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compatibilism

 

Thesis that free will, in the sense required for moral responsibility, is consistent with universal causal determinism. It is important to distinguish the question of the logical consistency of belief in universal causal determinism with belief in free will from the question whether the thesis of free will (or that of causal determinism) is true. Compatibilists need not assert (though many have) the reality both of free will and of causal determinism. Among incompatibilists, some maintain the existence of free will and accordingly deny universal causal determinism, while others uphold universal causal determinism and deny the existence of free will. See also free will problem.

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World of the Mind: compatibilism
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Traditionally, those who maintain the truth of determinism and believers in the freedom of the will have been regarded as taking up incompatible positions. Thus from one side it is argued that, since all events, including human actions, are causally determined, the belief that we are free is an illusion; from the other side it is argued that we know we are free, and hence universal determinism must be false. Compatibilists maintain that both these arguments are invalid: since a free action is simply one that is not constrained by external forces, there is a perfectly ordinary and proper sense in which we act freely when we do what we want to do; and the existence of such freedom need not presuppose that determinism is false, or that human beings possess some contra-causal power. Defenders of the compatibilist or 'reconciliationist' position have included Leibniz and Hume.

(Published 1987)

— John G. Cottingham



 
 

 

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Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. © 2006 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. All rights reserved.  Read more
World of the Mind. The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Second Edition. Copyright © Oxford University Press, 2004. All rights reserved.  Read more