Battle of Villers-Bocage

Battle of Villers-Bocage Part of Operation Perch Captain Paddy Victory's destroyed Cromwell observation post tank.[1] Date 13 June 1944[2] Location Villers-Bocage, France[2] Result Tactically indecisive[3] Operational German victory[4][5][6] Belligerents  United Kingdom  Germany Commanders George Erskine[7] William Hinde[8] Fritz Bayerlein[9] Heinz von Westernhagen[10] Strength One Brigade group[11][12] ~60 tanks[13] 2 ad-hoc battlegroups[14][15] Elements of 1 Heavy tank battalion[16] 31–41 tanks[nb 1] Casualties and losses ~217 casualties[nb 2] 23–27 tanks[nb 3] Unknown casualties[nb 4] 8–15 tanks[nb 5]

v • d • e Operation Overlord (Invasion of Normandy) Neptune – British airborne landings – American airborne landings – Sword – Juno – Gold – Omaha – Utah – Pointe du Hoc – Caen – Brécourt Manor – Ushant – La Caine – Perch – Carentan – Le Mesnil-Patry – Villers–Bocage – Cherbourg – Martlet – Epsom (1st Odon) – Windsor – Charnwood – Jupiter – 2nd Odon – Goodwood – Atlantic – Verrières Ridge – Spring – Cobra – Bluecoat – Totalize – Lüttich – Tractable – Hill 262 – Falaise – Brest – Paris

The Battle of Villers-Bocage, fought during the Second World War on 13 June, 1944, was part of Operation Perch and the wider Battle of Normandy. While attempting to encircle and capture the German-occupied city of Caen, a Brigade group of the British 7th Armoured Division made an opportunistic thrust into the German flank through a gap that opened up in the front line. The British reached the town of Villers-Bocage without incident, but the Germans had foreseen their danger and correctly anticipated the likely direction of an attack. The unexpected intervention of German heavy armour caught the Brigade group's vanguard unprepared, and increasingly strong German counterattacks caused the British to abandon Villers-Bocage for a more defensible position outside the town. Having lost the initiative and with additional German forces moving into the area, the Brigade group was withdrawn the following day.

Launched on the heels of D-Day, Operation Perch was a pincer attack aimed at capturing the major Allied objective of Caen. British XXX Corps, forming the western arm of the encirclement, pushed south before becoming embroiled with strong German forces in a contest for the town of Tilly-sur-Seulles. However, on XXX Corps's right flank, American pressure had opened up a wide gap in the German lines. In an effort to keep operations mobile, a Brigade group of the 7th Armoured Division was diverted from the combat around Tilly-sur-Seulles and ordered to advance through the gap towards the town of Villers-Bocage. It was hoped this flanking manoeuvre would force the German Panzerlehrdivision to fall back.

The 7th Armoured's Brigade group entered Villers-Bocage during the morning of 13 June, and its lead elements moved quickly to secure Point 213, a commanding area of high ground to the east. Unaware of any German presence, the British were ambushed by Tiger I tanks of the SS Heavy Panzer Battalion 101, which had been stationed in the area as a precautionary measure. In less than 15 minutes numerous tanks, anti-tank guns and transport vehicles fell victim to the German force, the vast majority being destroyed by SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann's tank. Point 213's defenders were cut off and taken prisoner, and a German counterattack was launched against the town during the afternoon. Although this ran into a British ambush and suffered significant losses, after six hours the British commander decided to withdraw his force to a defensive position outside the town; a move that was accomplished, before nightfall, largely without interference.

Fighting resumed the next day in the Battle of the Brigade Box, following which the decision was taken to pull the Brigade group back from its salient. Villers-Bocage played no further role in Second Army’s Battle for Caen, which was finally liberated on 19 July. A Royal Air Force bombing raid in support of Operation Epsom largely destroyed Villers-Bocage, which eventually fell to the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division on 4 August. Analyses of the battle have generally taken the view that, due to failures at the British divisional and corps command levels, an early opportunity to capture Caen was squandered.

