Hylton v. United States
3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 171 (1796), argued 23–25 Feb. 1796, decided 8 Mar. 1796 by vote of 3 to 0; seriatim opinions by Iredell, Paterson, and Chase.
In 1794, Congress levied a carriage tax on passenger vehicles. The U.S. government sued Daniel Hylton in the federal circuit court of Virginia for nonpayment of the required duty. Hylton claimed that the levy was a “direct tax” within the meaning of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from levying direct taxes not apportioned according to the population of the several states. The controversy touched the sensitive question of the revenue‐raising power of the new national government. The circuit court was divided on the question, but Hylton confessed to judgment (admitted liability) in order to test the constitutionality of the tax by an appeal to the Supreme Court. The three justices who heard the case—Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell—unanimously agreed that the carriage levy was an indirect tax and, therefore, not proscribed by Article I. The Court's view on the tax issue remained the law until the Income Tax Cases of 1895 (see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.). Hylton was also significant because it implicitly raised the issue of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. While the members of the Hylton court never addressed that issue directly, the justices appeared to assume that they had the power to nullify unconstitutional acts of Congress. Justice Chase declared that if the Court did have such power, however, he would exercise it only “in a very clear case” (p. 175). Not until Chief Justice John Marshall's celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison (1803) did the Supreme Court finally explain its power of judicial review under the Constitution.
See also Taxing and Spending Clause.
— George Dargo



