The questioning of accepted beliefs or opinions. In Greek philosophy such doubting was erected into a philosophical system by the sceptics, such as Pyrrho of Elis (
fl. c.300 bc), who argued that all truth is unknowable and that the only appropriate attitude for life is one of total suspension of belief. In the 17th century,
Descartes's famous 'method of doubt' involved withholding assent from all matters that allow even the smallest possibility of doubt. Thus all information derived from the senses is potentially unreliable; further, we cannot know whether we are awake or asleep, so that even such a simple statement as 'I am holding this piece of paper' is open to doubt; and, finally, there may be a malicious all-powerful demon who is bent on deceiving us, and so 'the earth, sky, and all external things' may be merely delusions. Cartesian doubt is not, however, an end in itself, but it is designed to clear the way for the establishment of a secure system of knowledge built on indubitable foundations.
The questioning of accepted beliefs and preconceived opinions can be a valuable exercise both in philosophy and in science generally (see
common sense). It seems, however, that to insist on indubitability as a criterion of the acceptability of beliefs is to insist on an impossibly high standard. Immunity to all conceivable doubt is something that belongs to only a handful of very simple and relatively unexciting propositions, such as (perhaps) 'two and two make four', or Descartes's famous 'cogito' ('I am thinking'), and it does not seem possible to construct any worthwhile system of knowledge on such meagre foundations.
The difficulty of seriously maintaining a position of philosophical scepticism was highlighted by
G. E. Moore in the 20th century, and earlier by
David Hume. Hume observed that 'Nature is always too strong for principle, and though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself and others into a momentary ... confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts' (
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748).
(Published 1987)— John G. Cottingham