Battle of Broodseinde

Battle of Broodseinde Part of Battle of Passchendaele (World War I) German artillery piece captured by the Australian 45th Battalion Date 4 October 1917 Location Broodseinde, Flanders Result Allied victory Belligerents United Kingdom Australia New Zealand German Empire Commanders and leaders Douglas Haig Erich Ludendorff Strength 12 Divisions[1] 10 Divisions[2] Casualties and losses 20,000 total [3] (including 6,423 Australian [4] and 1,853 New Zealanders)[5] approx 20,000 (including 5,000 prisioners)[3]

v t e Battle of Passchendaele Messines Pilckem Ridge Langemarck Menin Road Ridge Polygon Wood Broodseinde Poelcappelle 1st Passchendaele 2nd Passchendaele

The Battle of Broodseinde was the most successful Allied attack of the Battle of Passchendaele. Using the "bite and hold" tactic (where the objective was limited to what could be captured and held against German counter-attacks), the Allied forces conducted an attack on well-entrenched German forces and showed that it was possible for the allies to overcome even the stoutest German defences.

Background

The Battle of Broodseinde was the third of Plumer's more limited form of "bite and hold" battles of the Passchendaele campaign (3rd Battle of Ypres) following the Battle of Menin Road on 20 September and the Battle of Polygon Wood on the 26th, with the intention of capturing the Gheluvelt Plateau.^[6] The Gheluvelt Plateau ran along the southern edge of the Ypres Salient and formed a formidable barrier to further eastward attacks, obstructing Field Marshal Haig's advance out of the salient. Haig believed that the Germans were on the edge of collapse and had ordered exploitation forces (infantry, tanks and cavalary, (as well as XV Corps on the Belgian coast and the amphibious force) readied to follow up in case of a general withdrawal by the Germans.^[6][7] At least 24 German counterattacks^[8] (nine were conducted immediately after the Battle of Menin Road,^[9] as well as more on 30 September and 1 October) were made,^[10] it should have been apparent that German morale was still strong. Gough and Plumer wrote to Haig that an exploitation was premature. Haig replied that he wanted advanced guards supported by field artillery ready, to operate in conditions similar to open warfare should the occasion arise and that the arrangements would provide the means if the opportunity occurred.^[11]

Once the Gheluvelt Plateau was captured, Haig believed that two further attacks, planned for 10 October (the Battle of Poelcappelle, moved forward to 9 October) and 13 October (the First Battle of Passchendaele, moved forward to 12 October) might result in a German withdrawal. The subordinate Army commanders (General Plumer commanding the British Second Army and General Gough commanding the British Fifth Army) doubted that the breakthrough was imminent,^[12] since the limited advances made meant that most German artillery was intact.^[13]

Prelude

The Battle of Broodseinde was the last assault launched by Plumer in good weather.^[14] The operation aimed to complete the capture of the Gheluvelt Plateau and the occupation of Broodseinde Ridge. This would protect the southern flank of the British line and permit attacks on the Passchendaele Ridge to the east.^[15] The attack was originally planned for 6 October to permit II Anzac Corps time to prepare.^[16] Haig was anxious about the possibility of deteriorating weather so he pushed to have the assault advanced by two days.^[17] The Germans were equally concerned about the amount of ridge-line the British held near Zonnebeke and sought to recapture as much as possible in a local attack on 4 October.^[18] 12 divisions were involved in the attack over a 14,000 yards (13,000 m) front.^[1]

Allied forces and objectives of the Battle of Broodseinde

Preparation

The battle was planned to start on 6 October but was moved forward to 4 October.^[6][12] The Battle of Menin Road the first of the bite-and-hold attacks which incorporated the lessons learned from 31 July had three weeks of preparation.^[19] Due to the speed with which V Corps was relieved

The original date of Broodseinde had been brought forward to 4 October from 6 October thanks to the speed with which II Anzac Corps could relieve V Corps. This decision was made by the 26 September, immediately after Polygon Wood.^[20]

and the increasing chance of rain affecting the battle as had happened during the Battle of Langemarck. The interval between attacks was shortened, having several effects on the battle as it allowed less time for either side to prepare, which resulted in more German artillery escaping counter-battery fire and less time being available to cut barbed wire and destroy pillboxes, although the Germans generally left these to give battle in the open. The increased tempo of British attacks put more strain on the German system of reinforcement and relief of tired divisions.

