A village of western Russia west of Moscow. Nearby, Napoleon defeated the Russian troops defending Moscow on September 7, 1812.
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Bo·ro·di·no (bôr'ə-dē'nō, bŏr'-, bə-rə-dyē-nô') ![]() |
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Borodino, battle of (7 September 1812), the greatest battle during Napoleon's 1812 invasion of Russia, and the second bloodiest of the Napoleonic wars, one of Jomini's three ‘hecatombs’, along with the ‘battle of the nations’ at Leipzig and Waterloo. At the village of Borodino, on the main road 77 miles (124 km) west of Moscow, Marshal Kutuzov, commanding 120, 000 Russian troops with 640 guns, gave battle to Napoleon's multinational Grande Armée with 130, 000-135, 000 men and 587 guns. More than one-third of those on each side were killed or wounded. The battle itself was indecisive, and the Russians withdrew, having lost about 44, 000 killed and wounded. But they had inflicted a mortal wound on Napoleon's overextended army, which lost about 50, 000.
On 3 September, after a long retreat from the frontier which included giving up Smolensk, Kutuzov dug in across a front of 5 miles (8 km) spanning the only two approaches to Moscow, the main (new) Smolensk road and the old Smolensk road to the south, with his right flank protected by the Moskva river, the left by the thick Utitsa forest, with the Kolocha stream to the front and with woods behind to conceal his reserves. In the centre was the Kurgan hill, where ‘the Great (Raevsky) redoubt’ was constructed. Miloradovich commanded the right near the villages of Maslovo and Gorki, strengthened with several redoubts, and Bagration commanded the left, near the village of Semyonov where he constructed three lunettes. The strength of the wings was designed to direct any attack into the centre, commanded by Barclay de Tolly with the bulk of the artillery. Outflanking movement to the immediate north or south was impossible because of the forest and river.
There was nothing subtle or deceptive about the Russian position: it was immensely strong and any sane general would have refused to assault it under normal circumstances. But Kutuzov calculated that after a long advance over scorched earth, Napoleon would be desperate for a decisive battle, and so it proved. The French army comprised the corps of Murat, Davout, Ney, and Junot, plus the Old and Young Guard in reserve under Napoleon's own command. The first contact was at the Russian redoubt at Shevardino, to the west of the main position, where 40, 000 French stumbled on 12, 000 Russians on 5 September and were repulsed, giving Kutuzov confirmation of the main line of French advance and buying time to strengthen his position yet further. This included reinforcing Bagration, upon whom Napoleon's first hammer-blow was to fall.
The French attacked at 05.00 on 7 September; seven separate assaults were beaten back at enormous cost but the eighth, at about noon, succeeded. His planned turning manoeuvre already seriously dislocated, Napoleon then attacked the Great Redoubt in the centre. As he had already discovered at Eylau, Russian infantry on the defensive fought to the death, and the battle lost any semblance of tactical refinement in an orgy of mutual slaughter. Shaken by the carnage and perhaps suddenly acutely aware of how far he was from home, Napoleon decided not to commit the Guard, whose bitterly ironic nickname of ‘the immortals’ may have been coined by the battered line infantry after Borodino. At about 18.00, as darkness approached, the fighting petered out through exhaustion. Not only the French were stunned. After an orderly withdrawal, six days later Kutuzov informed his subordinates of his decision to give up Moscow in order to maintain the army in being.
— Christopher Bellamy
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Borodino was the climactic battle of the Campaign of 1812, which took place on September 7. Napoleon had invaded Russia hoping to force a battle near the frontier, but he pursued when the Russian armies retreated. His efforts to force a decisive battle at Smolensk having failed, Napoleon decided to advance toward Moscow, hoping to force the Russian army, now under the command of Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, to stand and fight. Pressed hard by Tsar Alexander to do so, Kutuzov selected the field near the small village of Borodino, some seventy miles west of Moscow, for the battle. He concentrated his force, divided into two armies under the command of Generals Peter Bagration and Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, and constructed field fortifications in preparation for the fight.
Napoleon eagerly seized upon Kutuzov's stand and prepared for battle. Napoleon's normal practice would have been to try to turn one of the flanks of the Russian army, which Kutuzov had fortified. Mindful of the Russians' retreat from Smolensk when he had tried a similar maneuver, Napoleon rejected this approach in favor of a frontal assault. The extremely bloody battle that ensued centered around French attempts to seize and hold Kutuzov's field fortifications, especially the Rayevsky Redoubt. The battle was a stalemate militarily, although Kutuzov decided to abandon the field during the night, continuing his retreat to Moscow.
