1. The baby and philosophers
2. Newborn intelligence
3. Imitating to share
4. Protoconversions in 'primary intersubjectivity'
5. Chasing and manipulating objects; playing games; sharing songs
6. Gaining a sense of self, and awareness of meaning in cooperation
7. The pride and shame of a social identity
8. Beginning to speak: the end of infancy
9. A mind adapted for human society and for cultural learning
1. The baby and philosophers
Theories of human mental life offer very different descriptions of the intelligence of infants. Empiricists, who tend to be materialists and rationalists, see consciousness coming into existence through learning — by a material brain remembering experiences. They claim the infant to be a reflex organism, making adaptive responses to stimuli and possessing drives for survival, but inert mentally and amoral, synthesizing representations of objects in the world and building up new motivations. A child gains thinking, intentions, perception of meanings, and appreciation of social values entirely through imitative learning and training — from parents and then from a wider society of peers and elders. Thus are collective knowledge, consciousness of meanings and purposes, and principles of morality and justice acquired and passed on from generation to generation. Individualities arise from each subject's unique voyage of experience.Romantic nativists assume a quite different view. They assert that the infant is born with unspoken wisdom: a human spirit with mind and feelings, who has simply to grow in strength and skill and in knowledge of the specifics of reality while acting on inherent human impulses. All humans, they believe, have the same basic forms of consciousness, the same instinctive motives, and the same intuitive awareness of one another's consciousness and emotions. In health, human minds grow on the same overall specifications. The characters of individuals differ in their particular natural gifts, and weaknesses, as well as in the opportunities these have had to grow and develop.
Contemporary theories of the infant's mind are 'interactionist', combining elements of the extreme empiricist and nativist philosophies. Psychoanalysis, by focusing on unconscious organizing processes of the individual, created a new interest in the development of the child's separate mental identity: a 'self' whose motivation and awareness grow within the protective mother–child relationship. John Bowlby's attachment theory takes up this view and interprets the emotional strength of the mature self as a product of the sensitivity and responsiveness of maternal care in the first years. Cognitivists emphasize the novelty-seeking and problem-solving tendencies of infants as active and aware individuals, and they explain development as a construction of increasingly complex 'cognitive representations' for mastery of physical reality and its patterns of change. The Swiss educational psychologist Jean Piaget, who made systematic observations of infants solving problems that he designed to test developing powers of thought, was the 20th century's great rationalist among developmental psychologists. He portrayed the child as an autonomous experimenter, a 'little scientist', who constructs concepts of objects in the world and who gains rational awareness through an obligatory sequence of stages of concept formation, by 'assimilating' the effects of his acts in 'circular reactions'. For both Sigmund Freud and Piaget, however, the newborn infant has little beyond reflex powers of integration. This was the prevailing view a century ago. Separation of 'self' from 'outside world' and from 'the other' who shares life with one was thought to be achieved by the learning of distinctions and forms of relationship that arise in interaction of the sensitive subject with the environment. This is called the 'object concept', and the formation of an 'object relation'.
Laboratory experiments to measure what infants can attend to have provided evidence that a baby is born with coherent intentions and a capacity to adapt body actions in one field of awareness. Information is taken in from many senses about the location, motion, and changes of certain nearby objects, integrating 'core concepts'. Tests of infants' perceptual preferences have established that Piaget underestimated the awareness of very young infants for the categories and qualities of objects and events in the world around them. It is important to note, however, that most tests of infant intelligence are still, like those of Piaget, of visual cognition. Vision develops, of necessity, after birth. New evidence from observing the infant's use of hearing and proprioceptive (body-sensing) modalities, especially for detection of the presence of persons and their vocal expressions, enriches the developmental picture. A conscious experience of human company may be active from birth. Indeed, it has been shown that an infant a few days old can see, and remember for a short time at least, subtle differences between the faces of different women. Even the undeveloped visual system is serving consciousness of people, and learning.
Thus recent knowledge supports a more nativist position in opposition to a physiological empiricism that dates from Ivan Pavlov. The increased detail of our knowledge also makes a self-controlled process of differentiation in the child's mind more obvious. An infant's consciousness is neither simple nor incoherent.
