Hylton v. United States

3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 171 (1796), argued 23–25 Feb. 1796, decided 8 Mar. 1796 by vote of 3 to 0; seriatim opinions by Iredell, Paterson, and Chase.

In 1794, Congress levied a carriage tax on passenger vehicles. The U.S. government sued Daniel Hylton in the federal circuit court of Virginia for nonpayment of the required duty. Hylton claimed that the levy was a “direct tax” within the meaning of Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which prohibits Congress from levying direct taxes not apportioned according to the population of the several states. The controversy touched the sensitive question of the revenue‐raising power of the new national government. The circuit court was divided on the question, but Hylton confessed to judgment (admitted liability) in order to test the constitutionality of the tax by an appeal to the Supreme Court. The three justices who heard the case—Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell—unanimously agreed that the carriage levy was an indirect tax and, therefore, not proscribed by Article I. The Court's view on the tax issue remained the law until the Income Tax Cases of 1895 (see Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.). Hylton was also significant because it implicitly raised the issue of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. While the members of the Hylton court never addressed that issue directly, the justices appeared to assume that they had the power to nullify unconstitutional acts of Congress. Justice Chase declared that if the Court did have such power, however, he would exercise it only “in a very clear case” (p. 175). Not until Chief Justice John Marshall's celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison (1803) did the Supreme Court finally explain its power of judicial review under the Constitution.

See also Taxing and Spending Clause.

— George Dargo

• 3 Dall. 171 (1796)
• Vote: 3–0
• For the Court: Seriatim opinions by Iredell, Paterson, and Chase
• Not participating: Cushing, Wilson, and Ellsworth

In 1794 Congress passed a law to tax carriages used as passenger vehicles. Daniel Hylton of Virginia refused to pay the tax, and the U.S. government sued Hylton for nonpayment of taxes.

The Issue

Daniel Hylton said that the federal carriage tax was a direct tax of the kind prohibited by Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution. Did Congress have the power to levy a carriage tax on passenger vehicles?

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court upheld Congress's power to tax carriages used as passenger vehicles. The carriage tax law was an indirect tax, said the Court, and was not prohibited by Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution. Justice Paterson wrote, “All taxes on expenses or consumptions are indirect taxes.”

Significance

This was the first time that the Supreme Court made a judgment about whether an act of Congress was constitutional. By upholding the federal carriage tax, the Court implied that it had the power to overturn it. The justices did not directly discuss the power of judicial review—the power of the Court to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, or in violation of the Constitution, and therefore void. However, they seemed to believe that they had the power to nullify acts of Congress that conflicted with the higher law of the Constitution. Justice Samuel Chase wrote that he would use this power of judicial review only “in a very clear case.”

In 1803 Chief Justice John Marshall used the case of Marbury v. Madison to explain and justify the Court's power of judicial review of acts of Congress.

See also Judicial power; Judicial review; Marbury v. Madison

Hylton v. United States (1796). The question of whether a tax on carriages imposed by an act of Congress (5 June 1794) was a direct tax and therefore subject to the constitutional rule of apportionment to the states, was decided in the negative. Three justices—Samuel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell—sitting without their colleagues, decided unanimously that the tax was an excise or duty and not a direct tax. The case is chiefly important for the implied assumption that the Court had the authority to review the constitutionality of an act of Congress.

Bibliography

Brown, Roger H. Redeeming the Republic: Federalists, Taxation, and the Origins of the Constitution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Currie, David P. The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

This article is missing citations or needs footnotes. Please help add inline citations to guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (December 2007)

Hylton v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 23, 1796 Decided March 8, 1796
Full case name	Daniel Hylton, Plaintiff in Error v. The United States
Citations	3 U.S. 171 (more) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171; 1 L. Ed. 556; 1796 U.S. LEXIS 397; 2 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 2155
Prior history	Defendant convicted, Circuit Court for the District of Virginia
Subsequent history	None
Holding
A tax on the possession of goods is not a "direct" tax, which must be apportioned under Article I of the Constitution.
Court membership
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth Associate Justices James Wilson · William Cushing James Iredell · William Paterson Samuel Chase
Case opinions
Seriatim opinion	Chase
Seriatim opinion	Paterson
Seriatim opinion	Iredell
Seriatim opinion	Wilson
Ellsworth and Cushing took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. I

Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796), was an early United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a tax on carriages did not violate the Article I, Section 9 requirement for the apportioning of direct taxes. It found the carriage tax was an "excise" instead of a "direct tax" requiring apportionment among the states by population. The Court noted that a tax on land was an example of a direct tax contemplated by the Constitution.

It is also significant for being the first case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of an act of Congress; In choosing to uphold the tax, the Court exercised judicial review, although they refrained from overturning the statute. While many say that Marbury v. Madison (1803) was the first case where the Supreme Court exercised judicial review, this is not true. Marbury v. Madison is simply the first case where the Supreme Court rules an act of Congress unconstitutional.

The Justices at the time, rather than issuing a single opinion of the Court, instead issued seriatim opinions, with each writing separately and reading their own analysis in turn. The Court's interpretation of the federal tax power lasted until modified in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1895), in which the Supreme Court held an unapportioned 1894 federal income tax on interest, dividends and rents to be unconstitutional because the tax was a "direct tax" that had to be apportioned. The Pollock decision was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment (1913), which allows the Congress to impose a tax on incomes from "whatever source derived" without any requirement for apportionment.

Alexander Hamilton argued before court on behalf of the government, claiming that the tax was a valid use of the power of Congress. Justice James Iredell wrote, two days after the event: "Mr. Hamilton spoke in our Court, attended by the most crowded audience I ever saw there, both Houses of Congress being almost deserted on the occasion. Though he was in very ill health, he spoke with astonishing ability, and in a most pleasing manner, and was listened to with the profoundest attention. His speech lasted about three hours."

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 3

References

• Frankel, Robert P., Jr. (2003). "Before Marbury: Hylton v. United States and the Origins of Judicial Review". Journal of Supreme Court History 28 (1): 1–13. doi:10.1111/1540-5818.00052 (inactive 2008-06-23). 
• Smith, Jean Edward (1996). John Marshall: Definer Of A Nation. New York: Henry Holt & Company. ISBN 080501389X. 

This entry is from Wikipedia, the leading user-contributed encyclopedia. It may not have been reviewed by professional editors (see full disclaimer)