The Marshalls-Gilberts raids were airstrikes and naval artillery attacks by United States Navy aircraft carrier and other warship forces against Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) garrisons in the Marshall and Gilbert Islands on February 1, 1942. The Japanese garrisons were under the overall command of Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the 4th Fleet. Japanese aircraft in the islands belonged to the IJN's 24th Air Flotilla under Rear Admiral Eiji Gotō. The US warship forces were under the overall command of Rear Admiral William Halsey, Jr.
Raids
The raids were carried out by two separate US carrier task forces. Aircraft from Task Force 17 (TF17), commanded by Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher and centered on the carrier Yorktown, attacked Jaluit, Mili, and Makin (Butaritari) islands. The Yorktown aircraft inflicted moderate damage to the Japanese naval installations on the islands and destroyed three aircraft. Seven Yorktown aircraft were lost as well as a scout floatplane from one of TF17's cruisers.
Aircraft from US Task Force 8, commanded by Halsey and centered on the carrier Enterprise, struck Kwajalein, Wotje, and Taroa. At the same time, cruisers and destroyers bombarded Wotje and Taroa. The strikes inflicted light to moderate damage on the three islands' naval garrisons, sank three small warships and damaged several others, including the light cruiser Katori, and destroyed 15 Japanese aircraft. The US cruiser Chester was hit and slightly damaged by a Japanese aerial bomb and six Enterprise aircraft were lost. TFs 16 and 17 retired from the area immediately upon completion of the raids.
Aftermath and significance
The raids had little long-term strategic impact. The IJN briefly sent two carriers to chase TF16 and 17 but quickly abandoned the pursuit and continued their support for the ongoing, successful conquests of the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies. The raids, however, did help lift the morale of the US Navy and American public, still reeling from the Pearl Harbor attack and loss of Wake Island. The raids also provided valuable experience in carrier air operations which was helpful for the US in future combat against Japanese forces. For their part, the Japanese apparently did not realize that their concept of a perimeter defense using dispersed island garrisons had serious flaws in that the garrisons were too far apart to be sufficiently mutually supporting to prevent penetration by enemy carrier forces.
References
Notes
Books
- Cressman, Robert (2000 (4th printing)). That Gallant Ship U.S.S. Yorktown (CV-5). Missoula, Montana, U.S.A.: Pictorial Histories Publishing Company. ISBN 0-933126-57-3.
- Lundstrom, John B. (2005 (New edition)). The First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway. Annapolis, Maryland, U.S.A.: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 159114471X.
- Lundstrom, John B. (2006). Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Seas, Midway & Guadalcanal. Annapolis, Maryland, USA: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-475-2.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot (1958 (reissue 2001)). The Rising Sun in the Pacific 1931 - April 1942, vol. 3 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Castle Books. ISBN 0785813047.
- Stafford, Edward P.; Paul Stillwell (Introduction) (2002 reissue). The Big E: The Story of the USS Enterprise. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-55750-998-0.
- Willmott, H. P. (1982). Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-535-3.
- Willmott, H. P. (1983). The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies February to June 1942. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-535-3.
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