Battle of Pilckem Ridge

Battle of Pilckem Ridge Part of the Third Battle of Ypres in the First World War British stretcher bearers carrying wounded in deep mud near Boezinge Date 31 July – 2 August 1917 Location Ypres Salient, Belgium Result Allied Victory Belligerents United Kingdom  German Empire Commanders and leaders Hubert Gough Friedrich Bertram Sixt von Armin Strength 12 divisions

v t e Battle of Passchendaele Messines Pilckem Ridge Langemarck Menin Road Ridge Polygon Wood Broodseinde Poelcappelle 1st Passchendaele 2nd Passchendaele

The Battle of Pilckem Ridge was the opening attack of the main part of the Third Battle of Ypres in the First World War. The battle took place in the Ypres Salient area of the Western Front, between 31 July and 2 August 1917.

Background

Operations in Flanders, Belgium had been desired by the British Cabinet, Admiralty and War Office since 1914. Douglas Haig succeeded John French as Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force on 19 December 1915.^[1] A week after his appointment, Haig met Vice-Admiral Reginald Bacon who emphasised the importance of obtaining control of the Belgian coast, because of the threat from German naval forces based there. In January 1916, Haig ordered General Henry Rawlinson to plan an attack in the Ypres Salient.^[2] Planning continued but the Battle of Verdun beginning in February 1916 and the demands of the Somme battles later in the year absorbed the British Expeditionary Force's offensive capacity.^[3]

On 15 and 29 November 1916, as the Battle of the Somme paused during the wet weather, Haig met French Army General Joseph Joffre and the other Allies in Chantilly, France. They agreed to continue the operations in progress, weather permitting, through the winter and resume the coordinated Somme offensive between the Somme and Arras together with the French army between the Somme and Oise by the first two weeks in February.^[4] A operation in Flanders was not discussed at the conference. However, after a meeting on 22 November 1916 in London between Haig, Chief of the Imperial General Staff William Robertson, First Sea Lord Admiral Henry Jackson and Dover Patrol commander Vice-Admiral Reginald Bacon, it was decided to write to General Joffre urging that the Flanders operation be undertaken in 1917; Joffre replied on 8 December agreeing to the proposal.^[5] By 21 June 1917, the principle of a Flanders offensive had met with the grudging approval of the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, and the approval of the British Cabinet.^[6][7][8]

Strategic background

In late 1916 and early 1917, military leaders in Britain and France were optimistic that the casualties they had inflicted on the German army at the Battle of Verdun, the Battle of the Somme and on the Eastern Front meant that the German army was near to exhaustion. At the same time, the civilian political leaders of both nations were growing wary of the immense cost to their countries. At the conference in Chantilly in November 1916 and a series of subsequent meetings, the Entente agreed on an offensive strategy to overwhelm the Central Powers by means of attacks on the Western, Eastern and Italian Fronts.^[9] British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, sought to find ways of avoiding a repeat of the British casualties involved in the Battle of the Somme and proposed an alternative strategy at a conference in Rome, which would involve an offensive on the Italian front. British and French artillery would be transferred to Italy to add weight to the offensive.^[10][11][12] This suggestion was opposed by the French and Italian delegations, as well at the British officers present, at least covertly, and was discarded.^[13] The new French Commander-in-Chief, Robert Nivelle, believed that a concentrated attack by French forces on the Western Front in during the spring of 1917 could break the German front and lead to a decisive victory. Nivelle's plan was welcomed by the British. While many were sceptical that the French would deliver a breakthrough, a French attack would nonetheless mean less of the burden of the war in 1917 falling on the British.^[14] Haig was ordered to co-operate with Nivelle's plan but secured Nivelle's agreement that in the event the Nivelle Offensive failed, the British would attack in Flanders.^[15]