Background

Allied and Axis dispositions on 12 June 1944

The Norman city of Caen was a major British D-Day objective,^[31] but the troops of the British 3rd Infantry Division were unable to generate enough momentum to carry them into the city on 6 June, and were stopped short of its outskirts by elements of the 21st Panzer Division.^[32] Caen was still firmly in German hands three days later, so the Allied ground forces commander, General Bernard Montgomery, decided to attempt a pincer movement to take the city.^[33] The pincer's eastern arm would consist of I Corps's 51st (Highland) Infantry Division and the 4th Armoured Brigade. These formations would strike out of the Orne bridgehead—the ground gained east of the Orne by the 6th Airborne Division during Operation Tonga—towards Cagny, 6 miles (9.7 km) to the southeast of Caen. XXX Corps would form the pincer's western arm; the 7th Armoured Division would swing east, crossing the Odon River to take Évrecy and the high ground near the town (Hill 112).^[34][35]

Spearheading the pincer's eastern arm, the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division soon ran into difficulty. Stiff and continued resistance from the 21st Panzer Division prevented the Highlanders from making any progress, and by 13 June the offensive east of Caen was called off.^[36] To the west, XXX Corps also became rapidly bogged down in heavy fighting, unable to make headway against the Panzerlehrdivision's tenacious defence of Tilly-sur-Seulles.^[37][38][39] However, on XXX Corps's right flank, a potentially favourable situation was developing. The German 352nd Infantry Division had been in combat since its defence of Omaha Beach on 6 June. Under continued pressure from the United States 1st Infantry Division, and having received few replacements for the losses it had suffered, the 352nd began to buckle.^[40] It withdrew south, and the destruction of five German battle groups, including LXXXXIV Corp’s reserves,^[41] opened up a 7.5-mile (12.1 km) gap in the German lines between the US V Corps and XXX Corps.^[41][42]

Conscious of the opportunity presented, British Second Army commander Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey met with Lieutenant-General Gerard Bucknall, commanding XXX Corps, and Major-General George Erskine, commanding the 7th Armoured Division, and ordered Erskine to disengage his armour from the fighting around Tilly-sur-Seulles.^[43] 7th Armoured was now to exploit the "Caumont Gap",^[42] seize the town of Villers-Bocage, and advance into the Panzerlehrdivision's exposed flank.^[44][45] A ridge 1.6 miles (2.6 km) to the east of Villers-Bocage was the ultimate goal;^[46] it was hoped that the appearance of British armour in Panzerlehr's rear, occupying high ground and interdicting important lines of communication, would compel the division to withdraw or surrender and thus keep operations fluid.^[7][11][47]

The 7th Armoured Division was slow to redeploy, and spent the morning of 12 June attempting to advance on Tilly-sur-Seulles according to its original orders. At 12:00 a meeting was held between Major-General Erskine and Brigadier Hinde, commanding officer of the 22nd Armoured Brigade; Hinde was ordered to move immediately to exploit the gap in the German front line.^[7] Soon afterwards the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars, the 7th Armoured Division's armoured reconnaissance regiment,^[48] began to reconnoitre the route the brigade would take; the rest of the division departed from Trungy at around 16:00.^[49] Four hours later the main body was approaching Livry,^[50] after a 12-mile (19 km) unopposed advance, 6 miles (9.7 km) of which were though German-held territory.^[45] However, north of Livry the leading Cromwell tanks of the 8th Hussars were destroyed by an anti-tank gun;^{[nb 6]} the village was defended by elements of the Panzerlehrdivision's Escort Company.^[49] Infantry were brought forward and within two hours the position had been cleared.^[50]

Hoping to keep the Germans guessing as to the British objective, Brigadier Hinde ordered a halt for the night.^[8] While the main force leaguered near la Mulotiere and conducted routine maintenance,^[49] the 8th and 11th (Prince Albert's Own) Hussars (the division's armoured car regiment^[48]) reconnoitred the flanks.^[52] The 11th Hussars found no resistance on the right flank and linked up with the United States' 1st Infantry Division, while on the left flank the 8th Hussars located elements of the Panzerlehrdivision just under 2 miles (3.2 km) away.^[52]

Planning

Michael Wittman photographed one month prior to Operation Overlord

During the night, Hinde put the final touches to his battle plan.^[11][53] It was clear that to retain control of Villers-Bocage his 22nd Armoured Brigade Group would also have to occupy a nearby ridge.^[46][54] The 4th County of London Yeomanry (4CLY), with one company of the 1st Battalion the Rifle Brigade, was to pass through Villers-Bocage and occupy Point 213 on the ridge. The 1/7th Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey) would follow up and occupy the town itself, while the 5th Royal Tank Regiment (5RTR), with a further company of the Rifle Brigade, was to take up positions on a second area of high ground to the southwest of the town at Maisoncelles-Pelvey.^[55] Equipped with M10 Achilles self propelled anti-tank guns,^[12] the 260th Anti-tank Battery of the Norfolk Yeomanry would cover the gap between 4CLY and 5RTR.^[55] The 5th Royal Horse Artillery, equipped with Sexton self propelled artillery guns, would come after the rest of the brigade. Hinde's two Hussar regiments were to provide flank protection, act as a buffer, screen the British from the Panzerlehrdivision, and seek out enemy positions on either side of the line of advance.^[56] The remainder of the division—the 131st Infantry Brigade with the 1st Royal Tank Regiment and the 1/5th and 1/6th battalions Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)^[48]—was to position itself in the Livry area to hold a "firm base", keeping the Brigade group’s lines of communications secure.^[57][58]

