Escobedo v. Illinois

 
US Supreme Court:

Escobedo v. Illinois

378 U.S. 438 (1964), argued 29 Apr. 1964, decided 22 June 1964 by vote of 5 to 4; Goldberg for the Court, Harlan, Stewart, White, and Clark in dissent. When Danny Escobedo, a murder suspect, was taken to the police station and put in an interrogation room, he repeatedly asked to speak to the lawyer he had retained. Escobedo's lawyer soon arrived at the station house and repeatedly asked to see his client. Despite the persistent efforts of both Escobedo and his lawyer, the police prevented them from meeting. The police also failed to advise Escobedo of his right to remain silent. In response to accusations that he had fired the fatal shot, Escobedo made some incriminating remarks and then confessed to the crime.

Even though Escobedo had been interrogated before adversary proceedings had commenced against him (compare Massiah v. United States, 1964), the Supreme Court threw out his confession. Because of the accordion‐like quality of Justice Arthur Goldberg's opinion for the narrow majority, a great deal of confusion resulted. At some places, the opinion seemed to say that a person's right to counsel is triggered once he becomes the “prime suspect” or once the investigation shifts from the “investigatory” to the “accusatory” stage and begins to “focus” on him. (Because this reading of the opinion threatened to cripple police interrogation, it alarmed many members of the bench and bar). At other places, however, the opinion seems to limit the case's holding to the specific facts preceding Escobedo's confession.

Two years later, Escobedo was shoved offstage by the equally controversial case of Miranda v. Arizona (1966). Miranda shifted from a “prime suspect,” or “focal point,” test to a “custodial interrogation” standard, moving from Escobedo’s right‐to‐counsel rationale to one grounded primarily in the privilege against self‐incrimination. Thus, although Miranda maintained the momentum in favor of suspects' rights generated by Escobedo, it largely displaced that case's rationale.

.

See also Due Process, Procedural

— Yale Kamisar

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Wikipedia: Escobedo v. Illinois
Escobedo v. Illinois
Seal_of_the_United_States_Supreme_Court.png
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 29, 1964
Decided June 22, 1964
Full case name: Escobedo v. Illinois
Citations: 378 U.S. 478; 84 S. Ct. 1758; 12 L. Ed. 2d 977; 1964 U.S. LEXIS 827; 4 Ohio Misc. 197; 32 Ohio Op. 2d 31
Prior history: Defendant convicted in Cook County criminal court; Illinois Supreme Court held statement inadmissible and reversed, February 1, 1963; on petition for rehearing, Illinois Supreme Court affirmed conviction, 28 Ill. 2d 41; cert. granted, 375 U.S. 902
Subsequent history: reversed and remanded
Holding
Where a police investigation begins to focus on a particular suspect who has been refused counsel and not Mirandized, his statements to police are excluded.
Court membership
Chief Justice: Earl Warren
Associate Justices: Hugo Black, William O. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, Byron White, Arthur Joseph Goldberg
Case opinions
Majority by: Goldberg
Joined by: Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan
Dissent by: Harlan
Dissent by: Stewart
Dissent by: White
Joined by: Stewart, Clark
Laws applied
U.S. Const., Amends. VI and XIV

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),[1] was a United States Supreme Court case holding that criminal suspects have a right to counsel during police interrogations. The case was decided a year after the court held, in Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that indigent criminal defendants had a right to be provided counsel at trial.

Background

Danny Escobedo's brother-in-law Manuel, a Chicago convict, was shot and killed on the night of January 19, 1960. The police arrested Danny Escobedo early the next morning, tried without success to interrogate him, and eventually released him. Ten days later, on January 30, the police interrogated Benedict DiGerlando, who told them that Escobedo fired the fatal shots. The police arrested and interrogated Escobedo that evening. Escobedo asked to speak to an attorney. His attorney went to police headquarters and tried to talk to Escobedo during the interrogation. Both requests were refused. When the police told Escobedo about DiGerlando's claim, Escobedo asked to confront him. When this happened, Escobedo implicated himself as an accessory in the murder, later confessed the same to a prosecuting attorney, and was eventually convicted.

Escobedo appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which initially held the confession inadmissible and reversed the conviction. Illinois petitioned for rehearing and the court then affirmed the conviction. Escobedo appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The ACLU argued before the court as amicus curiae favoring Escobedo.

The court's decision

The Supreme Court overturned Escobedo's conviction and recognized a suspect's right to an attorney during police interrogation. Writing for the majority, Justice Arthur Goldberg viewed the police interrogation in this case as more of an interrogation of a specific suspect than a general questioning of witnesses. As such, he held the distinction between pre- and post-indictment to be immaterial, since the police and prosecutor elicited a confession after they'd already gotten the damning statement necessary to indict Escobedo. To hold otherwise, wrote Goldberg, would be to "exalt form over substance". The court had already recognized a right to counsel after indictment in Gideon v. Wainwright. Extending that precedent, it interpreted the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a right to counsel as applying to defendants from the time they become primary suspects.

Dissenting Opinions

Justice Potter Stewart's dissent essentially accused the majority of conflating the formal difference between pre and post-indictment questioning. Justice Byron White's dissent began with his disagreement about the applicability of cited precedent. He also criticized the majority's Constitutional interpretation, insisting that the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination elucidated the full intent of the framers to provide protection to suspects during police interrogation. All the dissenting opinions stressed the adverse impact the court's decision would have on combatting crime.

See also

References

  1. ^ 378 U.S. 478 (Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com)

 
 

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