The preliminary artillery bombardment was also shortened. For the Battle of Menin Road, a week long artillery preparation was fired and for the Battle of Polygon Wood, a 24 hour artillery bombardment. No artillery preparation was used for the Battle of Broodseinde except for the normal heavy counter-battery fire and destructive fire on German strong-points. In an attempt to mislead the Germans as to the date and time of the infantry attack, when a hurricane bombardment was to be fired at zero hour, "practice" barrages were begun on 27 September.^[21] The first belt was 150 yards beyond the jumping-of tapes, after three minutes the barrage crept forward by 100 yard lifts in four minutes for 200 yards, then every six minutes to the first objective protective line, 200 yards beyond the infantry objective. During the pause the barrage was to move 1,000 yards further to hit German counter-attacks then suddenly return. At zero + 130 minutes it was to advance again in 100 yard lifts every eight minutes to the final objective. After a pause it was to creep forward at hourly intervals another 1,500 yards into the German defences. The defensive barrage by the first two belts from the field artillery was to stop at 11.20 a.m. except for SOS fire and the two back belts of heavy and medium artillery at 1.44 p.m.^[22] The practice barrages increased to two barrages a day from 1 October.^[23] Despite the ruse of using practice barrages, 'a very reliable agent' informed the Germans ^[24] that an attack was coming from as early as 1 October. The battle was almost called off, with rain starting on 2 October (2.7 mm on the first day, 1.2 mm on 3 October and 4.6 mm on 4 October).^[25] This had the effect of turning parts of the ground into a morass.

British offensive changes: 25 August

Plumer's tactical refinements had sought to undermine the German defence-in-depth by limiting objectives to a shallower penetration and then fighting the principal battle against German counter-attacking (Eingreif) divisions, rather than against the local defenders. By further reorganising the infantry's reserves, Plumer ensured that the echelons in depth of the attacking divisions roughly corresponded to the echelons in depth of the local German counter-attack reserves and their Eingreif divisions. This meant that more support was provided for the advance and consolidation against German counter-attacks. More units attacked on narrower fronts and troops advanced no more than 1,500 yards (1,400 m) into the German defence zone before consolidating their position.^[26] When the Germans counter-attacked they found a zone of defence-in-depth still heavily protected by artillery like the British green and black lines had been on 31 July, suffering heavy casualties to little effect. The tempo of these operations added to German difficulties in replacing tired divisions, because of the transport bottlenecks behind the German front.^[27]

The pause in British operations while Plumer moved even more artillery into the area of the Gheluvelt plateau helped to mislead the Germans. At first General von Kuhl (Chief of Staff, Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht) doubted that the offensive had ended but by 13 September had changed his mind, "My innermost conviction that the battle of Flanders has finished is strengthened more and more.". Despite Kuhl's caution, two divisions, 13 heavy batteries and 12 field batteries of artillery, three fighter squadrons and four air force units were transferred from the Fourth Army.^[28]

German defensive changes: 30 September

After the bloody defeats of 20 and 26 September the German commanders led by Ludendorff made more changes to the defensive deployment of their troops and altered the counter-attack tactics that had been negated by Plumer's more conservative version of limited attack. Previously their counter-attack (Eingreif) divisions had engaged in a manner analogous to an advance to contact during mobile operations;^[29] before September this practice had given the Germans several (albeit costly) defensive successes. The defensive counter-attacks in September had been assaults on reinforced field positions, due to the restrained nature of British infantry advances in better visibility, which greatly increased the effectiveness of artillery—infantry liaison. German counter-attacks were defeated with heavy casualties, after arriving too late to take advantage of the attackers' disorganisation. The British had made time to establish a defence in depth, behind standing barrages in dry clear weather, with increased air support for observation of German troop movements, contact patrolling and ground attack operations by the RFC. Systematic defensive artillery support was forfeited by the Germans' uncertainty over the position of their infantry, just when the British infantry benefitted from the opposite.^[30]

After each attack I discussed the tactical experiences with General von Kuhl and Colonel von Lossberg.... Our defensive tactics had to be developed further, somehow or other. We were all agreed on that. The only thing was, it was so infinitely difficult to hit on the right remedy. (Ludendorff, Memoirs.)^[31]

Ludendorff ordered a strengthening of forward garrisons and the reinforcement of the front garrisons of the ground holding divisions, supporting the front divisions with the Stoss regiment of the Eingreif division behind each one in the artillery protective line (behind the forward battle zone), to launch counter-attacks while the British were consolidating and the holding back of the Eingreif divisions, which were to be used instead in a methodical counter-stroke on the next day or the one after^[32] and also for forestalling attacks and counter-attacks between British offensives.^[33] All available machine-guns including those of the support and reserve battalions of the front line regiments were sent into the forward zone to form a cordon of four to eight guns every 250 yards.^[34]

