The Invergordon Mutiny was an industrial action by around a thousand
sailors in the British Atlantic Fleet,
that took place on 15 September-16 September
1931. For two days, ships of the Royal Navy at Invergordon were in open mutiny, in one of the few military strikes in
British history.
Causes
In September 1931, as part of its attempts to deal with the Great
Depression, the new National Government launched cuts to
public spending. The recommended cuts in spending on the navy were translated into a 10% pay cut (matching 10% cuts across the
board for public sector workers) for officers and senior ratings, and for all junior
ratings on the "new rate" of pay (introduced for new entrants from 1925). A 10% cut would cause great hardship to the already
poorly-paid ratings. Those ratings below Petty Officer who had joined before 1925 would
also have their pay reduced to the new rate; this amounted to a cut of 25%. On top of this, many working-class sailors shared the
sense of betrayal felt in the labour movement at Ramsay Macdonald's split with the
Labour Party and his formation of a new government with the Conservatives.
Sailors of the Atlantic Fleet, arriving at Invergordon, on the Cromarty Firth in
Scotland, in the afternoon of Friday 11 September,
learned about the cuts from newspaper reports; some reports implied that a 25% cut would be imposed on all ratings. The shock of
this news had a palpable effect. On 12 September, orders were received from the Admiralty
confirming the pay cuts. On the evening of 13 September, by which time sailors had already
started agitating, Rear-Admiral Wilfrid Tomkinson (in
temporary command of the fleet whilst Admiral Sir Michael Hodges
was in hospital) received a letter from the Admiralty dated 10 September. This letter stated the reasons for the reduction in pay and the principles on which it had
been based. The following morning, Tomkinson ordered the commanders of all ships present to read sections of the Admiralty letter
out to their officers and crew. However, several ships had not received copies of the letter and some were unable to pass the
information on to their companies until the next day. By that time, the mood for a strike had taken hold in many crews.
Initial disturbances
Ten warships arrived in port on 11 September: Hood (the flagship), Adventure, Dorsetshire, Malaya, Norfolk, Repulse, Rodney, Valiant, Warspite and York. After arriving, officers and crew had access to newspapers, which contained reports of the
pay cuts. On the night of 12 September, a group of sailors met at a football field on land.
They voted to organise a strike and left singing the Red Flag. The following evening, a number
of them made speeches criticising the cuts, at the canteen ashore. The Officer of the Patrol reported this disturbance to the
Warspite, the ship of the watch that night, and requested reinforcements. Extra patrols were sent, led by the commander of
the Warspite himself, Captain Wake, and the canteen was closed early. The crews left peacefully, although further speeches
were made at the pier. After considering reports about the incident from Wake and the Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Colvin,
Tomkinson decided not to take disciplinary action over the disturbances. He reported the incident, and his decision, to the
Admiralty by telegram. Meanwhile, HMS Nelson arrived at port.
On 14 September, Warspite and Malaya left the harbour to perform planned
exercises, and during the day four more ships arrived: Centurion,
Shikari, Snapdragon and Tetrarch. That evening, Tomkinson hosted a dinner attended by most of the ships' commanders along with
the various flag officers present. Shortly before dinner, Tomkinson was informed that patrols had been dispatched from
Hood and Valiant to deal with further disturbances at the canteen and in the open air ashore. These disturbances
were characterised as disorderly, and civilians were reportedly spotted amongst the sailors. The Officer of the Patrol was able
to address the assembly, but speeches, cheering and singing recommenced after he had finished. The sailors returned to their
ships; however many gathered on deck after their return and continued their protests. Tomkinson informed the Admiralty of the
protests, stating that the cause seemed to be the disproportionate pay cut of 25% for some ratings. He ordered commanders to
return to their ships and report on the situation.
The reports indicated that there was no trouble in the cruisers, nor on the battlecruiser Repulse, but crews on four
other battleships (Rodney, Hood, Valiant and Nelson) intended to prevent their ships from sailing in
practice manoeuvres the next day; the protests were confined to ratings below leading rate, and did not show any animosity
towards officers. In the early hours of 15 September, Tomkinson considered cancelling the
exercises. However, after discussions with several flag officers, the commanders of Hood and Nelson and the
Officers of the Patrol who had witnessed events, he decided against this, expecting that Repulse would follow orders and
this would quell any resistance on other ships. He ordered commanders to investigate complaints in due course and report typical
cases that he could use to represent the protests to the Admiralty, and informed the Admiralty that he expected problems sailing
in the morning.
The Mutiny
On the morning of 15 September, Repulse sailed on time at 06:30. However, sailors
on the other four battleships due to sail had already begun to refuse orders. On Hood and Nelson, crews carried out
the ordinary harbour routine, merely refusing to put to sea. On Valiant and Rodney, crews only carried out
essential duties, including the provision of safety patrols and fire guards, and did so without any recourse to their officers.
