One of the age-old problems of tactics and battlefield handling is the tension between the need for shock action and the requirement to deliver effective fire at a distance. This is not entirely a tactical problem: the tendency of men in combat to bunch up is something that requires rigorous training to overcome and before the advent of accurate rifle fire, it was an important factor to be weighed. Various military theorists and practitioners have wrestled with these conflicting exigencies of battle and proposed different solutions of varying effectiveness. During the Renaissance, the rediscovery of ancient military texts encouraged experimentation with different formations and this, coupled with the rise of professional troops who could be trained in various manoeuvres, meant that enterprising commanders, freed from the bonds of feudal allegiance, could give rein to their pet tactical theories.
Initially it was the shock action of the Swiss, and later the Spanish pike columns that was to prove decisive in battle, and although the Swiss system of an assault at a fast jogging pace in three massive columns was to come drastically unstuck at Bicocca in 1522 and at Marignano in 1515, the judicious admixture of supporting musketeers and arquebusiers to the pike column by the Spanish was to result in the famous tercio formation that dominated European battlefields for over a century.
It was Maurice of Nassau and later Gustavus Adolphus who were to find the key to defeating the tercio. Taking inspiration from ancient Roman writers, Maurice devised a smaller handier and thinner formation—the ‘Dutch Brigade’—that emphasized firepower and proved far more manoeuvrable in the field. However, it is important to note that the Dutch and Swedish brigade was not universally successful against the tercio, it required a high degree of training to become fully effective, and it was not until the perfection of flintlock firearms that were reliable, and the discontinuation of the pike in the late 17th century, that a military revolution can really be said to have come of age.
Yet still the drill and discipline required to defeat the enemy by firepower, and especially their cavalry, who could bowl over a thin line of troops by speed and shock alone, necessitated rigorous and extensive training. This training was possible for small militarized states like Brandenburg-Prussia, but given the large numbers required to defend a country like France, not all troops received the necessary instruction, and consequently the French infantry performed indifferently in the Wars of the Spanish Succession and Austrian Succession. This led a generation of French military theorists such as Maurice de Saxe and the Chevalier de Folard to seek to recapture the offensive spirit that they felt had been lost since the glory days of Louis XIV, by use of the infantry attack column. Although the French infantry did fare badly on the whole in the Seven Years War, some notable successes such as Hastenbeck in 1757 were won by using the column in offence in defiance of the prevailing orthodoxy. The lesson was not lost on French military commentators and writers, and Guibert began to formulate a theory of manoeuvre combining the offensive power of the infantry attack column with the use of close range musketry, in order to break the opposing line.
It was this system that was incorporated into the famous réglement of 1791 that became the standard French infantry manual until 1830. At first the ill-trained recruits of the French Revolutionary armies found the column an expedient method of manoeuvre and attack, especially when accompanied by hordes of tirailleurs who would snipe at enemy officers and NCOs from cover. Several victories were won by the attack in column, but it is important to note that it was not universally successful, and against a steady enemy it could easily founder, as very few of the troops in the column could bring their muskets to bear on the enemy. In any event, the drill book of 1791 called for the approach march to be made in column of divisions, two companies wide, and for a rapid shaking out into line to deliver two or three crashing volleys before charging home with the bayonet. Evidently, this required superb discipline and not a small amount of fancy footwork on the part of the fantassins. Many commanders either could not trust their troops to perform the complex evolutions required or failed to locate the enemy in time to deploy. In the Napoleonic wars, the classic test of column versus line came at Maida in 1806, and this was to establish the pattern for the bulk of the infantry combats of the Peninsular war, where the fire discipline of the British infantry in line was to prove decisive in many an encounter.
With the introduction of the percussion cap in 1822, and the conical Mini rifle-bullet in 1849, the infantry attack column was doomed, as the Russians found out to their cost in the Crimean war. By the time of the Franco-Prussian war, infantry began to adopt an attack in an extended skirmishing line, often firing from a prone position with breech-loading rifles, and making extensive use of field fortifications when in defence. The line had triumphed over the column for good.
— Toby McLeod
