne's brief incursion.^[59] Girard now regarded his division as a spent force, and tried to bring up Gazan's column to replace it. Gazan's battalions, however, had to struggle through the remnants of Girard's units, and the ensuing confusion gave the Allies the chance to re-form their own lines.^[59] Beresford deployed Hoghton's brigade behind Zayas's lines, and Abercrombie's to the rear of Ballesteros, and then brought them forward to relieve the Spaniards.^[60] Joseph Sherer, an officer serving with Abercrombie's brigade, recounts how a young Spanish officer rode up and "begged me … to explain to the English that his countrymen were ordered to retire [and] were not flying."^[61]

Following these reorganisations, the second phase of the battle commenced, if anything even more bloodily than the first.^[59] The French could only deploy a skirmish line against Abercrombie's brigade, and hence the bulk of the Allied fighting fell on Hoghton's formation, assisted by the 31st Foot, the sole survivors from Colborne's brigade; a line of 1,900 men faced the 8,000 men of V Corps.^[60] Hoghton's three battalions – the 29th Regiment of Foot, 1/48th Regiment of Foot and 1/57th Regiment of Foot – suffered huge casualties, with 56 officers and 971 men killed or wounded from their complement of 95 officers and 1,556 men.^[62]

Ordinarily, the British line should have driven off the French column, but the French were well supported by artillery. More than making up for the musketry disadvantage of a column, the artillery enfiladed the British lines with a crossfire of grape and canister from a range of just 300 yards (275 m).^[63] Early in this engagement, Colonel William Inglis of the 57th Foot was wounded by grapeshot from the French artillery. He refused to be carried to the rear and lay with the Colours – throughout the battle his voice could be heard calmly repeating "Die-Hard 57th, Die-Hard".^[64] The 57th, in obeying these exhortations, thus earned their nickname – 'the Die-Hards'.^[61]

The battle was by no means one-sided. Hoghton's brigade was decimated, the Brigadier had been killed and the shrinking front line no longer covered the French column. The French were, however, in no condition to press their numeric advantage home; the British volley fire had taken its toll, and V Corps lost 2,000 men during the confrontation.^[65] Girard tried to form his column into line in order to overwhelm the British with his superior numbers, but the deploying companies were constantly driven back into the column by the intense British musketry.^[66]

Soult's defeat

The result of the battle was still far from certain; Soult had Werlé's brigade in reserve, and most of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry had not been engaged. Cole's 4th Division, formed up behind Lumley's squadrons, seems to have persuaded Soult not to use the strong force of horsemen.^[67] Soult claimed, in his dispatch to the Emperor, that he had only now learned that Blake had joined Beresford, and he faced a much larger Allied force than expected.^[68] The Marshal therefore, having out-manoeuvred the Allies with his flank attack, went on the defensive: the cavalry were refused permission to charge, and Werlé remained in reserve.^[59]

Beresford, in the mean time, was proving no more incisive. Anxious to reinforce Hoghton and Abercrombie, he tried to bring up de España's independent brigade, but they refused to move into range of the French.^[69] He decided to leave Cole's division in place, later claiming that this was in order to protect the Allied flank from cavalry attack, though Wellington thought that Beresford was actually securing his line of retreat.^[70] Beresford therefore called upon Hamilton's Portuguese further north; but Hamilton had moved his division closer to Albuera to hold off Godinot's attack, and the orders took a long time to reach him – Hamilton's brigades only started moving half an hour after the orders had been sent.^[69] Facing defeat, Beresford now sent 3,000 Spaniards to Albuera to release Alten's KGL. Alten hastily regrouped and marched south to the Allies' right wing, but Godinot took Albuera before the Spaniards could arrive, exposing another Allied flank to the French.^[59]

It was at this critical point that Cole made his move. Having no orders from Beresford, he had been considering moving against the French left flank, but the idea of advancing across open country in the face of the 3,500 French cavalry made him think twice.^[71] Cole's mind was made up when Colonel Henry Hardinge, of the Portuguese Quarter-master-general's department, rode up and urged him to immediately advance.^[72] After a brief consultation with Lumley, Cole began to redeploy his division from column into line. Conscious of the dangers presented by Latour-Maubourg's horsemen, Cole flanked his line with a unit in column at either end: on the right were the division's massed light companies, including those from Brigadier Kemmis's brigade,^[24] while the first battalion of the Lusitanian Legion took station on the left.^[72] Lumley formed up the whole of the Allied cavalry to the rear and right, accompanied by a battery of horse artillery, and the whole mass, some 5,000 infantrymen, advanced on V Corps' left flank.^[71]

The sight of the approaching Allied line forced Soult's hand—if Cole's division was not stopped, defeat was certain. He sent four regiments of Latour-Maubourg's dragoons to charge the Portuguese part of Cole's line, and committed the whole of Werlé's reserve to protecting V Corp's flank.^[73] The French dragoons swept down on Harvey's Portuguese brigade, fully expecting to destroy it as they had Colborne's. The inexperienced Portuguese, however, stood firm and drove the cavalry away without even forming square.^[74] The French cavalry made no further attack on Cole's division and the line marched on. The Fusilier brigade and Lusitanian Legion, on the Allied left, soon encountered Werlé's brigade, which outnumbered them two to one.^[75] Despite their advantage in numbers though, Werlé had formed his nine battalions into three columns of regiments and hence could not bring as many muskets to bear as the Allies. Three separate regimental musket duels followed, as the 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers and the two battalions of the 7th Fusiliers each took on a column.^[73] During the ensuing fire-fight, the French tried to extend into line, as V Corps had attemped earlier, but as before the concentrated Allied fire prevented the movement. After 20–30 minutes of bitter conflict, the French finally broke and fled.^[75] The Fusiliers had lost more than half their numbers, mainly to artillery fire, while Werlé's brigade had suffered 1,800 casualties.^[73]

