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Bayes factor

 
Statistics Dictionary: Bayes factor

Variant: Bayes ratio

A measure of the evidence provided by the data, D, in favour of model M1 as opposed to model M2. The Bayes factor is B, given by




.
The value of B may be assessed with the following table, derived from that suggested by Jeffreys:

2ln(B)evidence in favour of M1
<0Negative
0–2.2Not worth more than a bare mention
2.2–6Positive
6–10Strong
>10Very strong



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Law Encyclopedia: Weight of Evidence
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This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.

Measure of credible proof on one side of a dispute as compared with the credible proof on the other, particularly the probative evidence considered by a judge or jury during a trial.

The trier of fact in a civil or criminal trial, whether a judge or a jury, must review the evidence presented, evaluate it, and determine if it meets the standard of proof. If it meets this standard, the trier of fact must return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in a civil suit and must convict a defendant in a criminal trial. If the evidence does not meet the standard of proof, the trier of fact must find for the defendant in a civil or criminal case. These decisions are based on the concept of the "weight of evidence."

The weight of evidence is based on the believability or persuasiveness of evidence. The probative value (tending to convince a person of the truth of some proposition) of evidence does not necessarily turn on the number of witnesses called, but rather the persuasiveness of their testimony. For example, a witness may give uncorroborated but apparently honest and sincere testimony that commands belief, even though several witnesses of apparent respectability may contradict her. The question for the jury is not which side has more witnesses, but what testimony they believe.

Particular evidence has different weight in inducing belief with respect to the facts and circumstances to be proved. Evidence that is indefinite, vague, or improbable will be given less weight than evidence that is direct and unrefuted. For example, a criminal defendant's testimony that he had never been at the scene of a crime would be given little weight if his fingerprints were found at the crime scene and witnesses testify they saw him at the scene. Similarly, evidence given by a witness who testifies from personal observation is of greater weight than evidence offered by a witness who is testifying from general knowledge alone.

In a civil trial, the plaintiff's burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence standard, which means that the plaintiff must convince the trier of fact that the evidence in support of his case outweighs the evidence offered by the defendant to oppose it. In contrast, criminal trials require that the weight of evidence proving a defendant's guilt must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a number of jurisdictions, judges are prohibited from instructing juries on the weight to be given to evidence. In other states, the judge is permitted to give a balanced and fair assessment of the weight she believes should be ascribed to the evidence. All jurisdictions prohibit the judge from instructing the jury on what weight is to be given to the testimony of any witness or class of witnesses. The judge may not state that any particular piece of admissible evidence is or is not entitled to receive weight or consideration from the jury. The judge is also forbidden either to aid a jury or to infringe upon its role in weighing the evidence or in deciding upon the facts. In addition, the judge, in giving her instructions to the jury, has no right to prescribe the order and manner in which the evidence should be examined and weighed by the jury, or to tell the jurors how they shall consider any evidence that has been received by the court.

See: preponderance of evidence.

Wikipedia: Bayes factor
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In statistics, the use of Bayes factors is a Bayesian alternative to classical hypothesis testing.[1][2] Bayesian model comparison is a method of model selection based on Bayes factors.

Contents

Definition

The posterior probability of a model given data, Pr(M | D), is given by Bayes' theorem:

\Pr(M|D) = \frac{\Pr(D|M)\Pr(M)}{\Pr(D)}.

The key data-dependent term Pr(D | M) is a likelihood, and is sometimes called the evidence for model or hypothesis, M; evaluating it correctly is the key to Bayesian model comparison. The evidence is usually the normalizing constant or partition function of another inference, namely the inference of the parameters of model M given the data D.

Given a model selection problem in which we have to choose between two models, on the basis of a data vector x, the plausibility of the two different models M1 and M2, parametrised by model parameter vectors θ1 and θ2 is assessed by the Bayes factor K given by

 K = \frac{\Pr(D|M_1)}{\Pr(D|M_2)} 
= \frac{\int \Pr(\theta_1|M_1)\Pr(D|\theta_1,M_1)\,d\theta_1}
{\int \Pr(\theta_2|M_2)\Pr(D|\theta_2,M_2)\,d\theta_2
}.

where p(x | Mi) is called the marginal likelihood for model i.

Thus the Bayesian model comparison does not depend on the parameters used by each model. Instead, it considers the probability of the model considering all possible parameter values.

This is similar to a likelihood-ratio test, but instead of maximizing the likelihood, Bayesians average it over the parameters.

If instead of the Bayes factor integral the likelihood corresponding to the Maximum likelihood estimate of each parameter is used then the test becomes a classical likelihood ratio test. However, an advantage of the use of Bayes factors is that it automatically, and quite naturally, includes a penalty for including too much model structure. It thus guards against overfitting. For models where an explicit version of the likelihood is not available or too costly to evaluate numerically, approximate Bayesian computation can be used for model selection in a Bayesian framework.

