Champagne campaign (1814). Early in 1814 the Allies invaded France, with Schwarzenberg's Austrians advancing into Alsace and Blücher moving into Lorraine with Prussians and Russians. French detachments fell back before them. There seemed little national enthusiasm for last-ditch defence against the invader and
Napoleon first retook Saint-Dizier and then moved against Blücher at Brienne. A crucial order was captured by a Cossack patrol, so the battle did not go as he hoped. Nevertheless, his infantry, so many of them young conscripts, fought surprisingly well, and after a hard-fought contest Blücher fell back with Napoleon behind him. The emperor halted at La Rothière for two days, redeploying his other forces in the area, and on 1 February he was attacked by Blücher and Schwarzenberg, who had met at Trannes, to the south-west. The battle was fought in a howling blizzard, and once again it was finely balanced. At its close weight of numbers told, and although both sides lost 6, 000 men, 50 French guns were also lost and a retreat in appalling conditions led to a growing number of desertions.
Schwarzenberg's caution, Blücher's confidence, and the inevitable problems of co-ordinating widely spread columns in a snowy countryside, gave Napoleon another chance. Learning that Blücher was heading for Paris via Châlons, Champaubert, and Montmirail, he detached troops to mask Schwarzenberg, and, moving much faster than Blücher, destroyed one of his corps at Champaubert and mangled another at Montmirail on 10 February. Blücher managed to break contact, blowing the bridge at Château-Thierry to delay pursuit.
The Champagne campaign, 1814.
(Click to enlarge)
In the meantime Schwarzenberg recovered his confidence and drove French covering forces off the Seine, opening a threat from the south. Before moving down to deal with him Napoleon gave Blücher another hammering, this time at Vauchamps on the 14th. However, a Russian corps of 30, 000 men joined Blücher at Châlons, making good the losses he had suffered so far. On 18 February Napoleon attacked one of Schwarzenberg's corps at Montereau, at the confluence of Seine and Yonne, beating it badly and sending Schwarzenberg reeling back to Bar-sur-Aube, where Blücher joined him on 25 February for a discussion on strategy.
Napoleon might have minted political advantage from his undoubted military success, and gained generous peace terms which would have left him secure on the throne, but he persisted in demanding ‘natural frontiers’. The Bar-sur-Aube meeting provided the basis for the Treaty of Chaumont, at which the Allied leaders undertook to fight to a finish and not to conclude separate peace treaties. They offered Napoleon only the frontiers of 1791, which he scornfully rejected.
For the next phase of the campaign he sought to repeat earlier success by sending a detachment to fix Schwarzenberg while he struck at Blücher. The attempt nearly came off, but Blücher managed to cross the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac just before Napoleon caught him. There was a chaotic battle at Craonne on 7 March, and at its conclusion Blücher fell back on Laon. On the 9th Napoleon, misjudging Blücher's strength and dispositions, attacked the Allies on ground of their own choosing south of Laon. The corps commanded by Marmont was crippled, and although Napoleon deftly warded off attacks on the 10th and slipped away to Soissons, he could ill afford the losses. However, he was dangerous even at this low ebb and, hearing that a division had been posted at Rheims to link Blücher and Schwarzenberg, duly demolished it on 13 March, yet again causing the Allies to pause for thought.
As the Allies hesitated, Napoleon lunged towards Troyes, hoping to lacerate Schwarzenberg's lines of communication. Schwarzenberg reacted in time, persuading the emperor to aim for the Marne instead, and to maul the garrison of Arcis-sur-Aube as he passed. Schwarzenberg had fortuitously concentrated nearby, and the French were roughly handled on 20 March. On the following morning Napoleon was shocked to discover that he was facing Schwarzenberg's entire army, but he was able to get his men across the Aube, blowing its bridges behind them. He then resumed his march to the Marne, hoping to do more damage to Allied communications and perhaps relieve the garrisons of Metz and Verdun.
Although Napoleon did not know it, the game was up. Most of his detachments were in full retreat, and the Allies, whose Cossacks now dominated the countryside, regularly intercepted Napoleon's dispatches and knew his intentions. They decided to move Schwarzenberg north to join Blücher and for the combined force to press straight down the Marne to Paris. Winzingerode was sent off towards Saint-Dizier to lure Napoleon further away from the capital. He took the bait and although he beat Winzingerode on 26 March, on the following day he heard that the Allies had defeated Marmont and Mortier at La Fère Champenoise and would inevitably reach Paris before he could intervene. He assembled what troops he could at Fontainebleau, and it was there that Ney, speaking for the other senior commanders, told him that the army would not march on Paris. Napoleon abdicated in favour of his son on 4 April but, informed that the Allies would accept only unconditional abdication, duly signed this abdication on the 6th.
The Champagne campaign saw Napoleon display skill which seemed to have deserted him over the past few years. His accomplishment is all the more remarkable in view of Allied strength, the poor weather, and the patchy quality of his own army. If he made a mistake in not treating for peace after Montereau, it was because he continued to trust in his remarkable luck, and he was never a man for half measures.
Bibliography
- Chandler, David, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London, 1967)
— Richard Holmes