2. Newborn intelligence
Experimental tests of infants' acts of exploration and choice prove that they experience in one mental time–space frame, and do so with a measure of foresightfulness or 'future sense'. Their consciousness creates measures of time in movement, and a space that is defined by the form of the body and by inherent capacities for directed action of its parts. For example, a baby no more than a few minutes old may turn as one whole person to anticipate the path of motion of an object seen (Fig. 1). Newborns can detect patterns in the recurrence of particular things — they make perceptual distinctions, and record the timing and location of recent happenings. Babies adapt, by coordinated movements, to the time, place, and nature of events that have importance for them. They demonstrate 'subjectivity', the awareness and purposefulness of a motivated self.Habituation tests, in which infants are subjected to repeated similar events, show that they may generate predictive strategies. They learn new 'rules', or 'habits', for keeping track of a changing world near them, and become avoidant of events that repeat with no interesting consequences. These tests count the infant's looking and listening behaviours, or record heart rate, breathing, or sucking on a pressure-sensitive nipple. The physiological measures detect fluctuations in attending, since visual or auditory focusing is preceded by changes in the pulse of the heart, and interruption of sucking and breathing. Evidence for complex emotional reactions to events also comes from video and film studies of the facial and vocal expressions and hand movements, and how these change in reponse to another person's behaviour. Expressions of concentrated puzzlement, surprise, pleasure, and displeasure are clearly delineated, and infant arms and hands make movements that vary systematically with the other signs of attending. Evidently babies are ready to signal a subtle variety of feelings.Of course, the neonate period, to about 3 weeks old, is highly specialized. It is true that survival and adapting to a new environment is the baby's main preoccupation then. Functions of suckling for milk, breathing, and protective action against threatening variations of temperature or injurious contact with hard objects or dangerous animals are all of top priority, and babies adjust quickly to the events of an entirely new human environment. The quick and effective movements of newborns to gasp air, to find the nipple, and to seek comfort and protection from a mother's body are remarkable. They are classically described as reflexes and assumed to be due to thoughtless neural links from sensory receptive tissues of the brain stem and spinal cord to motor nerve centres. But a healthy baby born without complications is immediately capable of more than mere fixed responses to physical stimuli, and much of the behaviour is spontaneous, curious, and adaptable.
Fig.1. A newborn infant turns to follow the path of motion of an object seen.
There are, in fact, many innate, non-reflex, investigative or seeking behaviours. Given quiet and gentle attention, a baby born without trauma or sedation may be strikingly alert within minutes of birth to the new world of sights and sounds. Wide-open eyes make finely coordinated stepping movements (see saccades) aimed in different directions round the body. They may stop or change direction to fixate bright places, or track stimuli in motion (see Fig. 1). They orient to the face of a person who approaches close and speaks gently in a tone of greeting. The eye movements are coupled to small pulsating rotations of the head. Films of newborns orienting to and tracking objects with their eyes reveal that a reach-and-grasp movement of arm and hand is inherently coordinated within the visual space–time field of awareness. The movements are a well-formed prototype of the movement an adult makes to take hold of an object. This automatic prereaching, linked to perception of the changing reality outside the body, is a necessary basis for the eventual exploration of objects and intentional command of actions. If a higher mental command is to work, it must eventually decide about goals in a richly patterned world, and the lower-level problems of perceptual locating and motor patterning must be solved speedily, without reflection. Apparently some of the required solutions have been formulated in outline during fetal stages of brain growth. They are ready for adjustment to perceptions of certain goals very soon after birth. Critical tests show that the newborn has almost no capacity to modulate the form of the basic reach-and-grasp automatism once it is triggered, by changing its duration or size in relation to different kinds of object with different kinds of motion, but the old idea that visual field and aiming of the hand have to be linked together by experience to build a reach-and-grasp movement is disproved.
Most remarkable of all are the infant's reactions to persons. Newborns will turn in the direction of a voice from a loudspeaker behind a curtain, orienting not only the head and ears but the eyes as well, searching to see the person who calls. Simultaneously, hands and face move in ways that indicate a total involvement of a coordinated expressive brain. At birth a baby prefers to hear its own mother's voice — her particular vocal characteristics have been learned in utero. In the first few days the sounds of different syllables in speech, as well as their emotional tone, are discriminated by the baby. Observations of face movements of both premature babies and full-term neonates prove that the nerve centres exciting the muscles are organized, so that a wide repertoire of well-formed expressions is present before the baby has had an opportunity to learn from adult exemplars of these human movements. Paediatricians and mothers sense the infant's facial expressions, hand activity, and body posturings to appraise a baby's state and needs. These subtle expressive movements, which may be small and fleeting, are only now being accurately charted by developmental scientists.
