Imperial policing is a term coined in the 1930s and reflects the change from traditional methods of control for conquered lands and peoples to cheaper policies following WW I, particularly by the UK. While on the ground it included patrolling by armoured cars, the principal innovation was the use of air power to manage and overawe areas of the globe which had hitherto required garrisons. Imperial policing was also an important factor in the survival and development of the independent RAF, since it was used by Trenchard as a method of demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of the air force to British imperial policy in the financially stringent inter-war years.
Air power proved to be an effective arm in imperial operations in the post-1918 era, initially because local populations had little defence against it. The British in particular were faced with a series of imperial problems and the first campaign where aircraft proved their worth was the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919. Aircraft bombed Kabul, Jalalabad, and Dakka and dropped leaflets designed to undermine morale. In 1920 a rising in Somaliland led by Muhammad bin Abdulla Hassan also saw the RAF being deployed effectively. However, the most famous example of aerial imperial policing came in the ex-Ottoman empire between 1922 and 1925. A rebellion had broken out in newly formed Iraq in 1920 and the British, as the occupying power, were forced to deploy ever-increasing numbers of troops to deal with the problem. Aware of the escalating costs Chief of the Air Staff Trenchard and Churchill (then the minister responsible) proposed a policy of ‘substitution’, in effect, deploying the RAF to police these troublesome regions at much lower cost than the army. The impact was considerable and costs were cut from £22.36 m in 1921-2 to £7.81 m in 1922-3. By 1927 the figure for policing the region had been cut to just £3.9 m. The RAF was also used in Transjordan (now Jordan), Aden, Palestine, and in ex-German East Africa. In areas of open country air power proved highly effective, but in urban centres it was less so for obvious reasons.
The imperial policing role was critical to the survival of the RAF in the early-to-mid-1920s as both the RN and the army were at the time advocating the reabsorption of the RAF into ground and maritime support air arms. Trenchard argued that the theory of strategic bombing and the policy of imperial policing were too important for the RAF to be dissected. To the British government of the 1920s, driven by the desire to cut costs and balance the books, the saving provided by the RAF's imperial policing rather than theories of air superiority was the critical factor in ensuring the RAF's survival as an independent arm.
Other powers also deployed air forces in imperial policing roles during this period. The French and Spanish were involved in long and drawn-out operations against Abd-el-Krim in Morocco in the Rif war (1921-6). The Spanish initially used aircraft sporadically, but when a systematic policy of bombing crops, villages, and livestock was introduced, along with the use of poison gas, success increased dramatically. The French used aircraft more effectively when Abd al-Krim moved from Spanish to French Morocco in 1925, deploying them in concert with small mobile ground units. The USA also used air power in imperial operations between 1927 and 1933 when US troops were deployed in support of the puppet Nicaragua government. US Marine Corps aircraft were employed in a variety of duties against the Sandinista rebels, most notably in the battle of Ocotal where dive-bombing was first used.
Although not technically imperial policing, the most extreme example of aerial activity against a non-western power came in the Italian-Abyssinian war of 1935-6. Almost 900 bombing operations were undertaken by the Regia Aeronautica, many infamously dropping poison gas bombs. Air power was as important an aid to the Italians in conquering their new empire as it was to others in maintaining theirs. It proved itself a highly effective weapon against local populations unused to aircraft, the psychological impact invariably outweighing the physical. Such operations had little impact on the metropolitan air forces, although it might be argued that the development by the British of long-range aircraft and the failure of the Germans to do so reflected the different imperatives prevailing in the two nations between the wars. It might also be argued that the USAAF's B-2 stealth bomber with a worldwide range and a technology that puts it beyond the reach of ‘lesser breeds outside the law’ represents the final expression of the concept of imperial policing.
Although imperial policing occupies an important position in the development of air power, as a concept it had far wider implications. In 1934 Maj Gen Sir Charles Gwynn published Imperial Policing, which considered the army's doctrine when it found itself ‘the chief agent for maintaining law and order and for the restoration of the authority of the civil power’. He established the important principle of ‘minimum force’, arguing that ‘the hostile forces are fellow citizens of the Empire, and that the military object is to re-establish the control of the civil power and secure its acceptance without an aftermath of bitterness’. He also argued in favour of civil supremacy and the need for civil-military co-operation, and emphasized the importance of timely action. While his principles have lasting importance, in other respects Gwynn was a creature of his times, arguing that ‘machine guns can be usefully employed without any suspicion of ruthlessness’. The large paramilitary police forces raised by colonial powers not only made their own contribution to imperial policing, but, as in the case of the Indian police, extended a tradition of gendarmerie-style policing beyond Independence.
Bibliography
- Gwynn, C. W., Imperial Policing (London, 1934).
- Hallion, R., Strike from the Sky (Washington, 1989).
- Omissi, D., Air Power and Colonial Control: The RAF 1919-1939 (Manchester, 1990)
— John Buckley/Richard Holmes
