Italian campaign (1859). Napoleon III had long been anxious to foster Italian unification, and in 1858 he met Cavour, PM of Piedmont, to agree how best to expel the Austrians from northern Italy. In mid-April 1859 he felt obliged to accept a British suggestion of a congress to discuss the Italian question, but Austria presented an ill-judged ultimatum to Piedmont, and Cavour and Napoleon III had their war.
Although Napoleon had anticipated war his army was ill-prepared and the formation of four corps in addition to the Imperial Guard produced chaos. Two corps were to go by land and the Guard and two others by sea, but they were not concentrated until early May. A swift Austrian offensive might have crushed the Piedmontese, but Gyulai, the Austrian commander, moved too slowly. Napoleon was in personal command, with the 70-year-old Marshal Vaillant as his COS. He disembarked at Genoa on 12 May, and, despite repeated assertions that the army was not ready to move, decreed that the campaign would start at once.
The French set off for Piacenza, but on 19 May Napoleon was persuaded that he had insufficient pontoons to cross the Po, and decided to march on Vercelli by way of Casale. On the following day an Austrian reconnaissance in force was repulsed by Forey's division at Montebello in an action which set the tone for the campaign: French infantry pushed on with such vigour that the fire of Austrian rifles could not stop them. The clash at Montebello persuaded Gyulai that the French were still heading for Piacenza, and he strengthened his left flank at exactly the moment that the Allies marched laboriously across his front to fall on his right flank. On 3 May the Piedmontese took Palestro and the crossings of the river Sesia around Vercelli, and when the Austrians counter-attacked the next day they ran into Canrobert's corps and were soundly beaten.
Area of the Italian campaign, 1859.
(Click to enlarge)
Napoleon reached Novara on 2 June and issued orders for the crossing of the Ticino. One crossing was secured at Turbigo and another at San Martino, despite some inept staff work and the proximity of the Austrians. On the 4th the French, advancing in two large columns, stumbled on the Austrians near Magenta: both sides had about 50, 000 men. The southern column was in difficulties when the northern column, headed by MacMahon's corps, swung in on the Austrian flank. Magenta was cleared house by house, with a French divisional commander killed in the mêlée, but by nightfall the Austrians were in full retreat.
Gyulai gave up Milan and fell back eastwards, breaking contact as he did so. On 8 June a three-corps attack on Melegnano misfired when Baraguey d'Hilliers attacked prematurely with his own corps. The battle persuaded the Austrians to continue retreating, and all units south of the Po were ordered to cross the river and head for the Quadrilateral, the fortresses of Verona, Mantua, Legnano, and Peschiera, gateway to Venetia. The Emperor Franz Josef I arrived to take personal command, and fell back across the Mincio on 20 June. But on the 23rd, believing that the Allies were so widely dispersed as to be vulnerable, Franz Josef pushed forward to a line from Pozzolengo through Solferino to Medole.
After taking Milan the Allies had two possible lines of advance, a southerly route along the Po and a northern road through Brescia. They chose the latter, entering Brescia on 16 June and then moving south-east, convinced that the Austrians were on the far side of the Mincio. Both armies issued orders for a routine advance on the 24th, and collided in the hills around Solferino. The village itself was the epicentre of the battle: six French attacks on the cemetery were repulsed until artillery was brought up to breach the walls and a Zouave regiment went roaring through. Although his flanks still held, Franz Josef realized that his position was untenable; a sudden rainstorm enabled him to recross the Mincio. He had lost more than 13, 000 men to about 10, 000 French and 5, 000 Piedmontese, and the scene around Solferino shocked many who saw it, particularly Napoleon and a young Swiss, Henri Dunant, who was to found the Red Cross.
The Austrians fell back within the Quadrilateral and the Allies were preparing for siege operations when Napoleon concluded an armistice. Prussia had mobilized, and he told Cavour: ‘With our present military organization, it is impossible for us to wage a war on two fronts’. The campaign had shown that the French army was ill-suited for war against a first-rate adversary, despite Napoleon's efforts to reform it. Not for nothing did Count Hübner call the war ‘The first step on the road to Sedan.’
— Richard Holmes
