507 U.S. 619 (1993), argued 1 Dec. 1992, decided 21 Apr. 1993 by vote of 5 to 4; Rehnquist for the Court, Souter, White, Blackmun, and O'Connor in dissent
In the early 1990s the Supreme Court struggled over the scope of the habeas corpus authority of the federal courts to hear and scrutinize state court criminal justice rulings. That struggle was part of a larger societal debate about how to deal with rising crime rates. Law enforcement officials, for their part, insisted that the federal courts had too willingly accepted habeas corpus petitions and in so doing failed to foster an appropriate sense of finality and of timely punishment. Defendants' rights advocates countered that by restricting access to habeas corpus protections in the federal courts, innocent persons would be wrongly convicted and prisoners denied a constitutional means of redress.
Brecht raised these concerns in a case involving Todd A. Brecht, who had been convicted in a Wisconsin court for shooting his brother-in-law to death. The prosecutor made known to the jury that Brecht had refused to say anything else to authorities after being read his Miranda rights, which include a provision advising him that he had a right to remain silent. The Supreme Court had ruled in
The Brecht decision further narrowed the grounds for appeal through a habeas corpus proceeding. At the same time, however, the justices left open a narrow window of appeal in the case of Withrow v. Williams (1993), decided at the same time as Brecht. The dissenters in Brecht, led by Justice David Souter, decided that federal courts should remain open to appeals from state prisoners challenging their convictions on the grounds that they were interrogated by the police without being told of their right to remain silent. In Withrow, of course, the prisoner had not been advised of his rights; in Brecht he had. Still, the two decisions underscored the close division and continuing tension in the Court over the habeas corpus issue.
— Kermit L. Hall




