245 U.S. 60 (1917), argued 10–11 Apr. 1916, decided 5 Nov. 1917 by vote of 9 to 0; Day for the Court. In this case the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance that required residential segregation by race. Enacted in 1914, the law prohibited blacks and whites from living in houses on blocks where the majority of houses was occupied by persons of the other race. In a case designed to test a type of legislation then appearing in several upper south states, a contract for the sale of property was arranged between a white seller and a black purchaser. In a unanimous decision the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.
Justice William R. Day said the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment secured the right of blacks to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against them solely because of color. More generally, the Court asked whether a white man could be denied the right to dispose of his property to a purchaser solely because the purchaser was black. Although acknowledging that race hostility was a problem that the law to some extent was bound to recognize, Justice Day stated that its solution “cannot be promoted by depriving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges” (p. 81). Day concluded that the law violated the rights of both whites and blacks to dispose of their property and directly violated the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of interference with property rights, except by due process of law (see Due Process, Procedural). The Court distinguished Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Berea College v. Kentucky (1908) as approving reasonable regulations of Fourteenth Amendment rights under the separate but equal rule. This decision placed limits on the movement to segregate blacks and showed that protection of property rights could have the effect of securing civil rights.
See also Housing Discrimination; Property Rights; Race and Racism; Segregation, De Jure.
— Herman Belz