A camouflaged Tiger tank on the Ancuenne Route de Caen, where Wittmann's company spent the night of June 12/13.^[59]

For the Germans, command of the Villers-Bocage ridge was an obvious priority should the British attempt to exploit the Caumont Gap.^[60] Well aware of their vulnerability, they planned to close the gap with the 2nd Panzer and 3rd Parachute Divisions.^[61] However, these formations would not be in place until 15 June, so light reconnaissance forces were sent to cover the area.^[62] In addition, I SS-Panzer Corps commander Sepp Dietrich ordered his only reserve, the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, to position itself behind the Panzerlehrdivision and 12th SS-Panzer to cover his open left flank.^[63] Anticipating the importance the British would assign to the high ground near Villers-Bocage,^[60] the SS-Panzer Battalion 101's 2nd Company, under the command of SS-Obersturmführer Michael Wittmann, was positioned just south of Point 213 on the Villers-Bocage ridge.^[64] It arrived on 12 June after a five day, 160-mile (260 km) drive from Beauvais.^[60][65]

The Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 would have mustered 45 Tiger I tanks at full strength^{[nb 7]} but the battalion had been under constant air attack during its journey from Beauvais and had been reduced to around 17 serviceable tanks.^{[65][nb 8]} The battalion's 1st Company was situated 5.6 miles (9.0 km) northeast of Villers-Bocage; the 2nd was just south of Point 213; and the 3rd, with only one serviceable tank, was near Falaise and would not reach the front for another two days.^[59][64] Wittmann's 2nd Company consisted of Tigers 211, 221, 222, 223, 233 and 234,^[10] although Lieutenant Wessel in Tiger 211 was sent off to establish contact with the Panzerlehrdivision, and Tiger 233 was suffering from track damage and 234 from mechanical failure.^[17]

Battle of Villers-Bocage

Advance

During the early hours of 13 June, riflemen of the 1st Rifle Brigade conducted a reconnaissance along the first half-mile (0.9 km) of the intended British route.^[67] Livry was reported to be clear of Germans and the advance resumed at 05:30, with 4CLY leading the way.^[49][56][68] Moving cautiously, the column was met at the farms and hamlets along its route by jubilant French civilians,^[69] leading to a mood of general relaxation among the soldiers.^[70] Information passed to the British—later found to be incorrect—suggested that German tanks were stranded in Tracey-Bocage,^[71] and rumours stated that other tanks, without fuel or infantry, were similarly stranded at the Cháteau de Villers-Bocage.^[72]

As the column approached Villers-Bocage, a German Sd.Kfz. 231 armoured car was sighted some distance off, its commander clearly observing the British advance. The nearest tank was unable to traverse its turret to engage, and by the time a second tank had moved into position the armoured car had withdrawn.^[72][73] At 08:30, having safely covered the 5 miles (8.0 km) from its overnight position, the 22nd Armoured Brigade group entered the town to be greeted by celebrating residents; two German soldiers were spotted leaving at high speed in a Volkswagen Kübelwagen car.^[28]

Morning fighting

British and German positions prior to Michael Wittmann's attack.

With Villers-Bocage in British hands, A Squadron 4CLY motored ahead to Point 213 without additional reconnaissance according to their instructions.^[54][74][75] A Kübelwagen encountered on the road was engaged and destroyed,^[76] and the tanks moved into hull down positions to establish a defensive perimeter.^[72] Along the road between the town and the ridge, the carriers of the Rifle Brigade were ordered to pull over and park nose to tail, to allow reinforcements for Point 213 to pass.^[72][77] The riflemen dismounted and posted sentries, although their visibility to their flanks was less than 250 yards (230 m).^[28][77]

Major Wright, commanding officer of the 1st Rifle Brigade,^[78] called a conference to be held on Point 213 and attended by all officers and senior NCOs of A Company. Moving towards the ridge in a single half-track, it was realised that one enemy shell could knock out the company's entire command capability, so the half-track's occupants were rapidly dispersed among several other vehicles.^[72] In Villers-Bocage, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Arthur Cranley, commanding officer of 4CLY,^[79] expressed concerns that his men were "out on a limb"; he was assured by Brigadier Hinde that all was well, and ordered to Point 213 to ensure his men had taken up good defensive positions. Hinde then left Villers-Bocage for his headquarters, which had been established to the west of the town.^[80]

