Battle of Buna–Gona

Battle of Buna-Gona Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II An Australian soldier, Private George "Dick" Whittington, is aided by Papuan orderly Raphael Oimbari, near Buna on December 25, 1942. Whittington died in February 1943 from the effects of bush typhus. (Picture by George Silk) Date November 16, 1942 – January 22, 1943 Location New Guinea 8°39′S 148°22′E / 8.65°S 148.367°E / -8.65; 148.367Coordinates: 8°39′S 148°22′E / 8.65°S 148.367°E / -8.65; 148.367 Result Allied victory Belligerents Australia United States Empire of Japan Commanders Edmund Herring George Vasey Edwin F. Harding Robert L. Eichelberger Yosuke Yokoyama Yoshitatsu Yasuda from December 2: Kurihanao Yamagata Strength 20,000+ 6,500+ (peak strength, December 2) Casualties and losses 2,300 killed, 12,000+ injured[1] 6,000+ killed, 1,200 injured (evacuated), 200 captured

v • d • e New Guinea campaign Rabaul (land battle) – Rabaul (1942 air raids) – Bougainville action – Salamaua-Lae Invasion – Mo – Coral Sea – Kokoda Track – Milne Bay – Buna-Gona – Wau – Bismarck Sea – Salamaua-Lae campaign – Cartwheel – Wewak raid – Finisterres – Huon Peninsula – Bougainville – Rabaul (1943 air raids) – New Britain – Admiralties – Emirau – Take Ichi – Western New Guinea

A firing trench (foreground) leads to a heavily camouflaged Japanese bunker (background) made from coconut logs.

The Battle of Buna–Gona was a battle in the New Guinea campaign, a major part of the Pacific campaign of World War II. On November 16, 1942, Australian and United States forces attacked the main Japanese beachheads in New Guinea, at Buna, Sanananda and Gona. By January 22, 1943, after prolonged heavy fighting in trying conditions, the Allied forces had overcome the defenders. Casualties were extremely high. Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger later compared the casualty ratio to the United States Civil War. As a percentage of casualties, killed or wounded in action at Buna exceeded the better known Battle of Guadalcanal.

Overview

Allied intelligence in the lead-up to the battle was deficient in two key areas. While it was estimated that there were no more than 1,500–2,000 Japanese troops at the beachheads, the Allies actually faced more than 6,000 soldiers from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and marines from the Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF).

The Japanese were now commanded by Maj. Gen. Oda, succeeding General Horii, who had been drowned in the Kumusi River while retreating from their initial attack on Port Moresby. Unable to dig trenches or shelters due to the 3 feet (0.91 m) deep water table, the Japanese had instead built hundreds of coconut log bunkers. These had been built with mutually supporting lines of fire and were organized in depth. Some of the larger bunkers were protected with steel beams and 50 gallon barrels filled with sand. A handful of pillboxes near the abandoned airstrip about a mile from the Buna Mission were built using steel and concrete. Some blockhouses were covered in earth and could hold up to 20 or 30 soldiers. The bunkers had been covered with earth and fast-growing jungle vegetation. Many smaller fortifications were placed in perimeter positions that were thick with trees or jungle vegetation. Firing slits were a few feet above ground. The bunkers rose to only 6 feet (1.8 m) to 8 feet (2.4 m), so that the emplacements were virtually invisible to attackers until the Japanese unleashed their weapons on the unsuspecting Allied troops. All of these positions could generate devastating interlocking fields of fire, supported by many snipers hidden in tall trees.^[2]

The Allies believed that widespread swampland would render the construction of strongpoints impossible. General Douglas MacArthur received intelligence from Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, who told MacArthur before the operation that there was "little indication of an attempt to make a strong stand against the Allied advance."^[2] The information also led him to believe that Buna was held by about 1000 sick and malnourished soldiers. Unfamiliar with the state of Japanese defenses, Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur’s chief of staff, glibly referred to these fortifications as "hasty field entrenchments."