Prelude

Initial planning

Several plans for the Ypres offensive were produced between November 1916 and May 1917. Haig first ordered General Herbert Plumer, the commander of the British Second Army which occupied the Ypres Salient, to produce a plan. Haig was dissatisfied with the limited scope of Plumer's plan for the capture of Messines Ridge and Pilckem Ridge. Haig felt that the more ambitious French attempt at a decisive battle planned by General Nivelle would either force the Germans to abandon the Belgian coast if successful or seriously weaken the German army if decisive success was not achieved. Plumer produced a revised plan, in which the first stage of the operation would capture Messines and Pilckem while also pushing some distance across the Gheluvelt Plateau. Shortly afterwards, this would be followed by an attack across the Gheluvelt Plateau, advancing to Passchendaele and then further on. Plumer believed that a force of 42 divisions and 5,000 guns would be necessary but the British Expeditionary Force had nowhere near 5,000 artillery pieces. Haig also asked for an assessment from Colonel Macmullen on his headquarters staff, who proposed that the Gheluvelt Plateau be taken by a massed tank attack, reducing the need for artillery. In April, a reconnaissance by Captain Giffard LeQuesne Martel found that the area was unsuitable for tanks, because of the narrow defiles between the three woods obstructing the approaches and the broken state of the ground and woods on the high ground. The tanks would have to detour north of Bellewaarde lake to Westhoek then wheel right at the German Albrecht (second) Line.^[16] Plumer then produced a second revision of his plan; Messines Ridge would be attacked first, along with the west end of the Gheluvelt Plateau and then Pilckem Ridge attacked a short while later. The involvement of British Fourth Army commander Henry Rawlinson produced yet another iteration of the plan; Messines alone should be the first target and Gheluvelt and Pilckem Ridge attacked within 47–72 hours.^[17] On 14 February after discussions with Rawlinson and Plumer and incorporating Haig's changes, Macmullen submitted his memorandum. This version became the plan for the 1917 Flanders campaign and on 13 May Haig appointed British Fifth Army commander Hubert Gough to the command of the northern operation and the coastal force. Macmullen gave Gough the 1917 plan on 14 May and this plan was adapted by Gough and the British Fifth Army staff on the understanding that Haig wanted a more ambitious version.^[18][19]

In April 1917, the Nivelle Offensive took place, with the main effort by the French being the Second Battle of the Aisne, while British and Empire forces undertook a preliminary attack at Arras. The French attack gained ground but at the cost of great casualties and failed to obtain the breakthrough Nivelle had promised; Nivelle was subsequently relieved and replaced by Philippe Petain. Over the summer it became clear that the failure of the offensive had caused a collapse in morale amongst French troops.^[20] The failure of the French breakthrough attempt meant that any offensive on the Western front would be a largely British affair, as the French were exhausted. British Prime Minister Lloyd George, while still attempting to promote his favoured Italian campaign, had little option but to support Haig's Flanders offensive.^[21][22] On 7 May, Haig set the timetable for his Flanders offensive, with 7 June the date for a preliminary attack on Messines Ridge. A week after the Battle of Messines and the capture of Messines Ridge, Haig informed is his Army commanders that his objectives were to wear down the Germans, secure the Belgian coast and connect with the Dutch frontier by first capturing Passchendaele Ridge, then advancing on Roulers and lastly attacking along the coast with an amphibious landing.^[23]

