Warfare and disease have always gone hand in hand. Disease affects armies, and armies spread disease. It seems probable that the first surgeons were military, treating the results of single combat or of tribal raids. The Roman army was the first for which there is much written and archaeological evidence of organized medical services. It was as much exposed to disease as any other, but because the troops were better fed and had better organized sanitary arrangements, strictly enforced, they suffered less than their opponents. Despite this, barely half the enlisted legionaries lived to complete their eighteen-year service. Rather fewer auxiliaries survived, but this was still a higher proportion than that for civilians.
The Romans felt that medical practice was suitable only for Greeks and slaves, so most, if not all, army doctors were Greek. Such tombstones, or altars, that have survived are of Greeks. In the legion, the doctor (medici) had under him orderlies (medici ordinarii) and dressers (capsarii) who seem to have been the equivalent of stretcher-bearers. They treated wounded in the battle lines, and evacuated them to safer areas. There is a scene on Trajan's column where an auxiliary is having his wounded thigh dressed.
Legionary fortresses were provided with a large hospital, containing many rooms, arranged round a courtyard and verandah. The larger auxiliary forts were also provided with smaller hospitals, of which several in Great Britain have been excavated. The best known of these is at Housesteads, on Hadrian's wall. Each hospital had a large room, occupying the full width of one end of the building, which seems to have been an operating theatre. The equipment of military surgeons has been found, and there are descriptions of the treatment of particular kinds of wounds. Split reeds were used to extract arrowheads, and a metal blade-like instrument was used for extracting larger missiles. Celsus (25 bc-ad 50), in De Re Medicina, describes a number of such operations, including limb amputations, carried out, of course, without anaesthesia. Herbal remedies were known and rather coarse antiseptics, such as pitch and turpentine, often accompanied by religious incantations, were widely used.
The first great figure of military surgery of whom much is known was Ambroise Paré, the greatest surgeon of the Renaissance. He served for almost 30 years in the armies of the French kings, with practice in Paris in the peaceful intervals. He left graphic descriptions of a vast array of wounds, with advice as to their treatment and the instruments to be used. Thomas Gale, a contemporary, published a treatise of gunshot wounds and their treatment in 1563, and William Clowes, who served in the Elizabethan navy, wrote on burns caused by gunpowder in 1591.
In the British army, organized military medicine began with the raising of a standing army in the 1660s. The army was organized on a regimental basis, and permanent commissions were given to regimental surgeons. They were not highly regarded, and career advancement for medical men was very uncertain. A surgeon and assistant surgeon formed part of each regiment, to run a small hospital and treat the sick. A few non-regimental doctors served on the administrative staff for general and field hospitals. Some distinguished medical men served in the forces. John Hunter (1728-93), the father of modern scientific surgery, served in both the army and the navy, and in 1790 was appointed surgeon general to the land forces, and inspector general of hospitals.
The Napoleonic wars produced many great medical figures. James Guthrie (1785-1856) joined the army at the age of 13, and became a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons at 16. He was bitterly opposed to the routine amputation of damaged limbs, and realized the necessity of rapid casualty evacuation. His textbook Commentaries on the Surgery of War 1808-1815 was a standard work for decades. Sir James McGrigor (1771-1858) was director general of the Army Medical Department from 1815 to 1851. He was a fine administrator, and quite early appreciated the dangers of cross-infection between wounds and infective fevers. He was even able to disagree with the Duke of Wellington and survive.
A worthy successor to the work of Ambroise Paré was Dominique Jean Larrey, who served in the French navy, the Republican army, and the Napoleonic army. He introduced ambulances volantes, light, two-wheeled, sprung vehicles, drawn by two horses, for the rapid evacuation of the wounded. He was a meticulous surgeon, who served in Egypt, Russia, Germany, and at Waterloo.
