For more information on Frank Hyneman Knight, visit Britannica.com.
| Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Frank Hyneman Knight |
For more information on Frank Hyneman Knight, visit Britannica.com.
| 5min Related Video: Frank Knight |
| Biography: Frank Hyneman Knight |
The American economist Frank Hyneman Knight (1885-1972) was a leading figure in the influential Chicago school of neoclassic economics, especiallyin his descriptive model of the system of perfect competition.
Frank Knight was born on a farm in McClean County, Illinois, on November 7, 1885. During his boyhood he was exposed to the fire-and-brimstone evangelism of the American Midwest, which probably led to his lifelong contempt for religious dogma. He received a bachelor's degree from Milligan College in Tennessee in 1911 and bachelor's and master's degrees from Cornell University in 1916. At Cornell he studied under Allyn Young, who exerted a direct influence on Knight's economic ideas.
Knight's academic career included appointments at Cornell, Chicago, and Iowa before he returned in 1928 to Chicago, where he was subsequently appointed Morton Hull professor of economics. Throughout his academic career Knight remained primarily an intellectual. He lived in the world of ideas and thus, he felt, preserved his intellectual integrity by not becoming involved in government service, activist organizations, or writing for the popular journals and newspapers. As skeptical scholar, critic, and self-made intellectual, he has been described as preeminently a product of the American Midwest, utterly unlike the typical sophisticated eastern seaboard intellectual.
Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), Knight's first major work, was originally written as his doctoral dissertation in 1916. As with so many of his later works, his goal was clarification - the clarification of what he regarded as certain ambiguities in the neoclassic economic theory of organization, especially as found in Alfred Marshall's works. In particular he sought to make clear the distinction between rent and profit. He thus described in detail the features of a system in which competition is perfect. His treatment of this question of perfect competition has been described as the apogee of neoclassic theorizing. Unlike a number of theorists who later cited him for programmatic political reasons, Knight fully realized and stated explicitly that the model of perfect competition is a construct of the mind, an idealization of reality, not a description of it. Some of those who followed him overlooked this important qualification and expected actual world institutions to be in accord with the model. The effect of this error was to permit the critics of a competitive economic order to effectively undermine much of the general social support for it, especially when comparative analysis failed to consider the flaws of alternative economic systems.
Knight exerted a great influence on applied economic theory in the 20th century, including that of the Richard Nixon administration, especially through his work The Economic Organization (1951). Its particular value is its integrated approach to the economy as a social organization. For example, he spelled out the five functions of the economic system, an approach that found its way into many basic economic textbooks, and used the image of the wheel of wealth or income, which is another standard feature of introductory texts and popular publications.
However, Knight is considered more of an essayist than a writer of economic tomes. His whole work has been described as a continuing review of the books that are written or read uncritically by so many others. This aspect of his work is most evident in The Ethics of Competition (1921-1935), a collection of his essays edited by a group of his students. The work is characterized more by the raising of critical questions than by the providing of answers. In one tour de force he denied that wants are static in human nature, and thus no government or economic system can ever satisfy human desires, since new ones are always arising. The instant one desire is satisfied, another arises to take its place.
Knight's pessimistic 1935 essay "Economic Theory and Nationalism" views the development of human history as a tragic one. He was critical of liberalism, which failed because of its own excesses and thus led directly to socialism as its replacement. Attempting to analyze the attractiveness of systems alternative to liberalism (such as national socialism), which he felt were equally wrong on other counts, he perceptively presented their values that stress the natural human desire to be part of a larger organic whole such as the nation. Knight viewed modern man's main problem as a moral one, not an economic one. He felt that liberalism had destroyed conventional religion without providing any effective substitute for it and judged that what men need is a common morality founded on truth. In Knight's Intelligence and Democratic Action (1960), his attitude on the attainment of this goal is somewhat optimistic. Knight died in 1972.
Further Reading
No definitive biography of Knight has been published. For a collection of essays about Knight's work and economic theory based on his work, see Blaug, Mark, ed. Frank Knight (1885-1972, Henry Simons) (1992).
| Columbia Encyclopedia: Frank Hyneman Knight |
| Wikipedia: Frank Knight |
| Western Economists 20th-Century Economists |
|
|---|---|
| Full name | Frank Hyneman Knight |
| Born | November 7, 1885 McLean County, USA |
| Died | April 15, 1972 (aged 86) |
| Main interests | economics |
| Notable ideas | Knightian uncertainty |
Frank Hyneman Knight (November 7, 1885 - April 15, 1972) was an important economist of the twentieth century. He was born in McLean County, Illinois in a devoutly Christian family of farmers. He never completed high school but was admitted in 1905 to the American University in Tennessee. He graduated in 1911 from Milligan College. At the University of Tennessee he obtained a B.S. and an M.A. (the latter in German) in 1913. He then moved to Cornell University for doctoral studies. His initial main subject was philosophy, but he soon switched to economics. He studied with Alvin Johnson and Allyn Young, who both supervised the work on his dissertation, that was completed in 1916 under the title A Theory of Business Profit. Entered in the Hart, Schaffner and Marx essay competition with the title Cost, Value and Profit, Knight's dissertation won second prize in 1917, and was subsequently revised for publication under its more familiar name Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).
