Clayton-Bulwer Treaty

 

concluded (Apr. 19, 1850) at Washington, D.C., between the United States, represented by Secretary of State John M. Clayton, and Great Britain, represented by the British plenipotentiary Sir Henry Bulwer. American and British rivalries in Central America, particularly over a proposed isthmian canal, led to the treaty. Its most important article provided “that neither...will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal...that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same...or occupy, or fortify, or colonize or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast [in present-day Honduras and Nicaragua], or any part of Central America.”

Although the treaty was soon ratified by the Senate, it was one of the most unpopular in U.S. history, viewed by some as a betrayal of the Monroe Doctrine. Successive secretaries of state tried in vain to secure modifications that would enable the United States to build its own canal and exercise, under restrictions, political control over it, but it was not until 1901, with the Hay-Pauncefote Treaties, that this end was finally achieved.

Bibliography

See M. W. Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815–1915 (1916, repr. 1965).

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, negotiated in 1850 by John M. Clayton and Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer (Lord Dalling), in consequence of the situation created by the project of an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua, each signatory being jealous of the activities of the other in Central America.

Great Britain had large and indefinite territorial claims in three regions — Belize or British Honduras, the Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands. On the other hand, the United States, without territorial claims, held in reserve, ready for ratification, treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras, which gave the U.S. a certain diplomatic advantage with which to balance the de facto dominion of Great Britain. Agreement on these points being impossible and agreement on the canal question possible, the latter was put in the foreground.

The resulting treaty had four essential points. It bound both parties not to "obtain or maintain" any exclusive control of the proposed canal, or unequal advantage in its use. It guaranteed the neutralization of the canal. It declared that the parties agreed "to extend their protection by treaty stipulation to any other practicable communications, whether by canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and South America." Finally, it stipulated that neither signatory would ever "occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Central America," nor make use of any protectorate or alliance, present or future, to such ends.

The treaty was signed on April 19, 1850, and was ratified by both governments; but before the exchange of ratifications British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, on June 8, directed Sir H. Bulwer to make a "declaration" that the British government did not understand the treaty "as applying to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras, or its dependencies." Mr. Clayton made a counterdeclaration, which recited that the United States did not regard the treaty as applying to "the British settlement in Honduras commonly called British-Honduras. .. nor the small islands in the neighborhood of that settlement which may be known as its dependencies"; that the treaty's engagements did apply to all the Central American states, "with their just limits and proper dependencies" (meaning, apparently, the Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands); and that these declarations, not being submitted to the United States Senate, could of course not affect the legal import of the treaty.

The interpretation of the declarations soon became a matter of contention. The phraseology reflects the effort made by the United States to render impossible a physical control of the canal by Great Britain through the territory held by the British at its mouth, just as the explicit prohibitions of the treaty rendered impossible such control politically by either power. But Britain claimed that the excepted "settlement" at Honduras was the "Belize" covered by the extreme British claim; that the Bay Islands were a dependency of Belize; and that, as for the Mosquito Coast, the abnegatory clauses being wholly prospective in intent, she was not required to abandon her protectorate. The United States contended that the Bay Islands were not the "dependencies" of Belize, which were the small neighboring islands mentioned in the same treaties, and nothing else; that the excepted "settlement" was the British-Honduras of definite extent and narrow purpose recognized in British treaties with Spain; that the United States had not confirmed by recognition the large, indefinite and offensive claims whose dangers the treaty was primarily designed to lessen; and that, as to the Mosquito Coast, the treaty was retrospective, and mutual in the rigor of its requirements. The claims to a part of Belize and the Bay Islands were very old in origin, but were heavily clouded by interruptions of possession, contested interpretations of Spanish-British treaties, and active controversy with the Central American States. The claim to some of the territory was new and still more contestable. See particularly on these claims Travis's book cited below.

Binding both not to "occupy" any part of Central America or the Mosquito Coast necessitated the abandonment of such territory as Great Britain was already actually occupying or exercising dominion over; and the United States demanded the complete abandonment of the British protectorate over the Mosquito Indians. It seems to be a just conclusion that when in 1852 the Bay Islands were erected into a British "colony" this was a flagrant infraction of the treaty; that as regards Belize the American arguments were decidedly stronger, and more correct historically; and that as regards the Mosquito question, inasmuch as a protectorate seems certainly to have been recognized by the treaty, to demand its absolute abandonment was unwarranted, although to satisfy the treaty Great Britain was bound materially to weaken it.^[1]

In 1859-1860, by British treaties with Central American states, the Bay Islands and Mosquito questions were settled nearly in accord with the American contentions. (Britain ceded the Bay Islands to Honduras in 1860 and ceded suzerainty over the Mosquito Coast to Nicaragua the same year.) But by the same treaties Belize was accorded limits much greater than those contended for by the United States. This settlement the United States accepted without cavil for many years.

Until 1866 the policy of the United States was consistently for interoceanic canals open equally to all nations, and unequivocally neutralized; indeed, until 1880 there was practically no official divergence from this policy. But in 1880-1884 a variety of reasons was advanced why the United States might justly repudiate at will the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The new policy was based on national self-interest. The arguments advanced on its behalf were quite indefensible in law and history, and although the position of the United States in 1850-1860 was in general the stronger in history, law and political ethics, that of Great Britain was even more conspicuously the stronger in the years 1880-1884.^[1] In 1885 the United States government reverted to its traditional policy, and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1902, which replaced the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, adopted the rule of neutralization for the Panama Canal.

Footnotes

1. ^ ^{a b} Analysis is from the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica, available here.

See also

• Nicaragua Canal
• Panama Canal
• Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
• Hay-Herran Treaty
• Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty

Sources

• Text of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty at the Yale Law School's Avalon Project
• I.D. Travis, History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1899)
• J.H. Latane, Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America (Baltimore, 1900)
• T.J. Lawrence, Disputed Questions of Modern International Law (2nd ed., Cambridge, England, 1885)
• Sir E.L. Bulwer in 99 Quarterly Review 235-286
• Sir H. Bulwer in 104 Edinburgh Review 280-298.
• This article incorporates text from the Encyclopædia Britannica Eleventh Edition article "Clayton-Bulwer Treaty", a publication now in the public domain.

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