During the Crimean war, the appalling conditions of the sick and wounded caused a public outcry. In that war 1, 761 British soldiers died of wounds and 16, 497 died of disease—almost ten times as many. The main causes of death were cholera, typhoid, and typhus, due principally to a total neglect of hygiene. Chaos reigned in the main hospital at Scutari, an old Turkish barracks, where, in the space of eight weeks, over 2, 000 men died of infections acquired in hospital. That remarkable woman Florence Nightingale took charge, and produced dramatic changes. She was autocratic and strong-willed, and needed to be, given the incompetence and obstruction of the medical and administrative staff. Surgery during the campaign remained fairly primitive, with wholesale limb amputations and a high rate of post-operative infections.
The American civil war took place on a vaster scale than the Crimean war, but the problems were much the same, although they were more efficiently tackled. Once again, disease was the major killer of soldiers. Of the approximate total of 618, 000 deaths on both sides, about 414, 000 were from disease and non-battle injuries, and 204, 000 from wounds. Although anaesthesia in the form of ether and chloroform was available for operations, because of the vast numbers of casualties, supplies sometimes ran out before all the wounded were treated. The Confederate forces were even worse off in this respect because their supply system was worse. Infectious diseases, by crippling armies, delayed some campaigns, and prevented others starting at all. The main killers were cholera, typhoid, dysentery, malaria, and tuberculosis, but there were also serious outbreaks of smallpox and measles, against which many troops had no immunity. In early battles, many wounded might lie out for two to three days, but by Gettysburg, at the end of each day the casualties had been cleared. Nearly all wounds became infected, the infection often being transmitted by the surgeons' unwashed hands and instruments. In the Union army, mortality from chest wounds was 62 per cent, and from abdominal wounds 87 per cent. An Ambulance Corps, to speed casualty evacuation, was formed in the Union army in 1862. As the war progressed, hospital arrangements became better, with many around Washington, and scattered throughout the Union states. Emulating Florence Nightingale, many women worked in hospitals, caring for the sick and wounded, and improving their lot considerably. Of the large number of POWs who died in camps, the vast majority died of dysenteric diseases, due to grossly deficient hygiene.
Following the Crimean war, an Army Hospital Corps was formed in the British army, but general medical care remained in the hands of regimental surgeons. The Army Nursing Service was formed in 1881, and the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) was formed as a separate entity in 1898, in time for the medical chaos of South Africa. The Second Boer War once again proved the overwhelming importance of hygiene and sanitation in armies. In the British and empire forces there were 26, 750 battle casualties with 7, 994 deaths (29.8 per cent mortality) and 404, 126 non-battle casualties with 14, 448 deaths (3.5 per cent mortality). The much lower death rates showed the significant advances in medicine, but the spread of disease was largely preventable. Once again, the sickness and deaths were due to cholera, typhoid, and dysentery, as many Boer war memorials will testify. The British army was said to be fully prepared to fight the Crimean war again in 1899, but the medical services were even worse, being understaffed, inadequate, and unprepared. Large numbers of very well-paid civilian specialists had to be employed to treat the sick and wounded. At one stage, the sickness was 958 per 1, 000 troops. In the so-called concentration camps, organized by Kitchener, to hold Boer women and children, things were even worse. There were 20, 000 deaths among 117, 000 inmates, partly due to inefficiency, unpreparedness, and lack of supplies, and partly due to the Boers being unused to living in close communities.
WW I was expected by most combatant nations to be over in a few months. Few people had planned for the enormous number of men, or the enormous number of casualties, that would be involved. This applied particularly to the medical services, who were at first overwhelmed by the sheer number of battle casualties confronting them, and later, by the even larger number of sick soldiers. In all the worldwide theatres of war, disease admissions to hospital reached staggering proportions, considerably outnumbering wounds. During the German East Africa campaign for example, admissions to hospital reached 240 per cent of troops in the theatre, mainly from malaria and dysenteric illnesses, with wounds accounting for only 3 per cent of admissions. Areas like Macedonia and Mesopotamia were almost as bad. Even on the western front, among British and Dominion troops, battle casualties were only 39.5 per cent of admissions. Mortality rates fell to less than 1 per cent for disease, and less than 8 per cent for wounds, a great improvement on previous wars.