Contents |
Jointly with Jacob Viner, Knight presided over the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago from the 1920s to the early 1960s (Viner left for Princeton in the late 1940s), and played a central role in setting the character of that department that was perhaps only comparable to Schumpeter's tenure over Harvard; Robbins's at the L.S.E or Paul Samuelson's at MIT. He was also one of the founders (in the early 1940s) of the University's Committee on Social Thought, with which he was associated for the remainder of his career.
His famous dissertation Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) remains one of the most interesting reads in economics even today. In it, Knight made his famous distinction between "risk" (randomness with knowable probabilities) and "uncertainty" (randomness with unknowable probabilities), set forth the role of the entrepreneur in a distinctive theory of profit and gave one of the earliest presentations of the now-famous law of variable proportions in the theory of production.
While irreducibly Neoclassical in a general sense, Knight's peculiar economics were a direct inheritance of his Cornell professor, Herbert J. Davenport and what was then called the "American Psychological School" which sought to ground the marginalist high theory of William Jevons, Philip Wicksteed, and the Austrians in the relativist foundations of Thorstein Veblen's methodology.
Like Davenport, the notoriously belligerent Knight criticized other schools on several accounts while also adopting some of their ideas: for instance, from the Walrasians he adopted the idea of theoretical rigor and viewing the economy in terms of multiple markets, but disparaged their mathematical propensities; from the Austrians he adopted their theory of alternative cost, but attacked their theory of capital; from the Marshallians he adopted their literary tone, but attacked their lack of rigor and their "real" theory of cost; from the Ricardians, he adopted a concern with the interaction between social structure and theory but attacked the objectivist basis of their theory; from the Marxians, he adopted many of their ideas about the ethical critique of capitalism as well as its tendency towards the concentration of capital, but he abhorred the labor theory of value; from the Institutionalists, he adopted their concern with social impact on behavior and evolution, but he opposed their empirical techniques and conclusions ("history is to be sensed, not plotted", as Knight put it).
The famously opinionated Knight used his numerous book reviews in Chicago's Journal of Political Economy and Ethics as vehicles for his thoughts on many subjects. As a result, he was embroiled in many debates with the most prominent economists of his day ranging over capital theory (versus Hayek, Mises and the Austrians, e.g. 1933, 1935, 1937), welfare theory (versus Pigou, e.g. 1924), Keynesian theory (1937) and positivist methodology (versus Hutchison (1940)). His reviews of John Dewey (1936), Bertrand Russell (1939), Jacques Maritain (1944), and Hayek (1967) – for a second time, now regarding The Constitution of Liberty – brought his acerbic style to debates with philosophers, political theorists, theologians, and others.
Thus, Knight amalgamated much of what was contained all over the spectrum of economic theory - but without once losing the skeptic's dissecting eye. Perhaps because he was endowed with enough of the demeanour and knowledge of a philosopher, sociologist and historian as well as an economist, he was able to appear as a kindred spirit to all schools as well as an opponent at the same time.
As noted, Knight was one of the leaders of the inter-war "Chicago School" (although we must keep in mind that during his stay there, the Chicago School had a much different tone than it acquired later). Yet, even then, he managed to remain an outsider in his own kingdom. Knight's well-known dislike of quantitative methods and especially empirical techniques brought him into conflict with several colleagues - notably, Henry Schultz, Paul Douglas and Oskar Lange. His opposition to the Marshallian propensities of his co-giant, Jacob Viner, earned him the latter's respect but not necessarily his friendship. Even Knight's own unlikely protegé Henry Simons, differed substantially from Knight on most matters.
