Share on Facebook Share on Twitter Email
Answers.com

Branzburg v. Hayes

 
US Supreme Court: Branzburg v. Hayes; In Re Pappas; United States v. Caldwell

408 U.S. 665 (1972), argued 22–23 Feb. 1972, decided 29 June 1972 by vote of 5 to 4; White for the Court, Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas in dissent. Social unrest during the early 1970s prompted an increased grand jury interest in information collected by investigative reporters who often claimed First Amendment privilege to protect the confidentiality of sources.

Paul Branzburg of the Louisville Courier‐Journal moved to quash a Kentucky grand jury subpoena that sought additional information about his story on the manufacture of hashish. Television journalist Paul Pappas refused to answer a Massachusetts grand jury's questions about his coverage of the black Panthers. A Northern District of California federal grand jury held New York Times reporter Earl Caldwell in contempt for refusing to appear to answer questions about the Black Panthers. A Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals later reversed the ruling.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a sharply divided vote, decided against a special First Amendment privilege for the press. Justice Byron White relied on common law and case law to hold that a reporter's responsibility to a grand jury did not differ from any other citizen. The grand jury, he said, was entitled to “everyman's evidence” (p. 688). White concluded that only legislatures could establish additional protection for reporters' testimonial privilege.

Justice Potter Stewart, dissenting for himself, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall, argued that protecting the confidentiality of sources was essential to newsgathering. He thus would have required the showing of a compelling interest before a grand jury could obtain privileged information from reporters. Justice William O. Douglas also dissented vigorously and emphasized the importance of the public's access to information.

The Branzburg case prompted spirited discussion and a movement for shield laws to protect the press. A number of states added statutes or modified those in place, but shield proponents were unable to persuade Congress to pass a national privilege protection law. Nearly twenty years later in Cohen v. Cowles Media (1991), White again wrote for a majority of five to deny a claim of a special press privilege. The Court held that the First Amendment does not protect a newspaper from litigation if an editor, asserting the public's right to information, breaks a reporter's promise of confidentiality to a source.

See also Grand Juries; Speech and the Press.

— Carol E. Jenson

Search unanswered questions...
Enter a question here...
Search: All sources Community Q&A Reference topics
Wikipedia: Branzburg v. Hayes
Top
Branzburg v. Hayes
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 23, 1972
Decided June 29, 1972
Full case name Branzburg v. John P. Hayes, et al., Judges
Citations 408 U.S. 665 (more)
92 S. Ct. 2646; 33 L. Ed. 2d 626; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 132; 24 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 2125; 1 Media L. Rep. 2617
Prior history Reporter's privilege denied, KY-Jefferson County trial court of Judge Pound; appeals petition denied, 461 S. W. 2d 345 (1970); similar proceedings in trial court in Franklin County and on appeal; writ of certiorari granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971)
Holding
The First Amendment's protection of press freedom does not give a reportorial privilege in court.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority White, joined by Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Concurrence Powell
Dissent Douglas
Dissent Stewart, joined by Brennan, Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I; Ky. Rev. Stat. 421.100 (1962)

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)[1], was a landmark United States Supreme Court decision invalidating the use of the First Amendment as a defense for reporters summoned to testify before a grand jury. The case was argued February 23, 1972 and decided June 29 of the same year. The case was decided on a vote of 5-4. It remains the only time the Supreme Court has considered the use of reportorial privilege.

Contents

Facts

Paul Branzburg of The (Louisville) Courier-Journal, in the course of his reporting duties, had witnessed people manufacturing and using hashish. He wrote two articles concerning drug use in Kentucky. The first featured unidentified hands holding hashish, while the second included marijuana users as sources. These sources requested not to be identified. Both of the articles were brought to attention of law-enforcement. Branzburg was subpoenaed before a grand jury for both of the articles. He was ordered to name his sources. Earl Caldwell, a reporter for The New York Times, had conducted extensive interviews with the leaders of The Black Panthers. Paul Pappas, a Massachusetts television reporter, had also reported on The Black Panthers, spending several hours in their headquarters.

All three reporters were called to testify before separate grand juries about illegal actions they might have witnessed. They refused, citing privilege under the Press Clause, and were held in contempt.

Decision

In a fiercely split decision, the Court ruled 5-4 against the existence of reportorial privilege in the Press Clause of the First Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White declared that the petitioners were asking the Court "to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. This we decline to do." Justice White acknowledged the argument that refusing to recognize such a privilege would undermine the ability of the press to gather news, but wrote that "from the beginning of the country the press has operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and the press has flourished."