The British Set-Piece Attack

The British set-piece attack in mid-1917

Fifth Army offensive preparations: May—July

British 18 pounder battery taking up new positions near Boesinghe, 31 July

Gough intended to use nine divisions and one brigade from the British Fifth Army, two divisions from the French First Army and five divisions from the British Second Army. Gough's plan involved a preparatory bombardment starting on 16 July and finishing on 25 July, (in the event the infantry attack was delayed until 31 July). The British Second Army would create the impression of a more ambitious attack beyond Messines Ridge, by capturing outposts in the Warneton Line.^[24] British Fifth Army would attack along a front of approximately 14,000 yards (13,000 m), running from Klein Zillebecke in the south to the Ypres—Staden railway in the north, with the French First Army on its northern flank attacking with two divisions, from the boundary with the British XIV Corps to the flooded area just beyond Steenstraat. The objective on the first day, was an advance in three stages to the three German trench-systems, roughly 1,000, 2,000 and 3,500 yards (910, 1,800 and 3,200 m) forward,^[25] at any one of which a halt could be called if necessary.^[26] A possible further advance to the red line by advanced guards as far as Polygon Wood, Broodseinde and Langemarck 1,000–1,500 yards (910–1,400 m) further on to exploit any collapse of German resistance on parts of the front, was left to the discretion of the division commanders.^[27]

II Corps had five divisions at its disposal, compared to four in the other Fifth Army corps. Three divisions and one brigade from would attack with support from approximately 43% of Fifth Army's artillery and the artillery of X Corps on the left flank of Second Army.^{[Note 1]} II Corps was given closer objectives than the other British Fifth Army corps, 1,000 yards (910 m) forward at Klein Zillebeke in the south and 2,500 yards (2,300 m) at the junction with XIX Corps on the Ypres—Roulers railway to the north.^[29] British intelligence estimates expected the Germans to make the Albrecht (second) Line their main line of resistance and to hold back counter-attacks until the British advance reached it.^[30] On the plateau, British intelligence expected the Germans to counter-attack early to recover their front line, reflecting the vital importance of this commanding ground to both sides.^[31][32] An attack of this nature was not a breakthrough operation. The German defensive position known as Flandern I lay 10,000–12,000 yards (9,100–11,000 m) behind the front and would not be attacked on the first day. ^[33] Nonetheless, Gough's plan was more ambitious than Plumer's version, which had involved an advance of 1,000–1,750 yards (910–1,600 m).

Air operations

By 31 July, the Allied air concentration from the Lys River to the sea consisted of 840 aircraft, 330 being fighter aircraft. By 31 July, the German Fourth Army had about 600 aircraft, 200 being single-seat fighters.^[34] The intended slow build-up of Allied air activity over the front of the British Fifth and Second armies was changed on 8 July to an immediate maximum effort due to the Luftstreitkräfte making a similar effort of air and artillery spotting and attacking British Corps aircraft.^[35] Poor weather stopped this until the 11th July. The Germans had been sending larger formations into action and on 12 July the greatest amount of air activity since the war began took place. Thirty German fighters engaged British and French fighters of the Service Aéronautique in a dogfight lasting an hour, the Royal Flying Corps losing nine aircraft and the Luftstreitkräfte 14.^[36] The Germans resisted the British and French air effort until the end of July, when their losses forced a change to more defensive tactics. The Germans continued periodically to assemble large aircraft formations; on 26 July 37 British fighters engaged 50 Albatros scouts near Polygon Wood. During the melée four German reconnaissance aircraft were able to slip over the line and reconnoitre. Next evening eight British aircraft over Menin lured about 20 Albatros scouts to Polygon Wood, where 59 British fighters were waiting. Allied and German aircraft in the vicinity joined in the dogfight and after an hour the surviving German aircraft withdrew. The British decoys shot down six German aircraft and the ambushers another three while the British lost two aircraft.^[37]

Artillery

The British Fifth Army had 752 heavy guns and 1,442 field guns, with support from 300 heavy guns and 240 field guns belonging to the French First Army in the north and 112 heavy guns and 210 field guns of British Second Army to the south. Gough also intended to use 120 tanks to support the attack, with another 48 held in reserve. Gough had five divisions of cavalry, one brigade of which was to be deployed, if XIV Corps reached its objectives.^[38]

During the preliminary bombardment, the artillery was intended to destroy German strong-points and trenches, cut barbed wire entanglements around German positions and to suppress German artillery with counter-battery fire. On the day of the attack, the first wave of infantry would advance under a creeping barrage advancing 100 yards (91 m) every four minutes.^[39] The first wave would be followed by more infantry advancing in columns or artillery formation. The infantry trained on a replica of the German trench system, built using information from aerial photographs and trench raids. Specialist platoons were given additional training on methods to destroy German pill-boxes and blockhouses.^[40]