Throughout the day, cheering crowds massed on the forecastles of all ships except Centurion and Exeter; on
Rodney, a piano was dragged on deck and songs were sung. Officers, who issued orders and threats through loudspeakers,
were ignored and ridiculed. Valiant unmoored and attempted to put to sea with a limited number of men on duty, but was
unable to proceed. On Tomkinson's own ship, Hood, striking crewmembers prevented officers and senior ratings from
unmooring the ship. Even Royal Marines, expected to enforce discipline and break up any
mutiny, joined the strike. Tomkinson suspended the exercises until further notice, cancelled all leave and called for the
investigations of complaints to proceed as quickly as possible. Warspite, Malaya and Repulse were ordered to
return to harbour.
In the afternoon, Tomkinson again informed the Admiralty of the situation and its chief cause, asking for an early decision to
be communicated and stating he did not believe it would be possible to restore order, or prevent further deterioration of the
situation, until a decision was received. He finally received a reply at 20:00, instructing him to inform sailors that the
existing pay rates would remain in force until the end of the month and that the Admiralty expected the men to uphold the
traditions of service and carry out their duties. The Admiralty stated that the cut in pay was only 10%, but this ignored the
situation for those on the old pay rate. In a second telegram, Tomkinson was instructed to resume exercises as soon as he had
completed his investigations into the complaints. Tomkinson believed that this response showed he had failed to communicate the
gravity of the situation and replied that it would be impossible to resume exercises in the circumstances. Incitements to stop
work were spreading from deck to deck: crews on Norfolk and Adventure had joined those on Rodney and
Valiant in only performing essential duties, with Dorsetshire and Hood set to follow suit. There were also
reports that some of the Petty Officers, who had so far continued to follow orders although they had not attempted to get junior
ratings to return to work, were starting to join the strike.
In the early hours of 16 September, Tomkinson informed the Fleet that Admiral Colvin had
been dispatched to the Admiralty to present sailors' complaints in person, but no decision could reasonably be expected for a day
or two; he expected all crews to return to duty.
On the morning of 16 September, Tomkinson received the last of the complaints. He
dispatched the Fleet Accountant Officer with these to the Admiralty, and sent extracts by telegram. Having discussed the
situation with Rear-Admirals Astley-Rushton (Second Cruiser Squadron, on
Dorsetshire) and French (Second Battle Squadron, on Warspite), he reported his belief that the mutiny would worsen
unless an immediate concession was made. He suggested junior ratings on the old rate should remain on that rate with a cut of
10%, and marriage allowances should be extended to ratings under the age of 25. He also asked that members of the Admiralty board
visit Invergordon to discuss matters in person. Shortly afterwards, he was informed by the Admiralty that the matter was being
considered by the Cabinet, and communicated this to the Fleet. Meanwhile,
the crew of Hood had ceased all but essential duties. Some sailors were threatening to damage machinery and leave ships
without permission. In the afternoon, the Admiralty ordered the ships of the Fleet to return to their home ports immediately.
Tomkinson directed the ships to proceed in their squadrons as soon as possible, and gave officers and crew with family at
Invergordon leave to visit the shore and say their goodbyes. That night, all ships sailed from Invergordon as ordered.
Aftermath
In summarising the mutiny for the Admiralty, Tomkinson reported that the crews had remained respectful to their officers
throughout, and that officers had done their best to explain the government's reasons for the cut in pay and that complaints
would be taken seriously. He concluded that the mutiny had been caused primarily by the 25% cut for junior ratings who had joined
the service before 1925, that there were no grievances besides the pay cut, and his belief that the complaint was well founded.
He also believed that any use of force would have made the situation much worse.
The Cabinet accepted Tomkinson's recommendation that ratings on the old rate of pay remain on that rate, with a 10% cut in
line with the rest of the service. It was made clear that further acts of insurrection would be severely punished. A number of
the organisers of the strike were jailed, while a total of 200 sailors from the Atlantic Fleet were discharged from the service.
A further 200-odd sailors were purged from elsewhere in the navy, accused of attempting to incite similar incidents. The
Admiralty held Tomkinson accountable for the mutiny, blaming him for failing to punish dissidents after the first protests.
The Invergordon Mutiny was a key event in forcing Britain off the Gold Standard the
following month. In 1932, the name of the Atlantic Fleet was changed to the Home Fleet,
ostensibly to purge the memory of the mutiny.
References
- Alan Ereira, The Invergordon Mutiny, Routledge, London 1981
- Len Wincott, Invergordon Mutineer, Weidenfeld, London 1974
- "The Mutiny at Invergordon" by Kenneth Edwards, Lieutenant-Commander (ret.), Royal Navy, Putnam Publishing House, London,
1937, provides a comprehensive and detailed day by day and even hour by hour account of the mutiny - from an explicitly stated
anti-Communist, British patriotic and imperial point of view.
- Divine, David, Mutiny at Invergordon, Macdonald, London, 1970.
- Bell, Christopher M., "The Invergordon Mutiny, 1931", in Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International
Perspective, ed. Christopher M. Bell and Bruce Elleman (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
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