A construct in the philosophy of science is an ideal object (i.e., one the existence of which may be said to depend upon a subject's mind) as opposed to a real object (one the existence of which is not so dependent).[1]
Concepts, such as those designated, say, by the sign 3 or the word liberty; hypotheses (such as that designated by the sentence, "evolutionary theory refers to individuals and populations"); theories (e.g., evolutionary theory, gravitational theory); classifications (e.g., biological taxonomy) and other conceptual entities are, by this argument, constructs.
Biologists, say, foxes, philosophers, rocks, computers or pencils, are, by contrast, real objects or things.
References
- ^ Bunge, M. 1974. Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Vol. I Semantics I: Sense and Reference. Dordrecth-Boston: Reidel Publishing Co.
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