South of Point 213 with his 2nd Company, Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, Wittmann was surprised to discover British armour advancing through Villers-Bocage much sooner than had been expected.^[81] He later stated: "I had no time to assemble my company; instead I had to act quickly, as I had to assume that the enemy had already spotted me and would destroy me where I stood. I set off with one tank and passed the order to the others not to retreat a single step but to hold their ground".^[82]

Wittmann's Tiger was spotted at approximately 09:00 by Sergeant O’Connor of the Rifle Brigade, who was travelling towards Point 213 in a half-track and broke radio silence to give the only warning the British force would receive.^[60] The Tiger emerged from cover onto Route Nationale 175 and engaged the rearmost tank of A Squadron 4CLY on Point 213—a Cromwell—destroying it.^[83][59] A Sherman Firefly responded but was itself knocked out. Burning, the Firefly came to rest across the road, impeding any attempt to either reinforce the ridge or withdraw from it.^[84] The British on Point 213 then came under fire from the rest of Wittmann’s command, losing three more tanks.^[1][84]

The wreckage of the 1st Rifle Brigade's transport column, and a 6 pounder anti-tank gun, on the road between Villers-Bocage and Point 213.

Wittmann now headed for Villers-Bocage.^[84] Along the road the men of the Rifle Brigade desperately attempted to find PIAT anti-tank weapons and set up a 6 pounder anti-tank gun, but as the Tiger drew closer panic set in, and the riflemen abandoned their efforts and sought shelter. Along the roadside, one by one the brigade's carriers burst into flames as their fuel tanks were ruptured by machine gun and high explosive fire.^{[84][85][nb 9]} However, few casualties were inflicted.^[10] Reaching the eastern end of Villers-Bocage, Wittmann engaged three M5 Stuart light tanks of the 4CLY's reconnaissance troop. One, under the command of Lieutenant Ingram, attempted to block the road but was hit, exploding violently.^[84] The other two soon followed suit.^{[85][nb 10]}

In the town, the tanks of 4CLY’s Regimental Headquarters attempted to escape, but their reverse speed was "painfully slow".^[10] One engaged Wittmann's Tiger, managing to get off two shots before being destroyed.^[10][89] Two others, their commanders believing they were being engaged from the flank, reversed off the road into gardens; 4CLY's Adjutant, Captain Pat Dyas, found his Cromwell further screened behind a small barn. The Tiger rammed its way past the wrecked Stuart and continued towards the centre of town, knocking out one of the two British tanks but missing Dyas.^[89] Lieutenant Charles Pearce took his scout car and, locating the rest of the reconnaissance troop in the middle of town, warned them about what was coming their way. While they quickly got off the road, Pearce continued further west to alert 4CLY’s B Squadron.^[10] Wittmann, meanwhile, had accounted for another Cromwell,^[90] and as he made his way onto Villers-Bocage's main street, destroyed two artillery Observation Post (OP) tanks—a Cromwell and a Sherman^{[nb 11]}—belonging to the 5th Royal Horse Artillery.^[91] These were followed by the intelligence officer’s scout car and the medical officer’s half-track.^[93]

Major Well's Sherman OP tank on the main street in Villers-Bocage^[94]

Accounts differ as to what happened next. Historians George Forty and Daniel Taylor record that, following the destruction of the OP tanks, Wittmann briefly duelled without success against a Sherman Firefly before withdrawing.^[95][96] In the Yeomanry Association's The Sharpshooter newsletter, tanker Robert Moore recalls that he was the one responsible for forcing Wittmann to pull back, when a shot from his tank dented the Tiger's driver visor.^[97] These accounts attest that Wittmann's withdrawal brought him face to face with Dyas’s Cromwell, which, having been bypassed, had been following the Tiger seeking a shot at its thinner rear armour. Dyas opened fire without effect; Wittmann returned fire and destroyed the British tank.^[98] Charles Pearce, however, puts the destruction of Dyas's tank earlier, suggesting that Wittmann had engaged it by traversing the Tiger's turret around before advancing onto the town's main street.^[99] The Tiger is then reported to have continued eastwards to the outskirts of Villers-Bocage before being disabled at the road junction to Tilly-sur-Seulles by a 6 Pounder anti-tank gun under the command of Sergeant Bray.^{[29][nb 12]} Wittmann's own account contradicts this; he states that his tank was disabled by an anti-tank gun in the town centre.^[82]