The Allies initially lacked tanks and air support for the troops thus heavy weapon support was inadequate and poorly coordinated. American officers also argued against artillery support as unnecessary with the result that the 32nd Division had to borrow eight 25 pounders from the Australians. General Harding requested tanks from Milne Bay but was sent Bren gun carriers instead with tanks not arriving until late in the campaign. Without the support that could have taken out a strongpoint in minutes, the Japanese positions could hold out for days and had to be taken one by one which required troops crawling to the bunkers and pushing grenades through the slits.^[3]

The beginning of the campaign revealed that the American troops were completely unprepared for the extended forced march across the Kapa Kapa Trail, and were generally poorly trained and unprepared for operations in a tropical environment. Although staff officers considered the 32nd Division unready for combat, MacArthur insisted that it be moved to New Guinea in October 1942. By the time the Allied advance on Buna had stalled in late November, morale was low due to heavy casualties and disease. Self-inflicted wounds were increasingly encountered amongst American casualties.^[3][4]

Tropical diseases, especially malaria, dengue fever and bush typhus (known to the Japanese as tsutsugamushi), caused far more casualties than the effects of battle. The 32nd Division suffered the extraordinary illness rate of 66 percent. Of the 9,825 men who entered combat in the division, 7,125 were casualties due to illness (with 2,952 requiring hospitalisation), compared to 586 killed in action, 1,954 wounded in action, and 100 more dead from other causes. Total casualties of 9,956 exceeded the Division's entire battle strength.^[5]

Forces, supply lines and materiel

The Japanese defences were concentrated in three strongholds. One was at Gona, under Major Tsume Yamamoto; another was around Sanananda, under Colonel Yosuke Yokoyama (who was in overall command of Imperial Japanese Army forces in the Buna-Gona area); and the third and largest Japanese stronghold was in the Buna area, under SNLF Captain Yoshitatsu Yasuda. Although these positions were separate, communications between them and Japanese supply lines were initially strong. The Japanese were initially able to maintain supply lines to Rabaul and to evacuate wounded personnel by sea. Japanese submarines maintained contact with the beachheads until January.

The Japanese garrison was a mix of army and naval forces. It initially numbered about 5,500 Imperial Japanese Army combat personnel: the remnants of the 144th Infantry Regiment, the 15th Independent Engineer Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 41st Infantry Regiment, a divisional cavalry detachment, and the 47th Field Anti-Aircraft Battalion. A few field artillery batteries were guarding the beachheads proper. In addition to these army units, there were about 500 marines from the 5th Yokosuka and 5th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Forces.

The Allies' major bases, at Port Moresby and Milne Bay, were distant. The Owen Stanley Ranges were impassable to motor vehicles. The Imperial Japanese Navy and air forces controlled the Bismarck Sea to the north of New Guinea. The attacking troops depended on airdrops by the Liberator cargo planes of the U.S. Fifth Air Force and makeshift transport units assembled by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), as well as coastal shipping, which was vulnerable to air attack. However, USAAF and RAAF ground attack and bomber aircraft, typified by the A-20 Havoc and Beaufighter respectively, represented a significant and ever-increasing advantage for the Allies.

The U.S. 32nd Infantry Division, an ill-trained and inexperienced National Guard formation, commanded by Major General Edwin F. Harding launched the initial attack on Buna. The Australian 2/6th Independent Company provided flank protection and reconnaissance. The Australian 7th Division (minus one brigade) under Major General George Vasey, and the U.S. 128th Infantry Regiment (detached from the 32nd Division) was to attack Gona. The Gona push was reinforced by the remnants of Maroubra Force, in the shape of the battered 30th Brigade, a Militia unit which included the "ragged bloody heroes" of the Kokoda Track, the 39th (Militia) Battalion. The Australian 16th Brigade, detached from the 6th Division, would push towards Sanananda.

Battle

First phase

Fighting was bitter from the outset: the 7th Division took 204 casualties in the first three days of its thrust. The 32nd Division lost 392 personnel within two weeks. By November 23 it was obvious that capturing Gona was unlikely due to lack of troops and insufficient support, General Vasey requested Herring to send the 21st Brigade to reinforce. While Battery A of the 129th Field Artillery, 32nd Division had been sent to New Guinea, the remaining batteries remained at Camp Cable in Australia. The four gun sections of Battery A were the first howitzers flown into combat, first landing at Port Moresby. Then one-half of Battery A was air-lifted over the Owen Stanley Mountains to Buna, becoming the first US Army artillery flown into combat in the Pacific in World War II.^[6]