Borodino was effectively a victory for the Russians and a turning point in the campaign. Napoleon sought to destroy the Russian army on the battlefield and failed. Kutuzov had aimed only to preserve his army as an effective fighting force, and he succeeded. Napoleon's subsequent seizure of Moscow turned out to be insufficient to overcome the devastating attrition his army had suffered. Russia's losses were, nevertheless, very high, and included Bagration, wounded on the field, who died from an infection two weeks later.
Bibliography
Duffy, Christopher. (1973). Borodino and the War of 1812. New York: Scribner.
—FREDERICK W. KAGAN
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Coordinates: 55°30.51′N 35°49.27′E / 55.5085°N 35.82117°E
| Battle of Borodino | |||||||
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| Part of French invasion of Russia (1812) | |||||||
"Battle of Moscow, 7th September 1812", 1822 by Louis Lejeune |
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| Strength | |||||||
| 130,000 men, 587 guns[2] | 120,000 men, 640 guns | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| ~27,000-35,000 dead, wounded and captured[3] [4](inc. 47 generals, 480 officers) |
39,000-45,000 dead, wounded and captured[5][6] (inc. 23 generals, 211 officers) | ||||||
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The Battle of Borodino (Russian: Бородинская битва, Borodinskaya bitva; French: Bataille de la Moskowa), fought on September 7, 1812,[7] was the largest and bloodiest single-day action of the French invasion of Russia, involving more than 250,000 troops and resulting in at least 70,000 casualties. The French Grande Armée under Emperor Napoleon I attacked the Imperial Russian army of General Mikhail Kutuzov near the village of Borodino, west of the town of Mozhaysk, and eventually captured the main positions on the battlefield, but failed to destroy the Russian army. About a third of Napoleon's soldiers were killed or wounded; Russian losses, while heavier, could be replaced due to Russia's large population, since Napoleon's campaign took place on Russian soil.
The battle itself ended with the disorganized Russian Army out of position and ripe for complete defeat. The state of the French forces and the lack of recognition of the state of the Russian Army led Napoleon to remain on the battlefield with his army instead of the forced pursuit that had marked other campaigns that he had conducted in the past. The battle at Borodino was a pivotal point in the campaign, as it was the last offensive action fought by Napoleon in Russia. By withdrawing, the Russian army preserved its combat strength, eventually allowing them to force Napoleon out of the country.
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The French Grande Armée had begun its invasion of Russia in June 1812; Emperor Alexander I proclaimed a Patriotic War in response. The Russian forces, initially massed along the Polish frontier, fell back in the face of the swift French advance. Count Michael Barclay de Tolly, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, attempted to form a defensive line, but his efforts were thwarted by the fast-moving French.
Napoleon advanced from Vitebsk, hoping to catch the Russian Army in the open where he could annihilate it.[8] The French army, however, was not positioned well for an extended overland campaign, as it was 925 km (575 miles) from its nearest logistic base at Kovno (Kaunas); the extended French supply lines were vulnerable to assault, causing Napoleon's forces to be seriously depleted by Russian supply raids.[9] The central French force, under Napoleon’s direct command, had crossed the Niemen with 286,000 men; however, by the time of the battle, it numbered 161,475 (most had died of starvation and disease).[10] Nonetheless, the lure of a decisive battle spurred Napoleon to action, driving him further into Russia and further stretching his supply lines.
Meanwhile, political infighting between Barclay's subordinates repeatedly prevented the Russian commander from committing his forces to battle.[11] Barclay's constant retreat was perceived by both his fellow generals and the Russian court as a reluctance to fight; consequently, he was removed from command and replaced by Prince Mikhail Kutuzov on August 29, 1812.[12] The 67-year old General Kutuzov was not seen by his contemporaries as the equal of Napoleon; however, he was favoured over Barclay because he was ethnically Russian (unlike Barclay, who was of Scottish descent), because he possessed the ability to muster a good defense,[13] and because he inspired the complete loyalty of both his army and his subordinates.[14]
The new Russian commander, however, was also unable to establish a defensive position until within 125 kilometers of Moscow; Kutuzov ordered another retreat to Gshatsk on August 30, at which time the ratio of French to Russian forces had shrunk from 3:1 to 5:4.[15] Kutuzov established his defensive line in an eminently defensible area near the village of Borodino, the best defensive position until the Russians reached Moscow.[16] Starting on September 3, Kutuzov strengthened the line with earthworks, including the Rayevski Redoubt in the center-right of the line and three open, arrow-shaped 'Bagration flèches' (named for Petr Bagration) on the left.