In less than 15 minutes, 13–14 tanks, two anti-tank guns and 13–15 transport vehicles had been destroyed by the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, the vast majority being attributable to Wittmann.^[1][102] Now on foot, Wittmann made his way to the headquarters of the Panzerlehrdivision at the Cháteau d’Orbois, 3.7 miles (6.0 km) north of Villers-Bocage.^[29]

Late morning and the fighting on Point 213

Later that morning Major Wenck of the Panzerlehrdivision conducted a reconnaissance of the area. He abandoned his scout car on hearing tank engines, and continuing on foot discovered a column of unoccupied Cromwell tanks. Their crews were with an officer at the front of the column studying a map; Wenke occupied one of the tanks and drove off before the British had a chance to react. At the eastern end of Villers-Bocage he found a scene of "burning tanks and Bren-gun carriers and dead Tommies". Wenke drove his captured tank back to the Panzerlehrdivision's headquarters at Cháteau d'Orbois.^[103]

In the wake of Wittmann's attack on Point 213, A Squadron 4CLY mustered nine operational tanks including two Fireflys and a Cromwell OP tank,^[104][105] although some were without their full complement of crew.^[66] In support was a single section of riflemen and an equal number of officers.^[104] The senior officers conferred, and deciding to hold their position on the ridge until reinforcements arrived, set about organising an all round defence.^[105] However, around 10:00 elements of the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101's 4th Company—its support and reconnaissance troops—arrived and began to round up isolated British tankers and riflemen.^[106][107] Some British troops who were between the town and ridge managed to evade capture, and over the next 24 hours around 30 worked their way back to British lines.^[106]

During the rest of the morning the troops of the 1/7th Battalion, Queen's Royal Regiment (QRR) took up defensive positions within Villers-Bocage, capturing an advance party of three men from the 2nd Panzer Division in the process.^[108] A force was put together to attempt to extricate the troops on the ridge, but this was unable to make any progress.^[19][109] Around 10:30 Lord Cranley reported over the radio that the position on Point 213 was becoming untenable, and withdrawal was impossible.^[9] Nevertheless a breakout was planned, and two hours later a Cromwell attempted to negotiate its way back to Villers-Bocage by a roundabout route, but was knocked out by a German tank. The Germans then started to shell the trees bordering the road, causing the shells to air burst; after five minutes the troops on the ridge decided to surrender.^[110] The British made an effort to burn their tanks before they fell into enemy hands, but German soldiers were quick on the scene. 30 members of the County of London Yeomanry were taken prisoner, along with some riflemen and troops of the Royal Horse Artillery.^[111] A few men did manage to escape, such as Captain Christopher Milner MC of the Rifle Brigade, who spent the rest of the day on the run and crossed back into British lines after dark.^[112]

Destroyed British tanks on Point 213 after the German arrival, with two Cromwells on the left and a Sherman Firefly on the right.

On arriving at the Panzerlehrdivision's headquarters, Wittmann briefed the division's intelligence officer, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Kauffmann, on the situation in Villers-Bocage. Kauffmann ordered Captain Helmut Ritgen to assemble what force he could and block the northern exits to the town. With 15 Panzer IV tanks from the division and a further 10 collected from a workshop south of Route Nationale 175,^[108][113] Ritgen rendezvoused with the Panzerlehrdivision's commanding officer, Fritz Bayerlein, at Villy-Bocage. Bayerlein gave Ritgen his orders,^[109] but as Ritgen’s tanks moved towards Villers-Bocage they ran into a screen of anti-tank guns, losing one tank that burst into flames.^[114]

In Villers-Bocage, A Company 1/7th Queen's Royal Regiment was tasked with securing the railway station and surrounding area, while B and C companies were to occupy the eastern side of the town.^[9] However, German infantry had already started to infiltrate Villers-Bocage, and scattered house to house fighting and skirmishing broke out.^[115] Two German tanks were damaged and driven off, but the QRR battalion's infantry companies were rapidly losing cohesion and were ordered to fall back to reorganise. A Company was again ordered to secure the railway station, while C Company was assigned the north-eastern edge of the town and D Company the south-eastern edge. B Company was placed in reserve, and the battalion’s anti-tank guns distributed along the front line.^[116] At the town square an ambush site was established by Lieutenant Bill Cotton of 4CLY. A Sherman Firefly and several Cromwell tanks, supported by a 6 pounder anti-tank gun and infantrymen from 1/7th QRR armed with PIAT anti tank weapons, laid in wait for German tanks to move down the town’s main street.^[19] Fighting was also taking place to the west of the town as the Germans attacked the 1/5th QRR near Livry, losing one tank in the process.^[108]

Wittmann was provided with a Schwimmwagen by the Panzerlehrdivision and returned to Point 213.^[19][117] By the time he arrived the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101's 1st Company, under the command of Captain Rolf Möbius, was on the scene, but although the two discussed the situation, Wittmann played no further part in the battle.^[19]

Afternoon battle

Knocked out German tanks on the main street of Villers-Bocage.

