The juvenile court and its philosophy of treating minors who violate the criminal law differently than adults is barely a century old. Historically, juvenile criminals were treated the same as adult criminals.
The Law Prior to the Creation of the Juvenile Court
Punishment was the central criminal law philosophy in English common law. A conclusive presumption that children under seven could not form criminal intent eliminated the youngest from the criminal justice system. Children between the ages of seven and fourteen were presumed incompetent to form the requisite criminal intent; the prosecutor, however, could rebut that presumption by demonstrating that the child knew the difference between right and wrong. Children over age fourteen were presumed to have the capacity to form criminal intent. There were no special courts for children, and they were treated as adult criminals. Minors were arrested, held in custody, and tried and sentenced by a court that had discretion to order the child imprisoned in the same jail as adult criminals. Although children received the same punishment as adults, they were not provided with many of the due process protections accorded adult criminals. For instance, minors did not have a right to "bail, indictment by grand jury, [and] right to a public trial" (Conward, p. 41).
Although the early American colonies adopted the English common laws regarding child criminals, from 1825 until 1899 several reform movements initiated significant changes both in philosophy and in treatment of juvenile delinquents. Quaker reformers spurred the New York Legislature in 1824 to pass legislation creating a House of Refuge, which separated poor children and juvenile delinquents from adult criminals. The goal of the House of Refuge movement was both to prevent predelinquents from becoming criminals and to reform those who had already committed crimes. The judge had discretion to determine which juvenile delinquents might properly benefit from the House of Refuge; child criminals unlikely to reform were maintained in adult prisons.
The First Juvenile Court
Progressive reformers in Illinois persuaded the legislature to pass the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act creating America's first juvenile court. The act adopted the early English common law parens patriae philosophy in providing that "the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents." Several unique features characterized the early juvenile court. First, because reformation was the goal, the system focused more on the individual child rather than on the nature of the criminal offense. Second, because the time within which reformation could be accomplished varied with the child, indeterminate sentences often exceeded the determinate sentences that adult criminals received for committing the identical criminal act. Third, juvenile delinquents were separated from adult criminals because they were different in kind. Adult criminals were morally blameworthy; children were merely the products of their environment and therefore retributive punishment was not warranted. Fourth, because juvenile court proceedings were not criminal, children were not entitled to the full panoply of due process protections accorded adult criminals. Informality permitted the court to consider all facts relevant to determining the child's reformation plan. Petitions replaced criminal complaints, summons replaced warrants, custody replaced arrest, detention replaced confinement, initial hearings replaced arraignments, and delinquency replaced conviction. Fifth, juvenile courts had broad discretion to fashion innovative rehabilitation programs not always available in adult courts, such as release upon informal voluntary probation conditions. Sixth, technical evidentiary rules were inapplicable in juvenile court because they impeded the judge from determining all facts necessary to determine the individualized treatment necessary to rehabilitate the minor.
Although the goals of the juvenile court were laudable, many historians have bemoaned the system's realities. In 1970 the harshest critic, Sanford Fox, termed the reformers' legislation "a colossal failure" (p. 1224). It became apparent that the informal procedures and almost unbridled discretion of juvenile court judges often supplied minors with less-fair procedures and treatment than adults received. In a famous 1839 Pennsylvania case, Ex parte Crouse, the court expressed the general view of American courts that because the goal of juvenile justice is rehabilitation, not punishment, the due process protections afforded adult criminals need not be provided to juveniles: "The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school. Where reformation, and not punishment is the end" the formalities of the criminal court are not required. In addition, the juvenile court's goal of individualized treatment often lacked objective criteria and conflicted with notions of justice. By the 1960s critics spoke of the demise of the juvenile court, and they "raised questions about the effect on juveniles of the lack of due process procedures and protection of individual rights" (Sarri, p. 5).
— DEWEY G. CORNELL, DANIEL C. MURRIE