The initial Russian disposition, which stretched south of the new Smolensk Highway (Napoleon's expected route of advance), was anchored on its left by a pentagonal earthwork redoubt erected on a mound near the village of Shevardino. In an effort to flank the Russian defensive line, the French advanced from the west and south of the village, creating a brief but bloody prelude to the main battle.[17]
The struggle opened on September 5 when Prince Joachim Murat's French forces met Konovnitzyn's Russians in a massive cavalry clash; the Russians eventually retreated to the Kolorzkoi Cloister when their flank was threatened. Fighting reopened the next day, but Konovyitzyn again retreated when Prince Eugene's Fourth Corps arrived, threatening his flank. The Russians retreated to the Shevardino Redoubt, where a pitched battle occurred. Murat led Nansouty's First Cavalry Corps and Montbrun's Second Cavalry Corps, supported by Compan's Division of Louis Nicholas Davout's First Infantry Corps against the redoubt; simultaneously, Prince Josef Poniatowski's infantry attacked the position from the south. The French captured the redoubt, at the cost of 4,000 French and 7,000 Russian casualties.[18]
The unexpected French advance from the west and the fall of the Shevardino redoubt threw the Russian formation into disarray. Since the left flank of their defensive position had collapsed, Russian forces withdrew to the east, constructing a makeshift position centered around the village of Utitza. The left flank of the Russian position was, therefore, hanging in the air and ripe for a flanking attack.
Russian forces present at the battle included 180 infantry battalions, 164 cavalry squadrons, 20 Cossack regiments, and 55 artillery batteries (637 artillery pieces). In total, the Russians fielded 103,800 troops.[19] There were 7,000 Cossacks as well as 10,000 Russian militiamen in the area who did not participate in the battle. After the battle, the militia units were broken up in order to provide reinforcements to depleted regular infantry battalions. Of the 637 Russian artillery pieces, 300 were held in reserve; many of these reserve pieces were never committed to the battle.[20]
French forces included 214 battalions of infantry, 317 squadrons of cavalry and 587 artillery pieces totaling of 124,000 troops.[21] However, the French Imperial Guard, which consisted of 30 infantry battalions, 27 cavalry squadrons and 109 artillery pieces - a total of 18,500 troops - was never committed to action.[22]
The Russian position at Borodino consisted of a series of disconnected earthworks running in an arc from the Moskva River on the right, along its tributary, the Kalocha (whose steep banks added to the defense), and towards the village of Utitza on the left.[23] Thick woods interspersed along the Russian left and center (on the French side of the Kolocha) made the deployment and control of French forces difficult, aiding the defenders. The Russian center was defended by the Raevsky Redoubt, a massive open-backed earthwork mounting 19 12-pounder cannon which had a clear field of fire all the way to the banks of the Kolocha stream.
Kutuzov, who was expecting a corps-sized force of reinforcements on his right, planned to cross the Kolocha north of Borodino, attack the French left, and roll it up. This helped explain why the more powerful 1st Army under Barclay was placed in already strong positions on the right, which were virtually unassailable by the French. The 2nd Army, under Bagration, was expected to hold on the left; however the fall of Shevardino unanchored the Russian left flank. Despite the repeated pleas of his generals to redeploy their forces, Kutuzov did nothing to change these initial dispositions. Thus, when the action began and became a defensive rather than an offensive battle for the Russians, their heavy preponderance in artillery was wasted on a right wing that would never be attacked, while the French artillery did much to help win the battle.[23]