The result of these discussions was reflected in a Fourth Army operation order of 30 September, which pointed out that the German position in Flanders was restricted by the topography, the coast and the Dutch frontier which made local withdrawals impossible. Efforts were to continue be made to increase British infantry losses in line with the instructions of 22 September, with more bombardment by feld artillery and by using at least half of the heavy artillery's ammunition for observed fire on infantry positions like captured pill-boxes, command posts, machine-gun nests, duckboard tracks and field railways. Gas bombardment was to be increased on forward positions and artillery emplacements whenever the winds allowed. Every effort was to be made to induce the British to reinforce their forward positions, where the German artillery could engage them by making spoiling attacks to recapture pill-boxes, improve defensive positions and harass the British with patrols and diversionary bombardments.^[35] Between 26 September and 3 October the Germans attacked and counter-attacked at least 24 times.^[36]

The British had not been complacent and these changes were predicted in an intelligence summary of 1 October.^[37][38]

British military intelligence did predict the major-German counter attack on 4 October but could not confirm it. It had accurately monitored the state and intentions of the German Army on the front during the build up to the battle.^[39]

Battle

The main attack was conducted by the I Anzac (composed of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions) and II Anzac Corps (composed of the New Zealand Division and 3rd Australian Division) of the Second Army (The German 19th, 45th Reserve and 4th Guards divisions were opposite the Anzac divisions.)^[40] and XVIII Corps (comprising the 11th and 48th Divisions) of the Fifth Army, with flanking attacks supporting the main attack conducted by the X Corps (comprising the 7th, 21st and 5th Divisions) and IX Corps (comprising the 37th Division) of the Second Army and XIV Corps (comprising the 29th and 4th Divisions) of the Fifth Army. The original plan was to have the I ANZAC Corps replaced after the Battle of Polygon Wood. As the I ANZAC Corps had emerged from the battle with fewer than expected casualties, it remained in the front line. The II ANZAC Corps replaced the V Corps.^[41]

Small forces of tanks were also used, with four tanks providing aid to the 21st Division^[42] and 10 tanks attached the 11th Division^[43] (all tanks were from the Tank Corps D Battalion).

The attack started at 0600 hours when the British barrage "... suddenly crashed down on the whole depth of the German position."^[44] XIV Corps to the north crossed the Lauterbeek on the left and 29th Division captured its objective, overlooking the Broembeek valley. The 4th Division advanced on a 1,400 yard front and crossed 19 Metre Hill despite a very ragged creeping barrage. Both brigades of 4th Division encountered machine gun fire from defences along the edge of Houlthulst Forest and suffered 1,700 casualties, forcing them back to the western slope of the hill. later attempts to resume the advance failed.^[45][46] The northern corps of the main attack (XVIII Corps) used three brigades (one from 48th Division and two from 11th Division) to capture all of its objectives with the help of ten tanks of D battalion, I Tank Brigade at a cost of 2,000 casualties. Despite the objective being only the west end of Poelcappelle the tanks chased the Germans out of the lot.^[47][48] German artillery fire and counter-attacks later recaptured the northern half of the village of Poelcappelle.^[43]

British soldiers advancing during the battle. Photo by Ernest Brooks

When the I ANZAC Corps was deployed to attack, a German artillery bombardment fell on it causing 1 in 7 of the infantry to become casualties.^[49] When the Australian forces advanced, the cause of the German artillery fire became apparent, when they met the German 212th Infantry Regiment from the 45th Reserve Division (backed by 4th Guard Division) in no-man's-land.^[50] The German attack (Operation Hohensturm) was the result of concerns over the amount of ridgeline held on the Groote Molen (Tokio) spur near Zonnebeke and the desire to recapture as much of it as possible.^[46] Due to the superior numbers involved, the Australians quickly routed the Germans and continued to advance. Despite hard fighting to capture the fortifications of the Flandern I line, the Australians reached the first objective (the "Red Line", 100 to 200 yards short of the crest of the ridge) by 07:20. During the hour long halt at the first objective, parts of the 1st Australian Division attacked German pillboxes positioned along the crest of the ridge (these turned out to be two Battalion headquarters).^[51]

The Australians consolidated just short of the second objective, due to defensive fire from German positions along the edge of 'Daisy Wood'.^[52] This effort cost the Australian divisions approximately 4,500 casualties.^[48]

Initially, the II ANZAC Corps had an easier time than its neighbouring ANZAC units. During the advance to the second onjective (the "Blue Line", 200 to 400 yards beyond the crest of the ridge), it had to advance through parts of the Flandern I line.^[53] Despite this, the second objective was reached by 09:00, at a cost of 3,500 casualties (including 1,853 New Zealanders).^[5]

The attack by the X Corps achieved most of its objectives (advancing 800 yards (730 m)), although unsubdued German artillery fire from behind the Ghevulelt Plateau caused large numbers of casualties (8,000 casualties in the three attacking divisions).^[46] IX Corps in the south experienced the same problems as the X Corps and made little headway against the German defence.

After the attacking units reached their final positions, Allied artillery fired a standing barrage for an additional two and a half hours, allowing the attacking troops to establish defences (trenches, outposts, defensive wire entanglements, etc.).^[54] As a result, when the Germans counter-attacked, most attempts were dispersed by artillery fire.