Fighting resumed at around 13:00.^[118] The tanks of the Panzerlehrdivision attempted to push into Villers-Bocage, but unsupported by infantry, found the going difficult. At the town's southern edge two tanks were disabled and a further two knocked out by British anti-tank gunfire. Some of the Waffen-SS Tiger tanks were brought up, and in an exchange of fire they silenced the anti-tank position.^[116] Continuing along the main road, the Tigers advanced slowly, their commanders confident that they could intimidate the British into withdrawing.^[119] However, as they reached the town square they ran into Cotton's ambush.^[120] The Firefly, commanded by Sergeant Bramall,^{[nb 13][119]} opened fire on the lead tank and missed, but the anti-tank gun supporting the position knocked it out.^[120] Now alerted to the ambush, a following group of three Tigers split up. Picking their way through the back streets in an attempt to flank the British, one was engaged by an anti-tank gun and destroyed. The other two were tackled by infantry using PIAT anti-tank weapons; one was knocked out and the other immobilised.^[119][122]

An artists impression of the Tiger being engaged though the corner window by Bramall's Sherman Firefly.

A fifth Tiger had halted on the main street short of the ambush site, apparently waiting for the British to emerge from cover.^[122] This tank was spotted by Bramall through the side and front windows of a corner building,^[123] and he decided that the only way to safely engage would be to reverse his Firefly and shoot diagonally through the building's windows.^[122] His tank fired twice, damaging the Tiger's gun mantlet; it drew back slightly and then raced past the side street before Bramall could react. A Cromwell under the command of Corporal Horne then advanced onto the main street from another side street and fired into the Tiger's rear, knocking it out, before reversing back into cover.^[123] The next victim of the ambush was a Panzer IV, accounted for by Bramall’s Firefly.^[122] Mindful of the German skill at recovering and repairing their damaged vehicles, during a lull in the fighting Lieutenant Cotton and Sergeant Bramall, with blankets and petrol, went to each knocked out tank in their vicinity and set them on fire.^[122]

Supported by mortars and artillery,^[124] the Germans put in a strong attack on A Company 1/7th QRR. The company was forced to centralise its defence,^[125] and a platoon was cut off and captured.^[124] Even though the entire battalion had been committed to the town's defence, holes were opening up through which German troops were infiltrating. By 18:00 the battalion headquarters was pinned down,^[125] and as pressure built, Brigadier Hinde reluctantly decided that the situation in Villers-Bocage was becoming untenable and that his force must be withdrawn.^[124] Under cover of artillery fire and a smoke screen laid by 5RHA, the infantry pulled back; last to leave were the tanks of 4CLY.^[126]

Aftermath

14 June

With their withdrawal from Villers-Bocage complete, on 14 June Hinde's 22nd Armoured Brigade group formed an all round defensive position—a "brigade box"—in the Amayé-sur-Seulles–Tracy-Bocage–St-Germain area.^{[nb 14]} The fighting that followed is known by two names: "The Battle of the Brigade Box";^[130] and "The Battle of the Island Position",^[24] the latter deriving from the 22nd Armoured Brigade's after action report, which referred to the box as the Island Position.^[126]

The town of Villers-Bocage, photographed during the bombing raid on 30 June 1944.

Supported by the 1st Company Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101, the Panzerlehrdivision renewed its attempt to eliminate the British salient.^[130][131] Heavy Allied artillery fire broke up the German infantry's initial assault but subsequent efforts closed in so tightly that further artillery concentrations could not be called in. One British platoon was overrun and a counterattack with tanks and infantry was mounted to restore the integrity of the position. The Germans then subjected the box to harassing fire before launching a major two-pronged assault later in the day, supported by artillery and tanks.^{[130][132][133][134]} This penetrated the British lines, closing in on the brigade headquarters before being driven back. The fighting died down during the evening.^[132] Although confident that the position could be held, the inability of British forces outside the box to make progress towards relieving the position prompted the decision to recall the Brigade group and straighten the front line.^[130][135] The withdrawal codenamed Operation Aniseed, began just after midnight.^[130][132]

An estimated 700–800 casualties were inflicted upon the Germans during the 14 June battle and between eight and 20 tanks were destroyed including several Tigers.^{[132][133][136]} British casualties were reported as light, including the loss of only three tanks.^[132] Michael Reynolds disputes the stated German casualty figures, calling them "exaggerated",^[131] although Niklas Zetterling points out that by 16 June the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 had only 15 operational tanks; they had lost nine destroyed with a further 21 under repair.^[137]

Bombing and liberation

Bill Cotton (on the left wearing a looted Iron Cross) and his tank crew.