After the initial hormonally triggered excitement of birth, the first weeks of a neonate's life are mostly spent in asleep. Infants are usually wide awake and active just after birth, but for two or three weeks thereafter the most common state is either one of sleep with eyes closed, or a vague open-eyed condition in which awareness of the outside world appears weak and fluctuating. The routine cycle of sleep and wakefulness is unstable at birth. It responds to shaping by the consistent routine of responsive care. Often a wakeful newborn is actively avoidant of experiences, and this is particularly noticeable in noisy, highly stimulating circumstances. The tissues of the brain undergo enormous developments in these few weeks and need protecting (see brain development). Intercellular connections are rapidly multiplying. There is evidence that nerve circuits in this condition powerfully limit their own excitation by controlling the movements that direct sensory pathways away from stimuli.
In spite of this avoidant state, which is comparable with the dark-seeking, closed-eyed condition of a nestling kitten, controlled observations show that newborns are capable, like other newly born mammals, of rapid conditioning. With the assistance of a mother's routine, a newborn's sleep cycles become adjusted to time of day and night. The opinion of many mothers that a baby learns in a couple of feeds to find the breast with more skill, and that her baby soon knows her and the father as particular individuals, different from others, is confirmed. Olfactory, gustatory, visual, auditory, and body-contact senses have all been implicated in this recognition by familiar caregivers. The mother is known by her smell and ways of moving even when she takes the baby up silently in the dark. The individual appearance of her face is learned immediately.
3. Imitating to share
Psychologists are astonished, and mothers and fathers are delighted, by demonstrations that babies can imitate many expressions. Indeed, with some babies, it is easy for a mother to see for herself that her newborn, just minutes old, may watch her mouth intently if she protrudes her tongue or opens her mouth wide; then the baby's mouth opens and the tongue pokes out or the mouth opens wide. The model is accurately copied. Exaggerated expressions of happiness, sadness, or surprise, extensions of the fingers, blinking, looking up are also imitated. Even more remarkable are demonstrations that a newborn infant only hours old may repeat an action he or she has just imitated to 'provoke' an imitative reply from the adult, thus setting up a two-way 'conversation' of gestures. Concurrent changes in the infant's heart rate — acceleration with excitement before the imitation, and slowing with attentive expectation before the 'provocation' — prove that the imitations are intended as signals or requests in reciprocal communication. They anticipate responses. When calling vocalizations are offered, a similarly prompt imitation of the voice can be obtained when the baby is a few weeks older. Imitation of movements of the hands opening or coming together and index finger extension have also been documented.All these movements, like the expressions of smiling, knitting of the brows, etc., and hand movements of gesture, including making a fist, extending all fingers, or pointing with the index finger, may occur also without a model — but prompt and well-differentiated imitation of some of them is confirmed by well-controlled experiments. At the very least, this phenomenon proves that the infant has made a reasonably well-differentiated awareness of what the mother's face, vocal apparatus, or hands are expressing. This image of her must be formed in close relation to the appropriate motor command which sets off the right imitative response shortly after the baby's focused attending to the model the first time it is presented. Denials of the newborn's ability to imitate, and industrious tests expecting to show it is an artefact or a misinterpretation of the data, reflect a historical–cultural belief that a newborn cannot have awareness of persons. The more sympathetic acceptance that a baby is ready to communicate is increasingly confirmed by psychologists' research, and by the latest data from recording activity in babies' brains when they see or hear persons. Parents are certainly made happy by a simple imitation test that shows their babies 'know' them. Clinically, systematic use of such relatively complex natural social behaviours has value for diagnosis of sensory or motivational differences and abnormalities of young infants.
4. Protoconversations in 'primary intersubjectivity'
Besides imitating, neonates can smile and coo and make hand gestures when spoken to, and a newborn infant can enter into a conversational exchange of coo vocalizations with a parent who is imitating the baby's sounds. These expressive signs to persons become much more evident in the second month, after the perceptual systems of the cerebral cortex have developed, especially those for vision. A majority of 2-month-olds raise the right hand more than the left when they are making an expressive response when looking at a person speaking to them (Fig. 2). Their brains already have asymmetry of control for making messages of communication. Contented facial expressions of a baby may be stimulated by soft handling and gentle speech or singing; quite different patterns are evoked by loud, impatient, or aggressive speech and abrupt movements. The split-second timing of exchanges of expression between the infant and the mother has been analysed, and proves that both of them are actively controlling the exchange. The baby is wanting someone to 'talk' to.
Fig. 2. A 6-week-old girl smiles at her mother, coos and gestures, raising her right hand more than her left. Her mother is speaking gentle 'baby talk' on a steady beat and watching closely.
It has been found that a mother who is emotionally depressed, anxious, and inattentive to her infant will have difficulty holding her baby's attention, and the baby may be avoidant and even become depressed as well. This work has helped determine how the baby is normally eager to enter into control of the communication of moods and levels of awareness with support from the other person. But we have much description to do before we can give a full account of early intersubjectivity, how the baby perceives people, or how parents and the infant 'co-create' their communication.