Like Schumpeter (whom he both admired and resembled in many ways), Knight was an avid proponent of a cosmopolitan laissez-faire – but he did so on unique, "non-consequentialist" grounds. As is evident in his famous Ethics of Competition (1923) and in other works on ethics throughout his life, Knight does not regard the capitalist system as ethically defensible. Capitalism, he claims, does not produce what people want but merely creates the wants for what it produces - "the freest individual. ..is in large measure a product of the economic environment that has formed his desires and needs, given him whatever marketable productive capacities he has, and which largely controls his opportunities." (Knight, 1923). Furthermore, he argued that there was a tendency in market systems towards monopoly, that the "efficiency" of markets was misleading for there was no sense of "usefulness" of its output to society, that the marginal productivity thesis had erroneous ethical implications as "the income does not go to "factors" but to their owners. ..and ownership of personal or material productive capacity is based upon a complex mixture of inheritance, luck and effort, probably in that order of relative importance" (Knight, 1923).
Knight's peculiar ethical assault on the market system and "apologetic economics" did not diminish his penchant for laissez-faire as a policy conclusion. The economy, he argued, is a very complex and unstable thing. Programs of government intervention are too simplistic and do not take into account the complexities of a market economy - thus making interventionism even more dangerous. Laissez-faire is recommended, he argued, not because it "works" (for it patently does not) but rather because it holds individual freedom as an absolute good and the alternative may be much worse.
As a result, Knight's position is quite the reverse of the Second Chicago School economists of the 1960s, (i.e. Friedman, Stigler and company). The Second Chicago School tended to argue the positivist line that laissez-faire is desirable because it delivers the goods, and not because it is a good in itself. Indeed, throughout his life, Knight explicitly deplored and attacked many of the assumptions that the Second Chicago School held dear: e.g. the denial of the importance of monopolistic competition, the assumption of consumer sovereignty, stable preferences, efficient outcomes of markets, empirical-intuitive reasoning, interdisciplinary imperialism, etc.
All these items are precisely and directly opposed to virtually every important argument and position of Knight's (Emmett 2009). Indeed, the later Chicago School's declared "positivist" methodology was wryly characterized by Knight as "the emotional pronouncement of value judgements condemning emotion and value judgements which seems to [me] a symptom of a defective sense of humor" (Knight, 1940). However, we must grant that Knight's theories of capital (Knight viewed all factors as capital to a greater or lesser degree) and his "public choice" view of political behavior could be said to have persisted in at least some quarters of the modern Chicago School.
In this sense, then, Knight, like Schumpeter, carved a unique path in economics – being claimed by many schools of thought as one of their own, without really belonging to any. Unfortunately, also like Schumpeter, although he educated and influenced many students, Knight failed to acquire any followers and failed to build up a distinctive "school of thought" around himself. We can see some traces of his perspective in the work of Kenneth E. Boulding, Martin Bronfenbrenner, James M. Buchanan and George J. Stigler, but they can hardly be called "Knightians" in any meaningful sense.
Nobel laureates Milton Friedman, George J. Stigler, and James M. Buchanan were among Knight's many students at the University of Chicago.
Knight invented the notion of what has come to be called Knightian uncertainty, where he made a distinction between risk and uncertainty. He argued that situations with risk were those where decision making was made faced with unknown outcomes but known ex-ante probability distributions. He argued that these situations, where decision making rules such as maximizing expected utility can be applied, differ in a deep way from those where the probability distribution of a random outcome is unknown. While most economists today would recognize the difference between the two situations, there has been little progress in terms of writing models and doing empirical tests of problems with Knightian uncertainty. A possible exception is the "Markets from Networks" model developed by sociologist Harrison White in 2002.
He entered a famous debate with A.C. Pigou over social costs. He also made contributions to the arguments about toll roads. He said that rather than congestion justifying government tolling of roads, privately owned roads would set tolls to reduce congestion to its efficient level. In particular, he developed the argument that forms the basis of analysis of traffic equilibrium, and has since become known as Wardrop's Principle:
| Wikisource has original works written by or about: Frank Knight |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||
This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)
| Jazz in Paris: Stan Getz Quartet in Paris (2002 Album by Stan Getz) | |
| R. Strauss: Don Quixote; Haydn: Symphony No. 32 'Oxford' (Classical Album) | |
| Pardalotes (Pardalotidae) (zoology) |
| Who can be knights? Read answer... | |
| What are knights? Read answer... | |
| What is a Frank? Read answer... |
| How can be a knight? | |
| What does a knight have to do? | |
| What a knight? |
Copyrights:
![]() | Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. © 2006 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. All rights reserved. Read more | |
![]() | Biography. © 2006 through a partnership of Answers Corporation. All rights reserved. Read more | |
![]() | Columbia Encyclopedia. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition Copyright © 2003, Columbia University Press. Licensed from Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. www.cc.columbia.edu/cu/cup/. Read more | |
![]() | Wikipedia. This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution/Share-Alike License. It uses material from the Wikipedia article "Frank Knight". Read more |
Mentioned in