The attack was delayed on 1 July at the request of General François Anthoine, commander of the French First Army as the French needed more time to prepare artillery emplacements.^[41] On 7 July, Gough asked for a delay of five days as some of the British heavy artillery had been lost to the German counter-bombardment, some delayed in arriving and bad weather had hampered the programme of counter-battery fire.^[42] Haig agreed to delay until the 28th. Anthoine then requested another delay because of the poor weather slowing his artillery preparation and after Gough supported Anthoine, Haig reluctantly agreed to delay to 31 July, even though this meant postponing Operation Hush from 7—8 August to the next period of high tides.^[43]

German defensive preparations

German defensive preparations: June—July 1917

Fourth Army: June—July

The German Fourth Army operation order for the defensive battle was issued on 27 June.^[44] German defences had been arranged as a forward zone, the main battle zone and the rearward zone.^[45] The defence in depth began with a front system of three breastworks each about 200 yards (180 m) apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no man's land.^[46] About 2,000 yards (1,800 m) behind these works was the Albrecht Line, a secondary or artillery protective defence line that marked the rear boundary of the forward zone.^[46] Companies of the support battalions were located at the back of the forward zone with half in the pillboxes of the Albrecht Line. Dispersed in front of the Albrecht Line were divisional sharpshooter machine-gun nests.^[46] The Albrecht Line also marked the front of the main zone with the Wilhelm (third) Line, located a further 2,000 yards (1,800 m) away, marking the rear of the main zone. This zone contained most of the field artillery supporting the front divisions. In pillboxes of the Wilhelm (third) Line were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments in divisional reserve.^[46]. The rearward zone, located between the Wilhem (third) Line and the Flandern I, contained the support and reserve assembly areas for the Eingreif divisions.^[46] The German failures at the Battle of Verdun in December 1916 and at the Battle of Arras in April 1917 had given more importance to these areas, since the forward zone had been overrun and its garrisons lost. It was anticipated that the main defensive engagement would take place in the main battle zone by the Eingreif divisions, against attackers who had been slowed and depleted by the forward garrisons.^[47]

The counter-attack was to be the main tactical response to attacks on the front divisions as local withdrawals would only disorganise the troops moving forward to their assistance. Front line troops were not expected to cling to shelters, which were man traps; they were to evacuate them as soon as the battle began and move forward and to the flanks to avoid British fire and to counter-attack. A small number of machine-gun nests and permanent garrisons were separate from the counter-attack organisation, to provide a framework for the re-establishment of defence in depth once the British attack had been repulsed.^[48] German infantry equipment had recently been improved by the arrival of thirty-six MG08/15 machine guns per regiment, which gave German units a better means for fire and manoeuvre.

The British Attack: 31 July

Fifth Army

The assault began at 3:50 am on 31 July.^[49] The attack was meant to commence at dawn but low cloud meant that it was still dark.^[50] The main British effort of the offensive by II Corps across the Ghelveult Plateau to the south, had the most difficulty against the principal German defensive concentration of artillery, ground-holding and Eingreif divisions. ^{[Note 2]} The 17th Brigade on the right of 24th Division reached its objective 1,000 yards (910 m) east of Klein Zillebeke. The 73rd Brigade in the centre, was stopped by German pillboxes at Lower Star Post and 72nd Brigade on the left reached the Bassevillebeek but then had to withdraw to a line south from Bodmin Copse, a few hundred yards short of the blue line.