Microanalysis of ordinary face-to-face play between mothers and their 2-month-old babies reveals a precise timing in the way they address one another and reply. Babies stimulate an adult to use a gentle and questioning infant-directed speech, 'motherese', or 'baby talk', which has a regular beat and characteristic expression of mood in its changing intonation, rhythm, and in the accompaniment of movements of head, eyebrows, eyes, and so forth. The infant watches the affectionate and playful display intently, and then makes a reply — on the beat, with a smile, and with head and body movements, cooing, hand movements, and lip-and-tongue movements that have been called pre-speech. Photographic records suggest that the last are developmental precursors of actual speech. The attempts at vocal expression are synchronized with hand gestures, as in adult conversation.
It is not claimed that babies have things to say, or that they can hear words as such, but they are certainly perceptive of identifying features in the sight and sound of human speech. They appear to want to make rudimentary 'utterances' themselves when persons excite them by friendly greetings. The outbursts of infant expressive movement form phrases that last two or three seconds, and that are organized in narratives of expressed excitement with characteristic beginning, climax, and end. Sometimes they contain coos or calls — but often there is no vocalization at this age, merely activity of mouth and hands. Their regularly repeated form helps the mother give the right support and encouragement in her well-timed movements and speech (see Fig. 2). The enjoyment parent and child have in extended 'protoconversations' is taken to demonstrate a state of 'primary intersubjectivity' or dynamic interpersonal awareness that allows mutual regulation of feelings and motives.
Analysis of vocal exchanges in protoconversation by acoustic techniques that allow the timing, rhythms, pitch modulations, and quality of sound expressions to be accurately defined has led to the hypothesis that human beings are born with a 'communicative musicality'. Tests of young infants' preferences and capacities to discriminate sounds show that they perceive many musical parameters, such as melodies, harmonies, rhythms, accents, in both vocal and instrumental sound, and that their sensibilities are particularly adapted to hear the melody of emotions and states of animation in the human voice, especially the mother's.
The intensity of interest and the delicacy of response of young babies to persons who speak to them reinforces an affectionate personal relationship, which has great importance in the baby's well-being and mental development. In the 'bond' (in the sense of a compact of mutual trust) that develops between them, infant and favourite companion begin to develop a shared repertoire of expressive tricks and exchanges of feeling (see attachment).
5. Chasing and manipulating objects; playing games; sharing songs
As the babies' cognitive powers increase by selective retention of mental rules that work better and better to control objects, and after actions have become stronger, more alert and discriminating, around 3 or 4 months, mutual interest with the mother undergoes a subtle but pervasive change. There develops a conflict between pursuit of purpose in subjugation of objects and ways of exploring them, on the one hand (i.e. development of an 'object concept'), and the sharing of sympathy or interpersonal interest with people, on the other (see Fig. 4). But out of this complication, or 'conflict of interests', appears a new playfulness that offers a crucial bridge for sharing motives, and for learning arbitrary cultural knowledge. The baby begins to enjoy and contribute to games.
Fig. 3. Paul, at 36 weeks, plays happily with his mother trying to 'catch' a ball, but he is shy then sad with a friendly stranger.
Fig. 4. Emma, at 28 weeks, has learned to play a traditional hand game ('clappa, clappa handies') with her mother. Songs for infants have similar musical form in different cultures. Emma is a genetic left-hander; already she claps left hand over right. Esme, 40 weeks, enjoys playing with and exploring wooden dolls and a truck, but has to be physically 'persuaded' to obey the instruction 'Put the man in the truck'. She does not understand her mother's gestures and spoken instructions.
6. Gaining a sense of self, and awareness of meaning in cooperation
Out of the interacting developments of object perceiving and communicating with persons emerge powerful mental functions that open the way for language and other symbolic communications, effective logical formulae for systematic reasoning, and other key artefacts of human culture. Before a baby is 9 months old, he or she has become clever at handling and mouthing objects, very alert to the sight and sound of happenings, including effects of their own manipulations transforming and combining objects, and clear about the distinctions between the familiar and the strange. Life with others is enlivened by humorous games and clowning, created mutually. Sometimes there are conflicts of purpose, and the baby learns to adjust to these with strong and unambiguous expressions of refusal or acquiescence. But there is rarely any sign before the baby is 9 months old of specific interest in taking up another's wishes or intentions in regard to the shared reality (see Fig. 4).Then, within two or three weeks, this phase of self-directedness or self-absorption (called 'egocentricity' by some psychologists who see it as a limitation of immaturity, rather than a necessary process of development in purposeful autonomy) changes fundamentally. By 1 year a baby starts both to express and to respond to a new kind of mental relationship, a cooperative awareness in which the purposes and experiences of another in relation to the world outside both of them become of primary interest (Fig. 5). Both joint and mutual attention draw the infant into cooperative tasks. The 1-year-old is interested in what others intend, what interests others, and how others feel about what they are doing. He or she is beginning to take up other persons' responsible purposes and concerns. The way this consciousness develops gives a fascinating account of a specifically human way of being.