Napoleon, in command of the French forces, made errors similar to those of his Russian adversary, deploying his forces inefficiently and failing to exploit the weaknesses in the Russian line. Despite Marshal Davout's suggestion to a maneuver to outflank the weak Russian left, the Emperor instead ordered Davout's First Corps to move directly forward into the teeth of the defense, while the flanking maneuver was left to the weak Fifth Corps of Prince Poniatowski.[24] The initial French attack was aimed at seizing the three Russian positions collectively known as the Bagration flèches, four arrow-head shaped, open-backed earthworks which arced out to the left en échelon in front of the Kolocha stream. These positions helped support the Russian left, which had no terrain advantages. The flèches were supported by artillery from the village of Semyanovskaya, whose elevation dominated the other side of the Kolocha.[23] The battle began at 0600 with the opening of the 102-gun French grand battery against the Russian center.[25] Davout sent Compan's Division against the southernmost of the flèches, with Desaix's Division echeloned out to the left.[18] When Compans exited the woods on the far bank of the Kolocha, he was hit by massed Russian cannon fire; both Compans and Desaix were wounded, but the French continued their assault.[26]
Davout, seeing the confusion, personally led his 57th Brigade forward until he had his horse shot from under him; he fell so hard that General Sorbier reported him as dead. General Rapp arrived to replace him, only to find Davout alive and leading the 57th forward again. Rapp then led the 61st Brigade forward when he was wounded (for the 22nd time in his career). By 0730, Davout had gained control of the three flèches. Prince Bagration quickly led a counterattack that threw the French out of the positions, only to have Marshal Michel Ney lead a charge by the 24th Regiment that retook them.[26] Although not enamoured of Barclay, Bagration turned to him for aid, ignoring Kutuzov altogether; Barclay, to his credit, responded quickly, sending three guard regiments, eight grenadier battalions, and twenty-four 12 pounder cannon at their best pace to bolster Semyenovskaya.[27]
During the confused fighting, French and Russian units moved forward into impenetrable smoke and were smashed by artillery and musketry fire that was horrendous even by Napoleonic standards. Infantry and cavalrymen had difficulty maneuvering over the heaps of corpses and masses of wounded. Prince Murat advanced with his cavalry around the flèches to attack Bagration's infantry, but was confronted by Duka's 2nd Cuirassier Division supported by Neverovsky's infantry. This counterpunch drove Murat to seek the cover of allied Württemberger Infantry. Barclay's reinforcements, however, were sent into the fray only to be torn to pieces by French artillery, leaving Friant's Division in control of the Russian forward position at 1130. Dust, smoke, confusion, and exhaustion all combined to keep the French commanders on the field (Davout, Ney, and Murat) from comprehending that all the Russians before them had fallen back, were in confusion, and ripe for the taking. Napoleon, who had been sick with a cold and was too far from the action to really observe what was going on, refused to send his subordinates reinforcements; he was hesitant to release his last reserve, the Imperial Guard, so far from France.[28]
Prince Eugene advanced his corps against the Borodino, rushing the village and capturing it from the Russian Guard Jaegers. However, the advancing columns rapidly lost their cohesion; shortly after clearing Borodino, they faced fresh Russian assault columns and retreated back to the village. General Delzons was posted to Borodino to prevent the Russians retaking it.[29] Morand's division then crossed to the north side of the Semyenovka Stream, while the remainder of Eugene's forces crossed three bridges across the Kalocha to the south, placing them on the same side of the stream as the Russians. He then deployed most of his artillery and began to push the Russians back toward the Raevsky redoubt. Broussier and Morand's divisions then advanced together with furious artillery support. The redoubt changed hands as Barclay was forced to personally rally Paskevitch's routed regiment.[30] Kutuzov then ordered Yermolov to take action; the general brought forward three horse artillery batteries that began to blast the open-ended redoubt, while the 3rd Battalion of the Ufa Regiment and two jaeger regiments brought up by Barclay rushed in with the bayonet to eliminate Bonami's Brigade.[31] The Russian reinforcements' assault returned the redoubt to Russian control.