Aftermath

Results of the attack, compared with pre-battle Objectives

The attack was a stunning attritional success, with an average advance of over 1,000 yards (910 m)^[55] and the Australian 3rd Division advancing up to 1,900 yards (1,700 m).^[56] Capture and retention of ground was varied, with limited (or no) advance maintained by the southernmost Corps, to moderate gains between Menin Road and Polygon Wood and all objectives at Broodseinde Ridge.

Had the artillery been closer, it would have been possible for the advance to have continued. However, as some of the artillery was already at its extreme range,^[54] the plan would have had to have been modified to address this possibility prior to the attack. As it was, there was discussion between Generals Godley (II Anzac Corps commander), Charteris (Head of Intelligence at BEF HQ), Plumer (Second Army commander) and Birdwood (I Anzac Corp commander) as to the possibility of further attacks on 4 October (with Godley and Charteris wanting to go on but Birdwood and Plumer arguing against).^[57] By mid-afternoon it was decided that no further attacks would take place.^[58]

No man's land after the attack, looking towards German front line

The capture of the ridgeline was a stunning success, with General Plumer calling the attack "the greatest victory since the Marne",^[59] and German Official History referring to the attack as "the black day of October 4".^[60]

One German officer wrote,

what actually happened in that swampy area in the dark and the fog, no pen of a living author can ever write.^[61]

The German 4th Guards Division suffered horrific losses. Further up the line other German divisions had also been waiting to go over the top at the Broodseinde Ridge. The 19th Reserve Division had been lying in their positions in the trenches when the British bombardment of the 5th Division broke them up just as comprehensively. The entire 45th Reserve Division was also caught in the open along with regiments from the 4th Bavarian Division. The casualty figures for this one day were appalling. The 45th Reserve Division lost 83 officers and 2800 other ranks, whilst the 4th Guards Division suffered 86 officers and 2700 other ranks killed.^[62]

The success of the battle masked the conditions that would have so much influence on the next battle (the Battle of Poelcappelle). The wetness of the ground caused some units to lose the protection of the creeping barrage,^[19] as well as causing shells to bury themselves in the mud before exploding (and so be less effective, although this applied to German shells too). Similarly the muddy terrain also caused great difficulty in moving artillery from its positions on the southern edge of the salient (where it supported the battle) two miles to the eastern edge (where it would be used in the Battle of Poelcappelle). The closest field guns were 5,000 yards from Broodseinde; for the battle of Messines, 6,200 yards for the 18-pdrs and 7,000 for the 4.5-inch howitzers had been given as the safe maximum.^[63]

The success of the battle also caused relief in the BEF HQ (believing that the Germans were close to collapse), while anxieties about the weather increased, resulting in the time between attacks being further reduced (meaning less time for preparatory artillery and artillery moves) which had a deleterious effect on the next two battles (the Battles of Poelcappelle and First Passchendaele). Had note been made of the fact that the attacking units of the Second Army was subjected to 10 German counter attacks on the same day as the attack^[64] then a more accurate appreciation of German morale might have resulted. The effectiveness of German counter-attacks after 4 October was not uniform. The New Zealand Official Historian wrote,

His shelling was light and scattered all over the 2nd Army Front, indifferent local counter-attacks, the lack of cohesion no less than the mixture of units for thickening up the line, clearly betrayed his straits.^[65]

The weather now began to influence British offensive preparations,

"In view of the results of three step-by-step blows, what will be the result of three more in the next fortnight?" But on the very day on which this prospect opened, the weather broke.(Australian Official Historian)^[66]

Victoria Crosses

There were nine Victoria Crosses awarded during the Battle of Broodseinde.^{[citation needed]} These were awarded to:

• Acting Sergeant-Major James Ockendon, from the 29th Division;
• Acting Captain Clement Robertson, of the Royal Tank Regiment;
• Sergeant Charles Harry Coverdale, from the 11th Division
• Acting Corporal Fred Greaves, from the 11th Division;
• Private Arthur Hutt, from the 48th Division;
• Sergeant Lewis McGee, from the Australian 3rd Division;
• Lance-Corporal Walter Peeler, from the Australian 3rd Division;
• Acting Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Pugh Evans, from the 21st Division; and
• Private Thomas Henry Sage from the 37th Division.

Notes

References

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Battle of Broodseinde

• Battle of Broodseinde — a brief description of the battle
• Battle of Broodseinde Ridge — a brief description of the main attack
• The Ypres Salient — Battle of Broodseinde
• Order of Battle - France and Flanders 1917, Battle # 97 — Order of Battle for the Battle of Broodseinde

Coordinates: 50°51′07.26″N 2°53′26.49″E / 50.8520167°N 2.8906917°E / 50.8520167; 2.8906917