Brunschvicg, Léon (1869-1944). French philosopher. A proponent of idealism and humanism, Brunschvicg argued that our mental processes, through synthesizing acts of judgement, constitute a world which is the world for us (Les Modalités du judgement, 1897). He believed that the goal of philosophy was to reveal intellectual activity moving, throughout the historical development of mathematics, science, and ethics, towards ever greater self-awareness and unity (Le Progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale, 1927), and he stressed the freedom and inventiveness of the intellect in creating not only new categories of thought but new spiritual values.

— Rhiannon Goldthorpe

Brunschvicg, Léon (1869-1944) A commanding presence in French philosophy for the first half of the twentieth century, Brunschvicg espoused an idealist and neo-Hegelian philosophy, which sought to interpret the progress of self-consciousness in terms of the emergence of the natural sciences. He was equally well-known as a scholar and philosopher of mathematics, responsible for bringing Frege and Russell to the attention of French philosophers.

(lāôN' brün'shvēk) , 1869–1944, French philosopher, b. Paris. From 1909 until his death he taught at the Sorbonne. Brunschvicg's philosophy, which has had considerable influence on modern European thought, is usually called critical idealism. He extended the teachings of Kant and Hegel and also drew upon Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, and Pascal. He regarded mathematics as the highest level yet reached by human thought and maintained that judgment preceded all other activities of the mind. For Brunschvicg, God was whatever enables us to live the life of the spirit. His principal works are La Modalité du jugement (1897); Les Étapes de la philosophie mathématique (1912); Le Progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale (2 vol., 1927); and La Raison et la religion (1939).