30th Division had to advance across the Gheluvelt Plateau to Glencorse Wood and was reinforced by a brigade of the 18th Division.^[51] The 21st Brigade on the right lost the barrage crossing the wreckage of Sanctuary Wood and took until 6 am to capture Stirling Castle Ridge. Attempts to advance further were stopped by German machine-gun fire; 90th Brigade to the left was also stopped on the first objective. German artillery fire fell on Sanctuary Wood and Chateau Wood from 5 am and succeeded in stopping the advance of the 30th Division, except for a short move forward of about 300 yards (270 m) south of Westhoek.^[52] In the dark, 30th Division had veered to its left and advanced to Chateau Wood in the 8th Division sector and reported that it had captured Glencorse Wood. The attached 53rd Brigade of 18th Division moved forward into ground that both divisions believed to be clear of German defenders; it was not until 9 am that the mistake became known. 53rd Brigade spent the rest of the day attacking an area that 30th Division had been intended to clear.^[28] 30th Division and 24th Division failed to advance far due to the boggy ground, loss of direction in the dark and because much of the German machine-gun defence on this section of the front remained intact ^[53]

The 8th Division advanced towards Westhoek and took the Blue and Black lines without issue.^[54] Their southern flank then became exposed to the concentrated fire of German machine-guns from Nonne Boschen and Glencorse Wood,^[54] 30th Division's troubles on the right flank not being known to 8th Division, until just before the 25th Brigade was due to advance over Westhoek Ridge. Brigadier-General Coffin decided that it was too late to stop the attack and sent a company of the reserve battalion to fill the gap to the south; it was not enough to stop German enfilade fire so the Brigade consolidated on the reverse slope and held the crest with Lewis-gun posts. Small pockets of ground lost to German counter-attacks were regained by British counter-attacks.^[55] British artillery barrages made it impossible for German infantry advance further in this area.^[56]

XIX Corps attacked with 15th Division on the right, next to the II Corps boundary along the Ypres—Roulers railway and 55th Division north to just short of St Julien. Their objective was the black line up the bare slope of Frezenberg Ridge, then across the valley of the Steenbeek to the green line on the far side. If German resistance collapsed, troops separate from the main attack and organised as advanced guards, were to advance to the red line beyond Gravenstafel. The advance went well but then increasing resistance from fortified farms caused delays; several tanks managed to follow the British infantry and attack strong-points like Bank Farm and Border House allowing the advance to continue.^[57] After a pause for consolidation on the black line the reserve brigade of each of the XIX Corps divisions began their advance to the green line a mile beyond. The sun came out and a mist formed from the damp ground. On the right the advance encountered enfilade fire from the area not occupied by 8th Division beyond the Ypres—Roulers railway but further north the advance continued to Bremen Redoubt in the Wilhelm Line and Hill 37, then patrols pressed beyond the Zonnebeek—Langemarck road. 164th Brigade of 55th Division had a hard fight through many German strong-points but took Hill 35 and crossed the Wilhelm Line, an eventual advance of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m).^[58] One platoon went as far as Aviatik Farm on Gravenstafel spur and took fifty prisoners.^[59]

XVIII Corps reached the first objective and after an hour moved down to the Steenbeek, one of the muddiest parts of the battlefield behind a smoke and shrapnel barrage. 39th and 51st Divisions then established themselves on the stream for 3,000 yards (2,700 m) from St Julien to the Pilckem—Langemarck road. Several tanks were able to cross the ground and help capture strong-points delaying the advance and outposts were established across the stream.^[60]

The attack had most success in the north in the area of British XIV Corps, with the British Guards Division and 38th divisions and I Corps of the French First Army. A lack of German activity east of the Yser canal had led to the British Guards Division crossing it without artillery preparation in the afternoon of 27 July. The German front line was found to be empty so the Guards lurked forward 500–700 yards (460–640 m) beyond the canal as did the French 1st Division on the left. The 38th Division front line was on the east side and it moved forward slightly, despite the Germans here resisting fiercely.^[61] On 31 July on this section of the front, the Entente forces advanced 3,000–3,500 yards (2,700–3,200 m),^[62] up to the line of the Steenbeek river.^[63] The preliminary bombardment had succeeded in destroying the front line of the German position and the creeping barrage supported the infantry attack at least as far as the first objective.^[63] This meant that the infantry and some tanks could deal with German strongpoints encountered after the first line and forward battle zone had been penetrated, pushing on towards the further objectives.^[64] A number of field batteries moved forward once the black line had been captured to join the ones established there before the attack, which had remained silent to avoid detection. Small cavalry probes were also carried out but German fire stopped them before they reached the green line.^[65]