Meanwhile, Abercrombie had wheeled his brigade upon the right of the beleaguered V Corps and charged; Girard's and Gazan's men fled to the rear, joining the fugitives from Werlé's brigade.^[76] The Allied 4th Division, and parts of the 2nd, pursued the retreating French, leading Beresford to exclaim "Stop! Stop the Fifty Seventh; it would be a sin to let them go on!"^[77] There was, though, little further pursuit: Latour-Maubourg placed his cavalry between the chasing Allied divisions and the fleeing French infantry, and the British and Portuguese drew up on the heights they had just won. Soult had also moved up his final reserve, two strong Grenadier battalions, to cover the retreat and, although they suffered heavily from Allied artillery fire, they and the cavalry ensured there was little further fighting.^[76] After some delay, Beresford brought up three Portuguese brigades and drove the French Grenadiers back, but by this time Soult had massed his artillery in a line against the Allies and, wisely, Beresford did not charge.^[78]

As a postscript to the battle, Alten's KGL, who had not had time to join the southern front, had returned to Albuera and driven out what French force remained in the village. After six or seven hours of bitter conflict, the battle had come to an end.^[78]

Aftermath

On the morning of 17 May, both sides formed up facing each other; Beresford was preparing for another defensive battle, while Soult was holding his ground only long enough to arrange for his wounded to be transported to Seville.^[79] There was little chance of Soult resuming hostilities, since Kemmis's 1,400 strong brigade, that had been stranded on the north bank of the Guadiana, joined Beresford on the battlefield at dawn on 17 May. Beresford also had the relatively unscathed Portuguese division, Alten's KGL and several Spanish battalions ready for duty; Soult, in contrast, only had Godinot's brigade and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry in a fit state to fight.^[80] News that Wellington was marching to Elvas with two divisions persuaded Beresford not to launch an offensive against Soult's superior artillery and cavalry, and hastened the Marshal's decision to retreat.^[79]

Soult marched away before dawn on 18 May, leaving several hundred wounded behind for the Allies to treat.^[81] There were so many men wounded in the battle that, two days later, British casualties were still waiting to be collected from the field. The chapel at Albuera was filled with wounded Frenchmen, and the dead still lay scattered across the ground;^[80] In proportion to the numbers involved, the Battle of Albuera was the bloodiest of the whole Peninsular War.^[82]

Thus, the engagement ended indecisively after a bitter struggle. The losses on both sides were horrific, and while Soult had failed in his aim of relieving the siege of Badajoz, neither side had the will to press for a conclusive victory.^[83] The Allied losses amounted to 5,916: 4,159 British, 389 Portuguese and 1,368 Spaniards.^[1] The French casualties are a little more difficult to ascertain—Soult initially declared 2,800 in his dispatch to Napoleon, but the official figure, drawn up on 6 July, revised that number to 5,936. British historians, however, dispute this, comparing Soult's figure of 241 officer casualties with the regimental returns that total 362.^[2] Sir Charles Oman extrapolates this figure to come up with a total number of casualties of approximately 7,900. In comparison, the French historians Belmas and Lapéne place Soult's losses at 7,000.^[84]

Consequences

Soult's campaign had only managed to relieve the siege of Badajoz for three days, during which time the garrison's commander, General Phillipon, had managed to destroy the surrounding Allied trenchworks and batteries. The 4th Division, however, had sent the more valuable supplies back to Elvas before it moved up to Albuera on 15 May, so little more was achieved during the Allied absence. On 18 May, Beresford sent Hamilton's Portuguese division, along with some cavalry, back to Badajoz and, on 19 May, the investment was resumed.^[79] Beresford's corps was joined by Wellington's field army during June 1811, and the Allies continued to batter the town's defences. When the French Army of Portugal, now under the command of Marshal Auguste Marmont, and Soult's Army of the South converged, however, Wellington was forced to pull his 44,000–man army back to Elvas. On 20 June, the combined French force of over 60,000 men had lifted the siege.^[85]

Albuera therefore had little effect on the overall course of the war, but it had shown that British and Spanish troops could work together. Anglo–Spanish political relations, on the other hand, suffered following the battle. Wellington unfairly placed most of the blame for the losses on Blake, while a dispatch read in the Spanish cortes implied that the British had played only a minor role in the battle.^[86]

Notes

References

• Esdaile, Charles (2002), The Peninsular War, Penguin Books (published 2003), ISBN 0-140-27370-0;

• Fortescue, Sir John (1917), A History of the British Army, vol. VIII, Macmillan, <http://www.archive.org/details/historyofbritish08fortuoft>. Retrieved on 13 September 2007;

• Gates, David (1986), The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War, Pimlico (published 2002), ISBN 0-7126-9730-6;

• Glover, Michael (1974), The Peninsular War 1807–1814: A Concise Military History, Penguin Classic Military History (published 2001), ISBN 0-141-39041-7;

• Muzás, Luis (2002), Trophies of Albuera (May 16, 1811), The Napoleon Series, <http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/battles/c_albueraflags.html>. Retrieved on 10 October, 2007;

• Oman, Sir Charles (1911), A History of the Peninsular War: Volume IV, December 1810 to December 1811, Greenhill Books (published 2004), ISBN 1-85367-618-7;

• Weller, Jac (1962), Wellington in the Peninsula, Nicholas Vane.

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