Malaya and Singapore campaign (1941-2). The British acquired trading settlements on the Malay peninsula in the 18th century, and early in the 19th colonized Singapore island at its southern tip. Singapore became an important trading centre, and Malaya exported rubber and tin. After much debate the British decided to build a naval base at Singapore to counter the threat of Japanese expansionism. Heavy guns were put into position on Singapore island to defend it against attack from the sea. In the 1930s there was recognition that Singapore and Malaya could best be defended from the air, and new airfields were built. By 1938 it was accepted that the defence of Singapore must involve that of Malaya and its airfields, but with the outbreak of war in Europe, aircraft and warships which might have been sent to the Far East were more urgently needed elsewhere. The threat posed by the Japanese, who saw the capture of Singapore as part of seizure of the ‘Greater South Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’, was not fully grasped. There was a general failure to recognize the fighting quality of Japanese troops and the excellence of some Japanese equipment like the Zero fighter.
In October 1940 ACM Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was recalled from retirement to become C-in-C Far East: he was 62 and lacked recent operational experience and knowledge of the area. Sir Shenton Thomas was governor of Singapore and the Straits Settlement on the mainland, and each service had its own commander: Lt Gen Arthur Percival arrived as GOC Malaya in May 1941. Brooke-Popham had demanded more resources, but was told by Churchill in January 1941 that ‘The political situation in the Far East does not seem to require, and the strength of our air force by no means permits, the maintenance of such large forces in the Far East at this time.’
When Japan entered the war in December 1941 Malaya was defended by the two understrength divisions, 9th and 11th, of Lt Gen Heath's III Indian Corps. Maj Gen Simmons, GOC Singapore Fortress, was responsible for the defence of Singapore and the southern tip of Johore, and his force included the leading brigade of the 8th Australian Division under Bennett. The RAF had only 158 first-line aircraft, mostly old and vulnerable. The Japanese invasion was well prepared, with landings at Singora and Patani in Thailand and Khota Bharu in Malaya. The British considered mounting MATADOR, a pre-emptive move into Thailand to hold the peninsula at its narrowest point, and although this was cancelled there was an ill-starred attempt to send a column into Thailand to seize an important defile.
The pattern of the campaign emerged quickly. The Japanese soon gained air superiority, and three divisions under Lt Gen Yamashita moved rapidly southwards, attacking along the axis of main roads but hooking into the jungle to outflank the defenders and establish road blocks behind them. The British lost successive battles at Jitra (11 December), Gurun (15 December), Kampar (2 January 1942), and Slim River (7 January). Kuala Lumpur fell on 11 January.
In October 1941 the British decided that the brand-new battleship Prince of Wales and the equally new aircraft-carrier Indomitable would join the old battlecruiser Repulse in the Indian Ocean. The carrier was damaged during working-up trials, but the other vessels, known as Force Z, under the command of Adm Sir Tom Phillips, reached Singapore. On the evening of 8 December Phillips put to sea in an effort to engage the Japanese landings, and on the 10th was attacked by aircraft based in Indochina: both his capital ships were sunk by torpedo-bombers, and he was among over 800 men lost.
Disasters on land and sea encouraged the Allies to establish a unified American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command, with the British Gen Wavell at its head. Wavell visited Malaya, revised Percival's plans, and warned him to prepare defences in case he had to withdraw to Singapore. The commitment of the Australian division could not prevent the fall of Johore, and on 31 January the causeway linking Singapore to the mainland was blown.
Percival was ordered by Churchill not to contemplate giving up until ‘after protracted fighting among the ruins of Singapore city’, but his position was already difficult. Singapore's population was swollen by refugees, and two-fifths of the city's water had come in pipes from the mainland. Early on 9 February the Japanese landed on the north-west shore, and made good progress, rapidly reaching the reservoirs in the island's centre. The newly arrived 18th Division, committed to battle without preparation, could do little to stem the flow, and after consulting his senior commanders Percival surrendered on 15 February. Yamashita was desperately short of ammunition, and in no position to fight a protracted battle.
Churchill was right to call it ‘the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British military history’. Of the 140, 000 British and Commonwealth engaged, some 9, 000 were killed and about 130, 000 captured. The Japanese committed 55, 000 men and lost 3, 500 killed. The defeat struck an irreversible blow to European prestige in the Far East. Although British performance was generally lacklustre, the real origins of the catastrophe lay in a pre-war defence policy which failed to balance commitments with resources.
Bibliography
- Allen, Louis, Singapore 1941-1942 (London, 1977).
- Kirby, Maj Gen S. Woodburn, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster (London, 1971)
— Richard Holmes