In support of Operation Aniseed, 300 Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers dropped 1,700 tons of high explosives on the town of Évrecy and on targets around Villers-Bocage, destroying one Tiger tank of the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 and damaging three more.^[4]

Just over two weeks later in support of Operation Epsom, at 20:30 on 30 June Villers-Bocage was bombed again. The town was destroyed by 250 RAF heavy bombers dropping 1,100 tons of bombs.^[138][139] As a vital traffic centre for the German forces, it was hoped that German troops would be caught in the bombing, but only French civilians were present at the time.^[138] The town was finally liberated by a patrol of the 1st Battalion Dorset Regiment, 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division, on 4 August 1944.^[140]

Battle honours and awards

In 1956 and 1957, the British and Commonwealth system of battle honours recognised participation in the Battle of Villers-Bocage by the award to 11 units of the battle honour Villers Bocage, for service in expanding the bridgehead from 8–15 June.^[141]

For his actions at Villers-Bocage, Michael Wittmann was promoted to Hauptsturmführer (Captain) and awarded Swords to his Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.^[142] For their skill and bravery in defending Villers-Bocage, Lieutenant Cotton was awarded the Military Cross and Sergeant Bramall the Military Medal.^[122]

Analysis

Because the British had lost contact with their forces on Point 213 and withdrawn from Villers-Bocage, they were unable to establish the full extent of either their own losses or those they had inflicted. The German propaganda machine seized this opportunity.^[143] Michael Wittmann—already a household name in Germany^[142]—was credited with all the British tanks destroyed at Villers-Bocage.^[143] He recorded a radio message on the evening of 13 June, describing his role in the morning's fighting and claiming that later counterattacks had destroyed an entire British armoured regiment and infantry battalion.^[82] To lend weight to this claim, doctored images were produced; three joined-together photographs published in the German armed forces magazine Signal gave a false impression of the scale of destruction in the town.^[144] The propaganda campaign was given credence both in Germany and abroad, leaving the British convinced that the Battle of Villers-Bocage had been a complete disaster when in fact its results were less conclusive.^[143] Historian John Buckley believes that the German wartime propaganda has influenced subsequent published historical works, with Wittmann's role exaggerated to such an extent that historians such as Carlo D’Este and Gary Simpson imply that Wittmann single-handedly stopped the entire 7th Armoured Division. Buckley points to Russell A. Hart's erroneous claim that Wittmann "all but annihilated" 7th Armoured's spearhead.^[145]

The British also attempted to manufacture capital from the battle. Having escaped from their knocked-out tank, Lieutenant Cloudsley-Thompson and his crew, of 4CLY, spent much of the day hiding in a basement in Villers-Bocage. They made their way back to British lines after dark, and were picked up by elements of the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division. During his debriefing Cloudsley-Thompson emphatically stated that he "never wished to see another tank as long [he] lived", but when the British press ran a story on the battle, this became: "The first thing the five tank men asked for was another tank."^[146]

A knocked out Cromwell tank in Villers-Bocage.

Unimpressed by the misinformation surrounding the battle, historian Wolfgang Schneider describes the actions of Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101 as "everything but awe-inspiring".^[147] He calls into question some of Wittmann's tactical decisions, claiming "a competent tank company commander does not accumulate so many serious mistakes".^[147] Criticising Wittmann's disposition of his forces before the battle, Schneider notes that by having his Tigers position themselves in a sunken lane with a vehicle with engine trouble at the head of a stationary column, he was hampering the mobility of his unit and risked blocking the entire company. However, Schneider saves his real opprobrium for Wittmann’s solitary advance into Villers-Bocage. Although he acknowledges Wittmann's courage, he points out that such an action "goes against all the rules". No intelligence was gathered beforehand, and there was no "centre of gravity" or "concentration of forces" in the attack. Schneider claims that because of Wittmann's actions, "the bulk of the 2nd Company and Mobius 1st Company came up against an enemy who had gone onto the defensive".^[147] He calls Wittman's "carefree" advance into British-occupied positions "pure folly", and states that "such over hastiness was uncalled for". Schneider goes on to surmise that if Wittmann had properly prepared an assault involving the rest of his company and the 1st Company, far greater results could have been achieved. He concludes with the belief that "thoughtlessness of this kind was to cost [Wittmann] his life on August 9, 1944, near Gaumesnil, during an attack casually launched in open country with an exposed flank."^[147]