On November 20, MacArthur ordered his forces to attack "regardless of losses". The following day General Harding was further ordered to "take Buna today at all costs". General Herring arrived at the American front on November 25 and reported that the American infantry had "maintained a masterly inactivity at Buna". When MacArthur offered the 41st American Division as reinforcements for Gona, General Thomas Blamey declined, in what is seen as payback for earlier statements by MacArthur regarding the quality of Australian troops. He stated he would rely on his depleted 21st Brigade as he "knew they would fight".^[7]

When the artillery finally arrived on November 26, the accuracy of artillery fire was limited by poor maps and inadequate ground observation. On that morning, the Japanese lines were strafed and bombed at tree-top level for nearly an hour by P-40s and Beaufighters. A-20s bombed the Japanese rear areas for another 30 minutes. The air attacks were then followed by a half hour of pounding by mortars, machine guns, and the newly available artillery. At 9:30, the infantry advanced as scheduled, but it immediately became apparent that the two hours of bombardment had not touched the enemy hidden in their bunkers.^[9]

Machine guns concealed in the many bunkers and snipers in the tops of coconut trees opened up, and by evening the Allied lines had barely moved. Units of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, 32nd Division got close enough to the Japanese bunkers to learn that the Japanese machine guns were emplaced in bunkers reinforced with oil drums and covered with a roof.^[9]

On November 29, the Japanese were reinforced by the remaining 500 troops from the South Seas Detachment (mostly the 41st Infantry Regiment under Colonel Kiyomi Yazawa), which had led the Kokoda Track campaign and retreated to the sea at a point north of Gona. They were shuttled by boat to the Sananada stronghold.

By November 29, the Supreme Allied Commander in the South West Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, had become frustrated at what he saw as poor performance by the 32nd Division, especially its commissioned officers. He told the US I Corps commander, Major General Robert L. Eichelberger:

Second phase

Upon arrival at Buna, Eichelberger saw the poor morale among the men, and on December 2, 1942 he replaced Harding with the division's artillery commander, Brigadier General Albert W. Waldron. Eichelberger also sacked the regimental commanders and most battalion commanders, ordered improved food and medical supplies, and halted operations on the Buna front for two days, to allow units to reorganize. On the same day, 500 Japanese reinforcements, in the form of the inexperienced 21st Independent Mixed Brigade (based on the 170th Infantry Regiment), arrived at Gona under Maj. Gen. Kurihanao Yamagata. Eichelberger also ordered additional reconnaissance to help fix the enemy positions. What he learned impressed him.

Brigadier Generals Hanford MacNider, Albert Waldron, and Clovis E. Byers recuperate in hospital in Australia after being wounded in the Battle of Buna-Gona.

An Australian 2/6th Armoured Regiment tank supporting infantry

On December 5, Eichelberger ordered an attack across the entire front. Waldron was shot in the shoulder by a sniper while observing the fighting, and Eichelberger replaced him with his Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Clovis E. Byers. The Allies finally split the Japanese lines. Staff Sergeant Herman Bottcher led a thirty-one-man platoon forward against the attacking Japanese forces. He stood up and threw hand grenades at the enemy and was able to drive a wedge between Buna and Buna village. The tide of the battle of Buna turned and Bottcher was awarded the battlefield commission of Captain and his first of two Distinguished Service Cross Medals.

On December 6, following savage close-quarter fighting, the Australians captured Gona village. That same day, Eichelberger organized a new attack on Buna Village and the 32nd Division captured the position on December 14. General Clovis Byers was in turn wounded on 16 December, forcing Eichelberger to take direct command of the division. The Japanese landed 1,300 reinforcements, but by December 18 the Allies were reinforced by the Australian 7th Division's 18th Brigade along with the M3 Stuart light tanks of the 2/6th Armoured Regiment — the first tanks available to the Allied forces. In spite of this boost, the Australians suffered some of their worst losses of the entire battle, although they eventually broke through the Japanese defensive positions along the coast.

Papuan stretcher bearers carrying US Army wounded from the Buna front lines, pause to rest themselves and the soldiers in the shade of a coconut grove, enroute to hospitals in the rear.

