Falaise Gap, battle of (1944). The Normandy campaign reached its climax in August 1944. The British operation GOODWOOD, on the eastern flank, failed to break through but attracted German reserves. After a disappointing start, the US operation COBRA, on the western flank, developed into a breakout. On 1 August Third US Army became operational under Patton, forming part of Twelfth Army Group under Bradley. The two commanders recognized that, instead of sweeping down into Brittany, the bulk of Third Army should be swung eastwards towards the Seine. Montgomery, commander of Twenty-first Army Group and Allied ground forces, promptly concurred.
Patton's turn created the possibility of catching the Germans between Third Army and the Anglo-Canadian forces pressing down from Caen. The abortive Mortain counter-attack, launched on 7 August, made this outcome more likely by pushing German armour deeper into the pocket. However, determined resistance slowed down the advance on Falaise, and on 13 August Bradley ordered Patton not to proceed north of Argentan, fearing accidental collision with the Canadians. Falaise did not fall until the 16th, and in the meantime thousands of Germans streamed through the Argentan-Falaise gap. On 19 August 1st Polish Armoured Division met the Americans at Chambois, in the neck of the pocket. Polish defence of Mont Ormel, north of Chambois, played an important part in closing the gap, but until the last days it remained possible for determined Germans to get away.
Perhaps 10, 000 Germans died in the pocket and 50, 000 were taken prisoner. Allied aircraft inflicted terrible damage: huge quantities of tanks, half-tracks, and trucks were destroyed or abandoned. It is easy to criticize the Allies for not closing the pocket more swiftly. However, envelopment on such a scale, carried out by two army groups, demanded a greater degree of operational slickness than the Allies possessed.
— Richard Holmes