Historians and commentators have been equally scathing about the British handling of the battle. Mungo Melvin writes that neither the 131st Infantry Brigade nor the balanced divisional reserve—an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion—were employed effectively during the battle.^[148] The British Second Army commander, Miles Dempsey, remarked after the war that "this attack by 7th Armoured Division should have succeeded. My feeling that Bucknall and Erskine would have to go started with that failure … the whole handling of that battle was a disgrace. Their decision to withdraw [from Villers-Bocage] was done by the corps commander and Erskine."^[149] Although Carlo D'Este calls Dempsey's comments "excessively harsh",^[150] historians generally support them, suggesting that Bucknall squandered a great opportunity to swiftly capture Caen.^[4][5][6] Fully supporting Dempsey, John Buckley claims that Bucknall was unprepared to support the attack once problems developed, and that Erskine was not suited to the task at hand.^[151] Chester Wilmot agrees, stating that Bucknall refused to reinforce the 7th Armoured Division, having already concluded that its lines of communication were endangered. Wilmot goes on to suggest that the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage was not forced upon the division—the German counterattack had been defeated—but was ordered by Bucknall.^[152] Quoting a German general, D’Este notes that by withdrawing, the British failed to exploit the gap in the German front line and abandoned the possibility of successfully flanking I SS Panzer Corps. He cites the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage as the moment that ended any hopes of unhinging the German front line south of Caen.^[5]

A knocked out Panzer IV in Villers-Bocage.

Despite these criticisms, some historians have found positive elements in the British performance. Melvin approves of the 7th Armoured Division's institution of a flexible combined arms structure prior to the battle—a structure that other British armoured divisions would not adopt until after Operation Goodwood.^[148] The British official Normandy campaign historian, Major L. F. Ellis, excuses the withdrawal from Villers-Bocage as being only a temporary measure; the 7th Armoured Division was to be reinforced with the 33rd Armoured Brigade before renewing its offensive towards Évrecy.^[153] Ellis defends the outcome of the battle by claiming that with the unexpected arrival of the 2nd Panzer Division, the 7th Armoured Division "could hardly have achieved full success".^[154] However, this view is refuted by Michael Reynolds, who points out that "2nd Panzer's tanks were nowhere near Villers-Bocage at this time".^[155] David French states that the follow-up formations landing in Normandy were, on average, two days behind schedule. He speculates that, had the 7th Armoured Division’s infantry brigade, the 49th Infantry Division, and the 33rd Armoured Brigade landed on schedule, XXX Corps might have been able to secure Villers-Bocage before the arrival of substantial German forces.^[156]

In early August, up to 100 men including Bucknall, Erskine, Hinde, and other senior officers, were removed from their positions and reassigned. Historians largely agree that this was a consequence of the failure at Villers-Bocage, and had been planned since the battle.^{[157][158][159][160]} Daniel Taylor, however, is of the opinion that the battle's outcome simply provided a convenient excuse, and that the sackings took place to "demonstrate that the army command was doing something to counteract the poor public opinion of the conduct of the campaign".^[159]

Notes

Footnotes

World War II portal

Citations

References

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Battle of Villers-Bocage

• Attwood, Christopher. "The war diary of 8th Kings Royal Irish Hussars - June 1944". http://freepages.military.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~attwood/8thkri/war_diary.htm.  Transcribed from the War Diary of the 8th (Kings Royal Irish) Hussars for the period of June 1944 from copies provided by the Tank Museum, Bovington.
• Hamby, Alan. "Tiger I Information Center". http://www.alanhamby.com/unithist.shtml#SS101.  War Diary of the Heavy SS-Panzer Battalion 101
• Paterson, Ian A. "History of the British 7th Armoured Division". http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paterson/battles1944.htm#Normandy.  Website's page on the division's activities in Normandy.
• Warlinks. "War Diaries for the 4rd County of London Yeomanry September 1939 To July 1944". http://www.warlinks.com/armour/4_cly/4cly_44.html. 
• Warlinks. "War Diaries for the 11th Hussars, (Prince Albert's Own) September 1939 To March 1946". http://warlinks.com/armour/11_hussars/11huss_41.html. 
• Youtube. "German newsreel footage of the aftermath of the Battle of Villers-Bocage". http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JBLrtDpRUDc. 

Coordinates: 49°4′50″N 0°39′22″W / 49.08056°N 0.65611°W / 49.08056; -0.65611 (Battle of Villers-Bocage)