Japanese soldiers killed during the final phase of the battle at Buna Mission, January 1943.

In ten days of fighting, the Allies advanced along the coast from Duropa plantation to Buna Mission, taking the remaining Japanese positions by December 28.

The battle of Sanananda was the longest of the three battles and better defended by the Japanese than Buna or Gona with the defenders occupying the only dry ground and completely surrounded by waist deep swamp. The Australian 16th Brigade, by now half strength, was sent to attack the position but the march was poorly organised and from November 16 to their first contact with the enemy on the 19th the troops went without food. The 1,400 strong U.S. 126th Infantry regiment was ordered to report to the Australians but did not arrive until November 21 by which time the Australians had suffered more than 30 percent casualties. On December 7 the Australian 30th Brigade relieved the 16th Brigade, and Brigadier Porter took overall command. The 126th was also relieved but 635 manned a roadblock under constant Japanese attack. The Americans received their first reinforcements on December 18 when 350 men from the Australian 2/7th Cavalry Regiment fought their way through to the roadblock. The following day the 2/7th outflanked the Japanese and established another roadblock 1,000 feet (300 m) ahead of the American position and the Australian 49th Battalion now reinforced the 126th. By now illness and low moral was taking its toll and the 126th were retired on December 22, of the 635 American troops only 244 effective troops remained by the end of December. The U.S. 163rd Infantry Regiment — from the U.S. 41st Infantry Division — arrived and took over the two roadblocks from the Australians on January 2.

The preliminary attacks began with a failed attack on the Japanese position between the two roadblocks on January 8. Two days later, an attack against the Japanese position at the trail junction, supported by tanks failed but convinced Colonel Tsukamoto to order a retreat. Japanese Imperial Headquarters had already decided on January 4 to retreat to Lae and Salamaua but the order did not reach Sanananda until January 13. On January 14 the Allies discovered that most of the Japanese defenders had left and quickly overran the junction stronghold now held by only 158 Japanese. January 15 saw the US 163rd Infantry finally break the Japanese position between the road blocks. The main attack began the next day with the 163rd attacking the Japanese troops north of the two roadblocks while the Australian attack reached the coast on both sides of Sanananda and also supported the American attack. By January 17 the Japanese had been pinned down in three positions, on the coast north of Sanananda, on the coast west of Giruwa and on the main track north of the roadblocks which was still holding out. On January 20 General Yamagata ordered an evacuation and escaped while General Oda and Colonel Yazawa ran into Australian troops and were killed, the Japanese positions on the coast collapsed with little resistance. Evacuation of the main track was not possible and this last position was overrun on January 22. After almost three months of fighting the Japanese had lost 1,500 men, the Australians 2,700 and the Americans 798.

The Japanese forces had been cut off from resupply during the second week of January, and their food had already run out by January 2. In what turned out to be a unusually common practice among the enemy, Allied troops found evidence of cannibalism of their own troops in captured Japanese positions.

Two NCOs from the 32nd Division, both of them killed in action near Buna—1st Sgt Elmer J. Burr and Sgt Kenneth E. Gruennert—were later awarded the Medal of Honor.

References

Sources

• Brune, Peter (2003). A Bastard of a Place: the Australians in Papua. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74114-403-5. 
• Campbell, James (2007). The Ghost Mountain Boys: Their Epic March and the Terrifying Battle for New Guinea--The Forgotten War of the South Pacific. Crown. ISBN 0307335968. 
• Mayo, Lida (1974). Bloody Buna. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. ISBN 0-385-06268-0. 
• Rottman, Gordon L.; Dr. Duncan Anderson (consultant editor) (2005). Japanese Army in World War II: The South Pacific and New Guinea, 1942-43. Oxford and New York: Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-870-7. 

External links

• U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Papua (official account)
• Southern Cross, a Japanese account of the New Guinea campaigns by the Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, Lt Col Yoshiharu Kane
• South-West Pacific Area - First Year (Official History of Australia in the Second World War)
• Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command Thomas M. Huber,
• The 32nd Red Arrow Infantry Division in World War II 32nd Division Veterans Association website
• Battle of Buna Australian Military Units Australian War Memorial
• Battle of Buna, 19 November 1942-2 January 1943