Córdoba, Gonzalo Fernández de (1453-1515). Justly known as ‘El Gran Capitán’ (‘The Great Captain’), Córdoba was the right-hand man of his exact contemporary Ferdinand in the latter's stunningly successful dynastic expansion from prince of Aragon and titular king of Sicily to joint ruler of a united Spain, all of southern Italy, and the principal military power in Europe. Fernández de Córdoba's career started during the period when the successions to their respective kingdoms of both Ferdinand and his wife Isabella of Castile were threatened by rebellious nobles (1474-9). His leadership qualities emerged while serving in Christian armies during the final eight years of the centuries-long Reconquista, taking part in the sieges of Tajara, Illora, and Monte Frío, at the last of which he was the first man over the walls. Unhorsed and saved by the self-sacrifice of his manservant in a cavalry skirmish outside Granada, his familiarity with Arabic made him one of two crown commissioners in the secret negotiations for the surrender of that Muslim kingdom in 1492.
In 1495 he led an expedition of 5, 000 veteran infantry and 600 jinetes (light cavalry) for Ferdinand to Sicily, in alliance with Venice, to support the Aragonese King of Naples against an invasion by French King Charles VIII. Although the latter returned rapidly to France, the forces he left behind inflicted a rare defeat on Fernández de Córdoba at Seminara. But siege warfare and not field operations decided campaigns, and at Atella the next year his inspired use of a light cavalry screen combined with a close investment isolated and defeated the main French force, after which, and with an imaginative use of allied naval superiority, he mopped up the remaining French garrisons. The campaign ended in an armistice in 1497, after he drove French forces out of their stranglehold on Rome at the port of Ostia, at the invitation of Pope Alexander VI who earlier had bestowed the honorary title of ‘The Most Catholic’ on his master.
Ferdinand agreed with the new French king, Louis XII, to partition Naples between them in the Treaty of Granada in 1500, which neither intended to respect. He dispatched Fernández de Córdoba as viceroy of Sicily at the head of a large expedition to balance a similar French force, while combining with them and Venice against the Ottoman Turks who threatened Sicily. At the head of a Spanish-Venetian expedition, he took the strongly held Turkish island of Cephalonia in December 1500. During this siege he first employed Pedro Navarro, a sometime pirate, self-taught military engineer, and later a general of distinction in his own right.
When the French tried to seize the rest of the kingdom of Naples in 1502, Fernández de Córdoba confirmed his title of ‘Great Captain’ by inflicting severe defeats on them at Cerignola, where the vaunted Swiss in French service were shattered by Spanish arquebus and light cannon fire, and at the Garigliano river (December 1503), where he outflanked and forced the surrender of a considerably larger force by a night attack, using pontoons to bridge a flooded estuary. Ferdinand made him duke of Sessa and joined him in Italy 1506, returning with him to Spain the next year. In 1512 he was appointed grand constable of Italy to restore the situation following defeat of Pope Julius II's Holy League by the French at the battle of Ravenna, while his king took advantage of a religious schism to seize the kingdom of Navarre, a French ally.
Although Spanish military supremacy was based on the militarization of the whole society during the years of the Reconquista, Fernández de Córdoba is credited with synthesizing contemporary Moorish, French, and Swiss tactics into a potent combination of arquebusiers, gunners, and pikemen known as the tercio, using jinetes to screen his movements and to report those of his less agile opponents. Heavy cavalry, difficult to transport and maintain, and often undependable because of the individualistic arrogance of the knights, had already assumed a lesser role in Spanish campaigns following several disasters during the conquest of Granada.
Above all, the Spanish under Fernández de Córdoba showed themselves masters of siege warfare at a time when gunpowder had sounded the knell of city states and minor principalities in Europe, ushering in the era of the centralized nation state. Spanish battlefield ascendancy rested on the tercio and related formations for 150 years, until it was destroyed by combined arms tactics at Rocroi.
Bibliography
- Prescott, William, The Art of War in Spain, ed. Albert McJoyne (London, 1995)
— Hugh Bicheno