German counter-attacks

At noon the advance on the II Corps front had been stopped by the local German defenders and their artillery. The arrival of the British advance further north on the green line, 500 yards (460 m) beyond the Steenbeek on the XIX Corps front about 11 am, took a long time to be communicated to the British divisional headquarters because of the mist, slow going by runners, the cutting of signal cables by German artillery fire and poor reconnaissance results from contact-patrol aircraft, due to troops being unwilling to light flares while overlooked by German defences. Around 3 pm Gough ordered all XIX Corps troops to advance to the green line in support of the three brigades which had reached it but delays persisted and a German force approaching from behind the Broodseinde—Passchendaele ridge was not seen by British aircraft. A message from a ground observer did not reach 15th Division headquarters until 12:53 pm and rain began soon after, cutting off the view of advanced British troops by artillery observers.

A German creeping barrage began at 2 pm along XIX Corps front, then German troops attacked the flanks of the most advanced British positions. 39th Division was pushed back to St Julien, exposing the left of 55th Division just as it was attacked frontally over Zonnebeke spur by six waves of German infantry, preceded by a barrage and three aircraft which bombed and machine-gunned British troops. Attempts to hold the ground between the black and green lines failed due to the communications delays, the speed of the German advance and worsening visibility as the rain increased during the afternoon. The 55th and 15th division brigades beyond the black line were rolled up from north to south and either retreated or were overrun and killed or captured. It took until 6 pm for the Germans to reach the Steenbeek, because the downpour added to the mud and flooding in the valley. When the Germans were 300 yards (270 m) from the black line there, the British were ready and stopped the German attack with artillery and machine-gun fire.^[66]

The success of the British advance in the centre of the front caused concern to the German commanders. While the defensive system was designed to deal with some penetration, it was meant to prevent the 4,000-yard (3,700 m) advance that XVIII and XIX Corps had achieved. German reserves from the vicinity of Passchendaele had been able to begin their counter-attack at 11:00 to 11:30 am. The three British brigades facing the counter-attack by the German 221st and 50th Reserve Divisions of Group Ypres were depleted and thinly spread after dealing with German strongpoints earlier in the morning. The British brigades could not communicate with their artillery due to the rain and because like the British, the Germans added smoke shell to their creeping barrage. The German counter-attack was able to drive the British back from the green line along the Zonnebeke—Langemarck road, pushing XIX Corps back to the black line. The Germans also recaptured St Julien just west of the green line on XVIII Corps's front,^[62] where the counter-attack was stopped by mud, artillery and machine-gun fire.^[67] The three most advanced British brigades had 70% casualties by the time they had withdrawn from the green line during the German counter-attack.^[68]

On the flanks of the Entente attack, German counter-attacks had little success. In the XIV Corps area, German attacks made no impression against British troops who had had time to dig in but managed to push a small bridgehead that 38th Division had established on the east bank of the Steenbeek back across it, after having suffered heavy losses from British artillery when advancing around Langemarck. The British Guards Division north of the Ypres—Staden railway held its ground. The French repulsed the Germans around St Janshoek and followed up to capture Bixschoote.^[69] German counter-attacks against II Corps on the Gheluvelt Plateau in the afternoon to recapture Westhoek Ridge advanced a short distance from Glencorse Wood before the 18th Division artillery and a counter-attack pushed them back again. In the Second Army area south of the plateau at La Basse Ville, a powerful attack at 3:30 pm made no impression on the New Zealand Division. X Corps also managed to hold its gains around Klein Zillibeke against a big German attack at 7 pm.^[70]