Improvements in the treatment of wounds and disease were astonishing for the time, under the pressure of warfare, with the prospects for a sick or wounded soldier improving steadily throughout the war. The hard-won experience of WW I surgeons and physicians proved a very sound basis for the continuing improvements which occurred in later wars. The medical advances made in this war were the greatest in any conflict, and vastly improved not only military but also civilian practice. The type of wound and the bodily area of wounding changed from previous conflicts. It was very much an artillery war and in the British army shells, mortars, and grenades accounted for 61 per cent of all wounds, with bayonet wounds accounting for only 0.3 per cent. Wounds of the limbs made up the greater part of the treated casualties, revealing the poor survival of chest and abdominal wounds. Patients with wounds to the head and neck survived better than had been expected, due to improved surgery, with an astonishing 82 per cent being subsequently fit for some form of duty.
A considerable amount of research, often under front-line conditions, went on into the problems of shock, fluid replacement, blood loss, and wound infections. There was close co-operation between the British, Dominion, French, and later American medical services on all these topics, and on others of common interests as well. Blood transfusion, which was rarely used pre-war, became routine later in the war. At first, blood had to be fresh, with direct transfusion from man to man, but by 1916-17 blood could be stored for several days, and stocks could be moved where needed. Blood groups were unknown, but a simple agglutination test was performed to check that blood was suitable for the recipient. Early in the war, blood transfusion could only be given in base hospitals, but by early 1918, a blood transfusion service existed, so that blood could be provided as far forward as the Advanced Dressing Station. Fluid replacement proved invaluable in the treatment of dehydration, due to cholera and dysenteric diseases, but intravenous fluid had to be made up fresh, and all equipment had to be boiled at every use. The problems of wound infections were attacked with great vigour and much bacteriological research was undertaken. By opening wounds, cleaning out and removing dead and damaged tissue, infection was controlled to some extent, but healing was delayed. A large, open wound could be observed and dressed more readily. The twin terrors of tetanus and gas gangrene, due to fighting over heavily manured ground, were diminished compared with many previous conflicts, and were rare away from the western front. Both of these diseases thrived in deep wounds, in the absence of oxygen. In the British army, and probably in all forces, infections from gas gangrene occurred in 10 per cent of all wounds in 1914-15, but had fallen to 1 per cent by 1918. Mortality was 22 per cent in 1918, the same figure as in British forces in North-West Europe in 1944-5, despite the use of antibiotics in the latter campaign.
One problem, which all forces had, was the comparatively primitive state of anaesthesia. Although dramatic changes had taken place in surgery in the previous 40-50 years, anaesthesia had not kept pace. General anaesthesia, using the agents then available, was hazardous for shocked casualties, so that more and more local anaesthesia, mainly Novocaine, was used in British units, even for chest and brain surgery. Other armies had different views, the Americans, for example, swearing by inhaled nitrous oxide. Most branches of surgery received tremendous impetus from the Great War, particularly surgery of the chest, brain, and plastic and reconstructive surgery. Dentists had first been attached to medical units, to treat jaw injuries, during the Second Boer War, and co-operation between dentists and plastic surgeons during WW I laid the groundwork for modern plastic surgery. The surgery of limb wounds made dramatic strides, with the amputation rate for upper and lower limbs falling to 3 per cent, which would have astonished Crimean or American civil war surgeons.
Casualty evacuation, which had been such a problem at the third battle of Ypres and the Nivelle offensive in 1917, had been improved by 1918, with a corresponding improvement in survival rates. The problem of psychiatric casualties, victims of what is now called combat stress, was gradually tackled on a systematic basis, so that by 1917-18 a well-developed hospital procedure was in place. Treatment and convalescent regimes meant that the vast majority of cases could be returned to duty, but not all to front-line service. Recurrence rates in some groups remained high. Of the 341, 025 soldiers discharged unfit from the British army by April 1918, only 6 per cent were for war neurosis, a lower figure than popularly supposed. After the war, large numbers of pensioners, no longer fit for service or full-time work, had to be provided for. The fact that disease was still more important than wounds was shown by the Ministry of Pension's figures for 1919-20, when pensions for disease were 63 per cent, wounds 35 per cent, and gas poisoning 2 per cent.
