The Battle of the Heligoland Bight was the first named air battle of the Second World War, which began the longest air campaign of the war, the Defense of the Reich.[1] Just over 100 aircraft (80 German and 22 British) on both sides participated, not all engaging the enemy.
Tactically the Germans inflicted more damage on the Royal Air Force than the Luftwaffe received, but its influence on both sides' future strategy was profound. The battle forced the RAF to abandon daylight missions in favour of night bombing, but it also led the Luftwaffe to believe its base in Germany proper was invulnerable to enemy attack. This belief was reinforced with the Wehrmacht's success in 1939-41. Neglecting their day fighter force had fatal strategic consequences in the years 1943-45.[1]
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German defences
The Luftwaffe's organisation for air defence went through a number of changes in the first months of the war. The defence of the north German ports and vital strategic targets was given to the local or nearest Luftverteidigungskommando. In this case the unit responsible for the protection of German warships of the Kriegsmarine was the Luftverteidigungskommando Hamburg.[1] The system was impractical. The Hamburg air defence district controlled both air and ground defences, but were geographically in no position to help one another. There was no combined arms synthesis, meaning that the Flak arm did not directly support the German defences thereby forming one mass defence. Instead, fighter units protecting the coast were held there, with Kriegsmarine flak units, while the Hamburg air defence artillery was held to far inland. The fighters and Luftwaffe flak units were located too far apart to coordinate.[2]
The defence coordination was not helped by the poor relations between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine Commanders-in-Chief, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring and Großadmiral Erich Raeder. A system that required both to work together produced cooperation difficulties.[2] A solution to this problem was twofold. Fighter units defending the north sea coast were subordinated to Luftgaukommando XI in Hannover. These fighter forces would function as an autonomous fighter commands, or Jagdfliegerführer. The position of this Fighter Command unit was given to Carl-August Schumacher, an Oberstleutnant and former commander of II./Jagdgeschwader 77. Schumacher had served in the Imperial German Navy at the Battle of Jutland as an officer cadet. It was hoped with his maritime background and easy personality it would ease the air and naval service cooperation.[2]
Nevertheless, Schumacher and his peers in the Navy were of the same rank, so each lacked authority over the other. Such an arrangement lacked the needed unity of command.[2]
Forces involved
Schumacher's new command was designated Stab./Jagdgeschwader 1 (staff flight, fighter wing 1). Some called it JG Nord (North) or JG Schumacher. In addition to his newly equipped Geschwader (wing), he was given the Messerschmitt Bf 109D and E interceptors. The unit was also given some Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters. These latest types were only given to the defensive command over the offensive Luftflotten (Air Fleets) owing to the inactivity of the RAF or French Air Forces on the western front. Stab./JG 1 Controlled all the following gruppen (groups) which had a strength of 80 - 100 aircraft; II./Jagdgeschwader 77, II./TrGr 186, Jagdgeschwader 101, 10.Nacht./Jagdgeschwader 26, 1 staffel of I./Zerstörergeschwader 76, I./Jagdgeschwader 26. [2]
The British forces numbered just three squadrons of 22 Vickers Wellington bombers from No. 9 Squadron RAF, No. 37 Squadron RAF, No. 149 Squadron RAF.[2]
The battle
On the morning of the 18 December 1939, 24 Wellington bombers formed over King's Lynn and started out over the North Sea. Two bombers turned back, one due to engine trouble, the other following the troubled bomber back to base. The weather was clear and perfect for fighter aircraft to spot enemy bombers. The bombers flew north past the Frisian Islands to avoid flak, then turned due south. Wing Commander Richard Kellett, commanding the formation, was ordered to attack at minimum altitude (about 3,000 metres (10,000 ft). The belief that the greatest danger would come from flak, not German fighters, had become part of RAF operational doctrine.[3]
The low flying method may have avoided the flak, but gave the German system, supported by Freyar radar stations, time to alter its aircraft defences. The poor administration of the German defence took time to get the information from their radar sites. Major Harry von Bülow-Bothkamp, commanding II./JG 77, stated that it was the naval Freya, rather than Luftwaffe early warning sites that gave the alert. Owing to this, the Wellingtons nearly made landfall without interception. The first shots were not traded until one hour after the Luftwaffe Freya made the initial report.[3]
Heavy flak fire from Wilhelmshaven and Bremerhaven was noted. Ships from Schillig Roads also opened fire. The formation engaged with machineguns to throw the gunners off. The Wellingtons dropped no bombs; Kellett had been ordered not to bomb ships close to land, to prevent injuring civilians. The formation headed north in two formations of 12 aircraft. At 14:30 local time, the German fighters attacked.[3]
Oberleutnant Johannes Steinhoff flying with 10.(Nacht).JG 26 and escorted by a Rotte from JG 77 attacked one group after the barrage. The Bf 109s claimed seven Wellingtons, Steinhoff claimed two. At 14:40 a rotte of Bf 110s from ZG 26 led by Hauptmann Wolfgang Falck claimed four bombers. Falck aircraft was severely damaged by the forcing him to make a crash landing. At the same time JGr 101 claimed two more Wellingtons. Bf 110s from ZG 76 assaulted the formation claiming five more. By 15:05 the other formation was beyond interception range and the German fighters returned to base.[3]
While the first formation was assaulted, the second came under attack from JG 1 and Oberstlt Schumacher. Elements II./JG 77 and ZG 76 also took part. The formation sustained severe losses, but Oberleutnant Johann Fuhrmann of 10(Nacht)./JG 26 was shot down and drowned.[4]
Aftermath
Overclaiming
The German fighter units heavily overclaimed enemy losses. German pilots claimed 38 Wellingtons shot down; only 22 Wellingtons took part in the mission, actual RAF losses were 12. The British rear gunners claimed 12 German fighters as well as another dozen severely damaged. Actual German losses were three plus many more damaged.[4]
Influence
The tactical assessment of both sides was radically different. On 22 December No. 3 Group RAF stated that the attack was a failure and casualties were a result of poor formation flying and leadership. Others[who?] maintained that poor beam defensive armament and self sealing fuel tanks were needed. Within a few weeks, a debate began on shifting air attacks to the cover of darkness.[5]
Tactically, the Germans noted the same lessons, particularly the poor beam defences of Wellington bombers. But the German report stated that the bomber's rigid formation flying had worked in German favour, allowing them to choose the position and angle of attack. The German report regarded the attempt by the RAF to attack in clear conditions at altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 metres (13,000 to 16,500 feet) as "criminal folly".[5]
After the Polish Campaign the German General Staff had assessed the problems of leadership, tactics, command and control. But the Luftwaffe was too busy congratulating itself on its success rather than learning any operational lessons. The historian for the General Staff noted it was only exploited for propaganda despite the operational problems and warnings the battle had flagged for attacker and defender.[6]
References
Bibliography
- Caldwell, Donald; Muller Richard (2007). The Luftwaffe Over Germany: Defense of the Reich. Greenhill books. ISBN 978-1-85367-712-0.
- Hooton, E.R. (2007). Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West. London: Chervron/Ian Allen. ISBN 978-1-85780-272-6.
Citations
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