On 1 August the Germans attacked again in the XIX Corps area, despite the weather and pushed 15th Division back temporarily at Beck House. The next day an attack against 55th Division at Pommern Redoubt was stopped by artillery and machine-gun fire, as was an attempt to mass for an attack on the 39th Division front. St Julien was reoccupied by the British and outposts established east of the Steenbeek to the north. German artillery kept up a heavy fire on the new British front line and along with the rain caused great difficulty in consolidating the captured ground.^[70]

Aftermath

Casualties

The British Official History gives Fifth Army casualties for 31 July to 3 August as 27,001; 3,697 of them killed.^[71] Second Army casualties 31 July to 2 August are 4,819; 769 killed. German Fourth Army casualties for 21–31 July were approximately 30,000, excluding wounded whose recovery was to be expected in a reasonable time.^[71] The British Official Historian added another 10,000 for this category. The accuracy of Edmonds's casualty statistics of the German army has been questioned ever since.^[72] According to Albrecht von Thaer, Staff Officer at Group Wytschaete, units may have survived physically but they no longer had the mental ability to continue.^[73]

Air operations

Major-General Hugh Trenchard, commander of the Royal Flying Corps, wrote to the ground commanders after the battle that study of low flying attacks on German troops concluded that the effect was short-lived though highly demoralising for the victims and equally stimulating to friendly infantry in the vicinity and that such attacks would have best effect when co-ordinated with ground operations.^[74] Trenchard emphasised that the infantry should be told that much of the air effort took place out of sight and than absence should not be taken for inactivity. Rain continued until 5 August and seriously interrupted artillery observation flying.^[74]

II Corps operation: 10 August

An operation by II Corps intended for 2 August, to prepare the way for a general offensive due on 4 August by II, XIX and XVIII Corps was delayed by the weather.^[75] The II Corps operation was then postponed for 24 hours by a thunderstorm on 8 August which added 10 mm of rain to the 25 mm which had fallen between 1 and 4 August. ^[76] II Corps eventually attacked on the 10th to capture the back and green lines. British artillery fire was distributed across the battlefront for the general attack while the Germans concentrated their artillery on the II and XIX Corps fronts. British counter-battery efforts were hampered by the adverse weather which made air observation extremely difficult, so much of the effort was wasted by inaccurate fire and an inability to see German artillery shifting position among three or four alternative emplacements per battery.^[77] 8th and 30th Divisions were relieved by 25th and 18th divisions by 4 August. Reliefs of front-line troops every 48 hours compounded by the numerous rain delays, exhausted all of the infantry battalions involved by the time of the attack on the 10th. The advance succeeded but German machine-guns, artillery fire and infantry counter-attacks isolated the British infantry of 18th Division after it captured Glencorse Wood and at about 7 pm German infantry behind a smokescreen recaptured all but the north-west corner of the Wood.^[78] Only 25th Division's gains on Westhoek Ridge were all held.^[79]

25th Division advanced at 4:25 am, fast enough to clear the British front line before the German barrage came down and reached its objectives by 5:30 am, ably assisted by five Royal Field Artillery brigades. The German garrison of Westhoek was surprised and rushed, while on the right of the attack sniping and attacks by German aircraft caused considerable casualties.^[80] The division lost 158 killed, 1,033 wounded and more than 100 missing. The difficulties encountered by the 18th Division in Glencorse Wood on the right made consolidation difficult due to the fire from German troops who recaptured the area. During the day and night of 10/11 August the Germans made several more attempts to counter-attack but excellent artillery liaison by SOS signal, daylight lamps, pigeons and runners meant that the guns broke up the German troops massing in their assembly positions, except for one attack at 7:15 pm which was driven off by rifle and machine-gun fire.^[81]

Notes

Footnotes

References

External links

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