Other approaches are:

Interpretation

A value of K > 1 means that the data indicate that M1 is more strongly supported by the data under consideration than M2. Note that classical hypothesis testing gives one hypothesis (or model) preferred status (the 'null hypothesis'), and only considers evidence against it. Harold Jeffreys gave a scale for interpretation of K:[3]

K dB bits Strength of evidence
< 1:1
< 0
Negative (supports M2)
1:1 to 3:1
0 to 5
0 to 1.6
Barely worth mentioning
3:1 to 10:1
5 to 10
1.6 to 3.3
Substantial
10:1 to 30:1
    10 to 15    
    3.3 to 5.0    
Strong
30:1 to 100:1
15 to 20
5.0 to 6.6
Very strong
>100:1
>20
>6.6
Decisive

The second column gives the corresponding weights of evidence in decibans (tenths of a power of 10); bits are added in the third column for clarity. According to I. J. Good a change in a weight of evidence of 1 deciban or 1/3 of a bit (i.e. a change in an odds ratio from evens to about 5:4) is about as finely as humans can reasonably perceive their degree of belief in a hypothesis in everyday use.[4]

The use of Bayes factors or classical hypothesis testing takes place in the context of inference rather than decision-making under uncertainty. That is, we merely wish to find out which hypothesis is true, rather than actually making a decision on the basis of this information. Frequentist statistics draws a strong distinction between these two because classical hypothesis tests are not coherent in the Bayesian sense. Bayesian procedures, including Bayes factors, are coherent, so there is no need to draw such a distinction. Inference is then simply regarded as a special case of decision-making under uncertainty in which the resulting action is to report a value. For decision-making, Bayesian statisticians might use a Bayes factor combined with a prior distribution and a loss function associated with making the wrong choice. In an inference context the loss function would take the form of a scoring rule. Use of a logarithmic score function for example, leads to the expected utility taking the form of the Kullback-Leibler divergence. If the logarithms are to the base 2 this is equivalent to Shannon information.

Example

Suppose we have a random variable which produces either a success or a failure. We want to compare a model M1 where the probability of success is q = ½, and another model M2 where q is completely unknown and we take a prior distribution for q which is uniform on [0,1]. We take a sample of 200, and find 115 successes and 85 failures. The likelihood can be calculated according to the binomial distribution:

{{200 \choose 115}q^{115}(1-q)^{85}}.

So we have

P(X=115|M_1)={200 \choose 115}\left({1 \over 2}\right)^{200}=0.005956...,\,

but

P(X=115|M_2)=\int_{0}^1{200 \choose 115}q^{115}(1-q)^{85}dq = {1 \over 201} = 0.004975...\,.

The ratio is then 1.197..., which is "barely worth mentioning" even if it points very slightly towards M1.

This is not the same as a classical likelihood ratio test, which would have found the maximum likelihood estimate for q, namely 115200 = 0.575, and used that to get a ratio of 0.1045... (rather than averaging over all possible q), and so pointing towards M2. Alternatively, Edwards's "exchange rate" of two units of likelihood per degree of freedom suggests that M2 is preferable (just) to M1, as 0.1045\ldots = e^{-2.25\ldots} and 2.25 > 2: the extra likelihood compensates for the unknown parameter in M2.

A frequentist hypothesis test of M1 (here considered as a null hypothesis) would have produced a more dramatic result, saying that M1 could be rejected at the 5% significance level, since the probability of getting 115 or more successes from a sample of 200 if q = ½ is 0.0200..., and as a two-tailed test of getting a figure as extreme as or more extreme than 115 is 0.0400... Note that 115 is more than two standard deviations away from 100.

M2 is a more complex model than M1 because it has a free parameter which allows it to model the data more closely. The ability of Bayes factors to take this into account is a reason why Bayesian inference has been put forward as a theoretical justification for and generalisation of Occam's razor, reducing Type I errors.

See also

Statistical ratios

References

  1. ^ Goodman S (1999). "Toward evidence-based medical statistics. 1: The P value fallacy" (PDF). Ann Intern Med 130 (12): 995–1004. PMID 10383371. http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/130/12/995.pdf. 
  2. ^ Goodman S (1999). "Toward evidence-based medical statistics. 2: The Bayes factor" (PDF). Ann Intern Med 130 (12): 1005–13. PMID 10383350. http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/130/12/1005.pdf. 
  3. ^ H. Jeffreys, The Theory of Probability (3e), Oxford (1961); p. 432
  4. ^ Good, I.J. (1979). "Studies in the History of Probability and Statistics. XXXVII A. M. Turing's statistical work in World War II". Biometrika 66 (2): 393–396. doi:10.1093/biomet/66.2.393. MR82c:01049. 
  • Gelman, A., Carlin, J.,Stern, H. and Rubin, D. Bayesian Data Analysis. Chapman and Hall/CRC.(1995)
  • Bernardo, J., and Smith, A.F.M., Bayesian Theory. John Wiley. (1994)
  • Lee, P.M. Bayesian Statistics. Arnold.(1989).
  • Denison, D.G.T., Holmes, C.C., Mallick, B.K., Smith, A.F.M., Bayesian Methods for Nonlinear Classification and Regression. John Wiley. (2002).
  • Richard O. Duda, Peter E. Hart, David G. Stork (2000) Pattern classification (2nd edition), Section 9.6.5, p. 487-489, Wiley, ISBN 0-471-05669-3
  • Chapter 24 in Probability Theory - The logic of science by E. T. Jaynes, 1994.
  • David J.C. MacKay (2003) Information theory, inference and learning algorithms, CUP, ISBN 0-521-64298-1, (also available online)
  • Winkler, Robert, Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision, 2nd Edition (2003), Probabilistic. ISBN 0-964-79384-9.


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Copyrights:

Statistics Dictionary. A Dictionary of Statistics. Second edition revised. Copyright © Oxford University Press, 2008. All rights reserved.  Read more
Law Encyclopedia. West's Encyclopedia of American Law. Copyright © 1998 by The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.  Read more
Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Bayes factor" Read more