Justice White did not overlook the importance of a free press, however, and established a test, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., for deciding whether a reporter can be compelled to testify before a grand jury. For such a subpoena to have merit, the government must "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."

Complicating matters was Justice Lewis F. Powell's concurrence. While he sided with the majority, Justice Powell emphasized the "limited nature" of the decision when he stated:

The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

A few days after oral argument, and before writing his concurrence, Justice Powell prepared handwritten notes of the court’s private conference to decide the disposition of the appeal. He stated in those notes:

I will make clear in an opinion . . . that there is a privilege analogous to an evidentiary one, which courts should recognize and apply on case by case to protect confidential information. . . . My vote turned on my conclusion . . . that we should not establish a constitutional privilege. (emphasis in original notes)[2]

Subsequent history

Powell's opinion has been interpreted by several lower courts as an indication that reportorial privilege does indeed exist, but was simply not warranted in the specific case of Branzburg.

In Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (1981) the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the reporter's privilege did exist and its application depended on two factors: (1) that the information sought was crucial to a litigant's case and (2) that the information could not be acquired from any other source.

However, in 2003 in McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (2003), Judge Posner reaffirmed the majority's opinion in Branzburg, in an opinion concerning a refusal to stay an order to subpoena recordings of a key witness possessed by a group of journalists. Posner emphasized that Powell had sided with the majority and that courts asserting a reporters privilege in regard to nonconfidential sources "may be skating on thin ice."

In July 2004, Branzburg was cited as precedent by United States District Court Chief Judge Thomas Hogan in a memorandum opinion denying a motion to quash two grand jury subpoenas issued to reporters. NBC Washington Bureau Chief Tim Russert and Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper challenged the subpoenas issued in connection with the leak of the identity of former CIA operative Valerie Plame, citing their First Amendment rights as reason not to reveal their confidential sources. In the opinion, Hogan wrote:

Because this Court holds that the U.S. Supreme Court unequivocally rejected any reporter’s privilege rooted in the First Amendment or common law in the context of a grand jury acting in good faith, this Court denies the motions to quash.

Civil cases, as opposed to criminal cases, have been held not to come under the Branzburg test. Carey v. Hume, 160 U.S. App. D.C. 365, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C.Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938, 94 S. Ct. 2654, 41 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1974).

The New York Times recently published Justice Powell's notes of the court's private conference on a form that looks like a scorecard.[1] The Times purports that Justice Powell wrote the following:

I will make clear in an opinion - unless the court's opinion is clear - that there is a privilege analogous to an evidentiary one, which courts should recognize and apply on case by case to protect confidential information. My vote turned on my conclusion - after hearing arguments of counsel and re-reading principal briefs - that we should not establish a constitutional privilege. If we did this, the problems that would flow from it would be difficult to foresee: e.g., applying a privilege of const. dimensions - to grand jurys, petite juries, congressional committees, etc... And who are "newsmen" - how to define? [2]

Quotes about the case

  • "[Persuading the Court to grant First Amendment protection to journalists regarding their sources] was obviously going to be a hard sell. Notwithstanding the strong policy arguments in favor of establishing this privilege and the serious harm that would be caused by its absence, no such protection had ever been held to exist. Not only was the concept that the judicial system was entitled to 'every man's evidence' itself deeply rooted in the Constitution, but merely determining the scope of the privilege (when would it apply?) and identifying who would receive it (only regularly employed journalists? freelancers? anyone?) were difficult matters at best." Floyd Abrams[3]

See also

References

  1. ^ 408 U.S. 665 (Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com)
  2. ^ Branzburg v. Hayes - Journalists - Supreme Court - Confidential Sources - New York Times
  3. ^ Floyd Abrams, Speaking Freely, published by Viking Press (2005), Page 3.

 
 
Learn More
Grand Juries
Speech and the Press
Misprision (legal term)

Who are lemuel hayes and peter hayes? Read answer...
Is it bail hay or bale hay? Read answer...
What is a hay? Read answer...

Help us answer these
Hay how are you?
How does hay effect hay fever?
What is haying season?

Post a question - any question - to the WikiAnswers community:

 

Copyrights:

US Supreme Court. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.  Read more
Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Branzburg v. Hayes" Read more