Eugene's artillery continued to pound Russian support columns, while Marshals Ney and Davout set up a crossfire with artillery on the Semenovskoya heights.[32] Barclay countered by moving the Russian General Eugene over to the right to support Miloradovitch in his defense of the redoubt.[33] When Barclay brought up troops against an attacking French brigade, he described it as "A walk into Hell".[32] During the height of the battle, Kutuzov's subordinates were making all of the decisions for him; according to Colonel Karl von Clausewitz of On War fame, the Russian commander "seemed to be in a trance."[33] With the death of General Kutaisov, Chief of Artillery, most of the Russian cannon sat useless on the heights to the rear and were never ordered into battle, while the French artillery wreaked havoc on the Russians.[34]
At 1400, Napoleon renewed the assault against the redoubt, as Broussier's, Morand's, and Gerard's divisions launched a massive frontal attack, with Chastel's light cavalry division on their left and the II Reserve Cavalry Corps on their right;[33] General Caulaincourt ordered Wathier's cuirassier division to lead the assault. Barclay watched Eugene's assault preparations and countered it, moving his forces against it. The French artillery, however, began bombarding the assembling force even as it gathered. Caulaincourt led the attack of Wathier's cuirassiers into the opening at the back of the redoubt and met his death as the charge was stopped cold by Russian musketry.[35] General Thielemann then led eight Saxon and two Polish cavalry squadrons against the back of the redoubt, while officers and sergeants of his command actually forced their horses through the redoubt's embrasures, sowing confusion and allowing the French cavalry and infantry to take the position. The battle had all but ended, with both sides so exhausted that only the artillery was still at work.[36] Napoleon once again refused to release the Guard; the battle concluded at approximately 1600.[37]
Barclay communicated with Kutuzov in order to receive further instructions. According to Wolzogen (in an account dripping with sarcasm), the commander was found a half-hour away on the road to Moscow, encamped with an entourage of young nobles and grandly pronouncing he would drive Napoleon off the next day.[38] Despite his bluster, Kutuzov knew from dispatches that his army had been too badly hurt to fight a continuing action the following day. He knew exactly what he was doing: by fighting the pitched battle, he could now retreat with the Russian army still intact, lead its recovery, and force the weakened French forces to move even further from their bases of supply. The dénouement became a textbook example of what a hold logistics placed upon an army far from its center of supply.[39] On September 8, the Russian army moved away from the battlefield in twin columns to Semolino, allowing Napoleon to occupy Moscow and await a Russian surrender that would never come.[14]
The casualties of the battle were staggering: according to French General Staff Inspector P. Denniee, the Grand Army lost approximately 28,000 soldiers: 6,562 (including 269 officers) were reported as dead, 21,450 as wounded [40]. But according to French historian Aristid Martinien [41] at least 460 French officers (known by name) were killed in battle. In total, the Grand Army lost 1,928 officers dead and wounded, including 49 generals [41].
38,500 Russian troops were reported as dead, wounded or missing, not including militiamen and cossacks [42]; with militia and cossack casualties, Russian losses totaled approximately 44,000. The Russian forces lost 211 officers dead and 1,180 wounded [42]. 22 Russian generals were killed or wounded, including Prince Bagration, who died of his wounds on September 24.[6] Suffering a wound on the Borodino battlefield was effectively a death sentence, as French forces did not possess enough food for the healthy, much less the sick; consequently, equal numbers of wounded soldiers starved to death, died of their injuries, or perished through neglect.[43]
While Napoleon won the battle of Borodino, his victory ultimately cost him his army, as it allowed the French emperor to believe that the campaign was winnable, exhausting his forces as he pressed still further into Russia in his attempts to defeat the Russian army. French historian Rhiem notes that while the Borodino victory allowed Napoleon to move on to Moscow, where - even allowing for the arrival of reinforcements - the French Army could only possess a maximum of 95,000 men, who would be ill equipped to win a battle due to a lack of supplies and ammunition. The Grande Armée suffered 66% of its casualties by the time of the Moscow retreat; snow, starvation, and typhus ensured that only 23,000 men crossed the border into central Europe alive. Furthermore, while the Russian army suffered heavy casualties in the battle, they had fully recovered by the time of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow; consequently, they immediately began to interfere with the French withdrawal, costing Napoleon much of his surviving army. Napoleon's own account of the battle gives a good understanding of it: "Of the fifty battles I have fought, the most terrible was that before Moscow. The French showed themselves to be worthy victors, and the Russians can rightly call themselves invincible."[44]
Poet Mikhail Lermontov romanticised the battle in his poem Borodino. The battle was famously described by Count Leo Tolstoy in his novel War and Peace as "a continuous slaughter which could be of no avail either to the French or the Russians". A huge panorama representing the battle was painted by Franz Roubaud for the centenary of Borodino and installed on the Poklonnaya Hill in Moscow to mark the 150th anniversary of the event. Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky also composed his 1812 Overture to commemorate the battle.
In Russia, the Battle of Borodino is reenacted yearly on August 26. On the battlefield itself, the Bagration flèches are still preserved; a modest monument has been constructed in honor of the French soldiers who fell in the battle. There are also remnants of trenches from the seven-day battle fought at the same battlefield in 1941 between the Soviet and German forces (which took fewer human lives than the one of 1812).
A commemorative 1-ruble coin was released in the USSR in 1987 to commemorate the 175th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, and four million of them were minted.[45] A minor planet 3544 Borodino, discovered by Soviet astronomer Nikolai Stepanovich Chernykh in 1977 was named after the village Borodino.[46]
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