| Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council |
|
Supreme Court of the United States |
Argued March 2, 1992
Decided June 29, 1992
|
| Full case name: |
David H. Lucas, v. South Carolina Coastal Council |
|
| Citations: |
505 U.S. 1003; 12 S. Ct. 2886; 120 L. Ed. 2d 798; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4537; 60 U.S.L.W. 4842; 34
ERC (BNA) 1897; 92 Daily Journal DAR 9030; 22 ELR 21104; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 715 |
|
|
| Prior history: |
On certiorari from the South Carolina Supreme Court. |
|
|
| Subsequent history: |
On remand at the South Carolina Supreme Court: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (S.C. 1992) |
|
|
| Holding |
| A regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of land constitutes a taking unless the proscribed
use interests were not part of the title to begin with. In other words, a law or decree with the effect of depriving all
economically beneficial use must do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts under the law
of nuisance. |
| Court membership |
Chief Justice: William Rehnquist
Associate Justices: Byron White, Harry
Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence
Thomas |
| Case opinions |
Majority by: Scalia
Concurrence by: Kennedy
Dissent by: Blackmun
Dissent by: Stevens
|
| Laws applied |
| U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. |
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)[1], was a case in which the
Supreme Court of the United States established the "total takings"
test for evaluating whether a particular regulatory action constitutes a regulatory
taking that requires compensation.
Parties
- Plaintiff/Petitioner
- David H. Lucas, owner of two beachfront properties in South Carolina.
- Defendant/Respondent
- South Carolina Coastal Council, a body that grants permits for the use of beachfront
land.
Background
State of law
South Carolina's Coastal Zone Management Act (1977) required owners of coast land in "critical areas" near beaches to obtain
permits from Respondent South Carolina Coastal Council before committing the land to new uses. The state's Beachfront Management
Act (1988), S.C. Code Ann. § 48-39-10 et seq. (1989 Cum. Supp.), increased the regulations on the use of coastal land.
Facts of case
Petitioner Lucas purchased beachfront properties in 1986 for $975,000. David H. Lucas owned two vacant oceanfront lots in the
Beachwood East Subdivision of the Wild Dunes development on the Isle of
Palms in Charleston County, South Carolina. The Beachfront Management Act effectively deprived Petitioner Lucas of his ability to
erect homes on his properties.
Prior history
Lucas filed suit asserting that the restrictions on the use of his lots was a taking of his property without just compensation. The lower court agreed and awarded Lucas $
1,232,387.50 as just compensation for the regulatory taking. The government of South Carolina appealed, and was reversed by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 304 S.C. 376 (S.C. 1991).
Procedural posture
Petitioner Lucas seeks reversal of the South Carolina Supreme Court judgment, reinstatement of the trial court judgment, and
declaration that the Beachfront Management Act constituted a taking.
Legal analysis
Issue
Whether the South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the Beachfront Management Act was a valid exercise of the
police power and did not constitute a taking.
Arguments/theories
- Petitioner
- Not stated, presumed reflected in holding and reasoning.
- Respondent
- (1) The Beachfront Management Act is a valid exercise of the police power, as the beach/dune area of the shores is a valuable
public resource, and the erection of structures on that land contributes to erosion and destruction of that resource. (2) All
property is held subject to the limitation that the state may regulate the property in such a way as to remove all value.
Rule of law
A regulation that deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of land constitutes a taking unless the proscribed use interests were not part of the title to begin with. In other words, a
law or decree with the effect of depriving all economically beneficial use must do no more than duplicate the result that could
have been achieved in the courts under the law of nuisance. As a result, "total takings" analysis requires a consideration of (1)
the degree of harm to public lands or adjacent property posed by the regulated activities, (2) the social value of such
activities, and (3) the relative ease with which the alleged harms can be avoided through measures taken by either the claimant
or the government.
Holding
The South Carolina Supreme Court erred in holding that the Beachfront Management Act was a valid exercise of the police power
and did not constitute a taking.
Reasoning
The majority argued as follows: (1) Deprivation of all economically beneficial use is, from the perspective of a property
owner, deprivation of the property itself. (2) When all economically beneficial use is restricted, it is difficult to assume that
the legislature is simply "adjusting" economical benefits and burdens. (3) Regulations that restrict all economically beneficial
use may often be a guise of pressing that land into public service. (4) Lucas's lands have been deprived of all economically
beneficial use. (5) There is no way to distinguish regulation that "prevents a harmful use" and confers benefits on nearby
property. (6) Contrary to Respondent South Carolina's assertion, title is not held subject to the limitation that the state may
regulate away all the property's economically beneficial use.
Notable concurring and dissenting opinions
- Kennedy, J., concurring.
- The determination of no value must be considered with reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations.
- Souter, J.
- The case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted, as the decision of the trial court that a total taking had
occurred is highly questionable based on the facts presented.
- Blackmun, J., dissenting.
- Stevens, J., dissenting.
Result
Judgment/disposition
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for determination of whether regulation could be enacted under state nuisance law.
Subsequent history
On remand at the South Carolina Supreme Court: Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424 (S.C. 1992), the court granted the
parties leave to amend their pleadings to determine what the actual damages were.
Legacy and other notes
Established the modern "total takings" test.
See also
References
- ^ 505 U.S. 1003 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
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