Human wave attack

Human wave attack is an attack by massed infantry on a defended enemy position, intended to overwhelm the defenders by sheer weight of numbers, regardless of inevitable high casualties.

Usage

The description of an attack as a human wave attack implies the defender's ability to inflict horrific casualties on the attacker, usually through superior firepower, training or technology. It also suggests a callousness of the attacker towards its own troops, and therefore description of an attack as such is likely to be used only by the defender or a later commentator. It is doubtful whether any attacker has ever used these terms, or whether it has ever appeared in a tactical manual. Human wave tactics would normally be used by an attacker with a lack of tactical subtlety, or who simply lacks firepower and the ability to manoeuvre, but whose main advantage is in numbers of men. Their men may be poorly trained, though highly motivated: great physical courage and esprit de corps is required to advance unflinchingly into superior enemy fire. Despite several significant differences, the human wave attack is often closely associated with the infiltration and the shock tactics employed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army during the Korean War.^[1][2]

Although most massed attacks by infantry before the age of modern firepower could be (and sometimes are) described as human waves, the criticism implied by the term and the implied acceptance of high casualties from the defenders' superior firepower mean the term is unhelpful to describe earlier conflicts. Early examples of mass infantry charges against superior defensive firepower include Pickett's charge at the battle of Gettysburg and the Zulu attacks on British troops in the Zulu War.

Usage in China

The term "human wave attack" was often misused^[1][3] to describe the Chinese "short attack" — a combination of infiltration and shock tactics employed by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the Korean War.^[4] A typical Chinese short attack was carried out at night by small fireteams on a narrow front at the enemy's unit boundaries.^[4] The Chinese assault team would approach undetected within grenade range, then launch surprise attacks against the defenders in order to create a penetration and to achieve maximum shock and confusion.^[4] If the enemy defences failed to give way after the initial shock, additional fireteams would press on and attack the same point until a wedge is created in the enemy's defence.^[4] Once a penetration was achieved, the bulk of the Chinese forces would move into the enemy rear and attack from behind.^[1] The attacks by the successive Chinese fireteams were carefully timed and spaced to minimize casualties,^[5] but due to the primitive communication systems and the tight political controls within the Chinese army, short attacks were often repeated indefinitely until the defenses were penetrated or the attackers were exhausted.^[4] This persistent attack pattern left a strong impression on UN forces that fought in Korea, and a joke that circulated among the US servicemen was "how many hordes in a platoon?"^[1][4] Military historian Roy Edgar Appleman observed that the term "human wave" was a metaphor used by journalists and military officials to convey the idea that the American soldiers were defeated by overwhelming numbers of enemies, but it had no relations with the real Chinese infantry tactics of the same period.^[2]

Although abandoned by the PLA by 1953, the "human wave attack" tactic was adapted by the Viet Minh, and later by the Viet Cong and the Vietnam People's Army during the Indochina Wars.^[6] Interestingly, this tactic was re-adopted by the Chinese during the Sino-Vietnamese War. Their use in the Sino-Vietnamese War is a rare example of an army with superior firepower, in this case the PLA, throwing away its advantage.^[6]

See also

• Cannon fodder
• Charge (warfare)
• Banzai charge
• Highland charge
• Frontal assault
• Force concentration
• Infiltration tactics
• Swarming (Military)
• Rush (video games)

Notes

References

• Roe, Patrick C. (May 4, 2000). The Dragon Strikes. Novato, CA: Presidio. ISBN 0891417036. 
• Alexander, Bevin R. (1986). Korea: The First War We Lost. New York, NY: Hippocrene Books, Inc. 
• Mahoney, Kevin (2001). Formidable enemies : the North Korean and Chinese Soldier in the Korean War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press. ISBN 9780891417385. 
• Appleman, Roy (1990). Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950. College Station, TX: Texas A and M University Military History Series, 14. ISBN 0-89096-395-9.