IFF (identification of friend or foe). The ability to discriminate between enemy forces and allies is of utmost importance to all members of all military units, be they sea, land, or air forces. The need to avoid friendly fire has driven development of advanced systems to attempt to overcome the difficulties. In modern warfare, the number of systems which make it possible to ascertain the presence of troops or machinery on the battlefield do not do anything to help lift the ‘fog of war’; indeed, they may increase it. Targeting information provided by these systems makes it imperative that some form of accurately discerning friend and foe alike be in place. The task is enormously difficult, and even with advanced technology, the problem is not nullified and accidental engagement of friendly forces still occurs.
The earliest means of successful IFF was visual recognition, leading to banners and the gorgeous caparisons of medieval heraldry. The visual aspect of identification remains important, but is most prone to error. The failure to recognize a piece of equipment or group of troops as being friendly occurs throughout history. Modern instances include the destruction of large numbers of Luftwaffe aircraft by German anti-aircraft guns during BODENPLATTE in 1945, the clash between British special forces units in the Falklands, and several incidents of fratricide during the Gulf war, where some 20 per cent of US fatalities came from friendly fire. The culprit in almost all these cases was visual misidentification.
IFF is not a simple task. The confusion caused by combat can impinge upon the ability to discriminate between friend and foe. The conditions of the battlefield may degrade visibility, further complicating the issue. Finally, the range over which combat takes place has increased during the course of the 20th century, making visual identification problematic. The problem first became apparent to those responsible for air defence, since the development of radar made it possible to detect aircraft at far beyond visual range. Detection is not the same as identification, and some means of ascertaining the identity of the detected aircraft was necessary. Furthermore, being able to determine whether an aircraft was hostile while at extreme visual range or beyond would give certain tactical advantages to the pilot able to make this distinction. This led to the introduction of the first IFF system, pioneered by the RAF from around 1939. An IFF system acts as a radio transmitter and receiver. It sends out continual radio signals made up of coded pulses. A friendly IFF system will recognize these codes when it receives them and will transmit further coded pulses which identify the aircraft to the interrogating IFF set. The system is still employed, albeit in a more advanced form, in all aircraft. While it is theoretically the perfect answer to the identification of friend or foe in the air, there are difficulties. If the IFF transponder is not functioning correctly, or if it has not been set to use updated codes, it will be registered as a hostile aircraft. With the development of radar-guided missiles which can be fired at beyond visual range, the malfunctioning of an IFF system can have serious consequences, even if such system failures have proved to be rare in practice.
IFF may reduce the risks in aerial combat, but pilots have still been subjected to attack by their own side, often from misdirected anti-aircraft fire on the ground. Numerous pilots ruefully complain that naval forces have a tendency to shoot first at approaching aircraft before trying (if at all) to establish identity. While this is a little unfair, there are sufficient instances of aircraft being engaged by their own naval units. During WW I, the Royal Flying Corps was often heard to complain that it was ‘believed by none and fired on by all’. The root cause of this type of problem comes down to simple recognition. The failure to recognize friendly equipment is not the preserve of surface forces. Air forces have been known to engage their own side by mistake on countless occasions. Armoured vehicles can be terribly difficult to identify from the air, and this prompted them to be painted with recognition symbols. Although this was of assistance, it was more helpful to ground troops than to air forces. The increasing speed at which aircraft have been able to attack ground targets makes it essential that some form of highly visible recognition device is employed. These have included brightly coloured fabric panels attached to the tops of armoured vehicles, along with ever-larger painted symbols. They have not proved totally effective. The use of sensor systems and long-range engagements have increased the difficulties of positive identification. Thermal imaging sensors are particular sources of this difficulty, since they tend to give an image which lacks the definition to allow accurate identification; while it is clearly possible to identify a tank, identifying the type may be much more difficult, especially if the sensor's capabilities are degraded by battlefield conditions.
Solving the problem is far from simple. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, the USA took the decision to develop a digital battlefield recognition system. The long-term solution is felt to be to provide information-technology equipment which reduces confusion and provides users with real-time information. The acquisition of such systems is likely to be costly and fraught with short-term technical difficulties. The search for foolproof identification systems will take time to resolve, even with the most advanced technology. Eliminating fratricide through misidentification is unlikely to ever occur; the difficulties of identification are another of the unpleasant factors of war which have existed from the beginning and which will remain a constant difficulty. Recognition training and sophisticated equipment can reduce the problem immensely, but they can only do so much.
Bibliography
- Cordesman, Anthony H., and Wagner, Abraham R., The Lessons of Modern War, vol.
iv . The Gulf War (Boulder, Colo., 1996)
— David Jordan