WW II showed further reductions in sickness rates and in mortality from wounds. There were several reasons for this. The availability and storage of blood was further improved, and ready sterilized and packaged intravenous fluids were supplied. There were, in addition, further improvements in casualty evacuation and a great improvement in anaesthesia. Advances in the diagnosis, prevention, and treatment of disease, particularly tropical disease, made a great difference. Antibiotics were available and their importance was very great, but this can be overemphasized except in the treatment of venereal diseases where it was outstandingly effective. Large numbers of men died, or were invalided, during WW I because of chest infections, particularly forms of pneumonia. Penicillin made a great difference to these in WW II. The results of treatment of abdominal wounds, which had been disappointing during WW I, improved, partly due to improved surgery and anaesthesia, but largely due to the control of infection. One problem which occurred after surgery, particularly of the upper abdomen, was the development of pneumonia due to breathing being restricted. The same thing had happened with chest wounds, not only in the affected lung, but also in the opposite one. Antibiotics made a great difference to this complication, with improvement in survival. Although the infection rate with tropical disease was bad, particularly malaria, for example during the Burma campaign, it was never quite the problem it had been in the German East Africa campaign in 1914-18. Casualty evacuation in Burma, New Guinea, and some of the Pacific Islands was as great a problem as it had been in Flanders, until air evacuation became a practical possibility.
One attempt to provide surgery as close to the action as possible was the Forward Surgical Unit (FSU), developed in Libya in 1941. A later development at the FSU was the provision of post-operative beds for supervision in the dangerous time after surgery. The developed FSU became standard practice later in the war, in all theatres. During the Normandy campaign the problem arose of how to evacuate wounded before there was sufficient room to set up hospitals ashore. This was solved temporarily by converting some LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank) to take about 300 patients. They proved adequate in calm weather, but rolled appallingly in rough seas. The problem was solved permanently when airstrips became available for air ambulance evacuation. Psychiatric casualties were expected in WW II, and during the campaign in Europe over 13, 000 cases were seen in the British forces, but adequate provision had been made beforehand.
The Korean war, and later wars, continued the progress made before. The widespread use of helicopters for rapid evacuation of casualties to specialized surgical units, revolutionized the outlook for the wounded. The first recorded helicopter casualty evacuation was in Burma in 1945, but the increasing availability of numbers of helicopters made them, by far, the best form of evacuation. Further improvements in anaesthesia and antibiotics also helped. The outlook for a casualty was much improved compared with 35 years earlier. Disease was not absent from Korea, as shown by American casualty statistics. They suffered in 1950-3 33, 629 killed or dead from wounds and 20, 617 non-battle deaths. There were also 10, 218 listed as missing or prisoners.
The Vietnam war confirmed the importance of air evacuation: 372, 947 Americans and Allied troops were carried to hospital by helicopter in 1965-9. The USAF evacuated, to facilities in South-East Asia or the USA, 406, 022 patients, including 168, 872 battle casualties in 1965-73. The type and causation of wounds suffered by US personnel differed somewhat from previous conflicts, with 16 per cent of wounds and 51 per cent of deaths caused by small arms, there being much less artillery used by their opponents. Seventeen per cent of wounds and 11 per cent of deaths were caused by various forms of booby trap, which came as a very unpleasant surprise. The lightweight, high-velocity, small-arm rounds caused significant entrance and even larger exit wounding, with massive tissue damage. On another front, penicillin-resistant venereal diseases announced the return of an old enemy.
The Falklands war and the Gulf war were largely continuations of previous wars, from the medical standpoint. The Gulf war was somewhat different, in that fear of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons caused many thousands of troops to be immunized, and given antidotes against every eventuality. This caused significant medical problems later.
Bibliography
- Grant, Michael, The Army of the Caesars (London, 1974).
- Guthrie, Douglas, A History of Medicine (London, 1945).
- McLaughlin, Redmond, The Royal Army Medical Corps (London, 1973)
— Geoffrey Noon