Towards the end of the first year, the infant develops a clear awareness of the persistence of objects in their own right. A short-term 'episodic' memory for identified things and a new more curious searching impulse can direct the baby to find a toy when it has been hidden by someone in view of the infant. But there are other developments, too, that change the infant's communication and awareness of what things mean, how they can be categorized. Before 9 months, babies do not 'offer to give to' or seek 'to have help from' or 'point to direct the attention of' the person with whom they play. They gesture and babble in a highly expressive way, obviously playing with the postures and sounds, and with effects on others, but they do not make utterances about their experiences that are addressed to others as comments or enquiries that seek an affirmation or complement. They do not make baby words to specify objects to others. Nor do they appear to recognize the mother's names for objects. But by the end of the first year most babies everywhere do all of these things. They quickly learn intricate reciprocal or cooperative games where they purposefully share the effort to build something, look at a book, create an amusing effect. They become aware of and are interested in the changing focus of another person's interest. They retain impressions of interesting events shared with others, and can show 'deferred imitation' of meaningful acts, reproducing ideas or tricks as offerings to interested others several days after first learning them. The motivation for this kind of cooperative play is strong, and people who know the baby well become aware of an intense companionship in it. It leads to a sharing of experiences and of symbols that is uniquely human. It has been called 'secondary intersubjectivity' or cooperative awareness.
7. The pride and shame of a social identity
As an infant is gaining in clever awareness of how others know the world, he or she is also changing emotionally and becoming more subtle in personality and temperament. Through the last six months of the first year babies show strong selective affection for their principal caretakers, usually mothers, and they become highly sensitive to approaches from strangers — often acting afraid or distressed (see Fig. 3). This sign of trust in the familiar 'friend', with matching anxiety about unfamiliar company, seems to relate to the great increase, at 9 months, in complexity of the baby's interest in the knowledge and skills that can be shared best with steady and trusted companions. The familiar playmate is an integral and necessary part of the baby's developing consciousness — a friend. One-year-olds are beginning cultural learning and they show powerful feelings of joyful pride at sharing what they know with appreciative company, and fearful 'shame' when their expressive games are not appreciated, or not comprehended by a stranger, who, too, is naturally sensitive to the mistrust. The infant is showing the early signs of 'basic complex emotions' that will be so important in regulating social relationships and moral attitudes later in life.8. Beginning to speak: the end of infancy
There is much attention in contemporary developmental psychology to the start of spoken language when, by definition, a child ceases to be an infant (the Latin infans means 'unable to speak'). (See language development in children; language: learning word meanings.) Language, and the symbolic understanding of moods, purposes, and meanings, is central in human nature. Evidence from the interpersonal skills of infants strongly supports the idea that language skills are built on a communicative but non-linguistic sharing of motives that begins soon after a baby is born. The speedy and rich exchange of thoughts that is made possible when insubstantial words stand for all manner of actions and physical objects and events is preceded by the infant's ability to enter into the minds of others, first by their direct expression of interest and mood in affectionate relationship, then by their playful teasing, and finally by their willingness to share significant moments in the experience of surroundings and what may be done inside this evolving joint experience.The time patterns of speech in a particular language can be discriminated even by a baby a few weeks old. Infants listen to talk from birth. They start to imitate speech sounds more accurately and to play with babbling of repeated syllables at about 6 months of age. At the same age a deaf baby in a home where hand sign language is used to share ideas will begin practising and showing expressive hand movements or 'sign babble'. This shows that the impulse to communicate in artful ways — by means of learned signs — is not confined to the vocal–auditory channel. In fact, during the first eighteen months, vocalizing and making hand gestures develop synchronously as complementary ways of communicative expression, responding to the usage in the family from six months. Humans can 'see' language as well as hear it, as long as the meaning is defined in consistent, mutually accepted forms. A 1-year-old does not merely want to keep close to mother. He or she wants to take note of comments, give and take, share the looking and handling of things, and try to follow the words or signs that seem to be given special emphasis in these interactions. The baby will make vocalizations with gestures in order to mean something, or to give a deliberate message: a demand, a request, a refusal, etc. This protolanguage shows to other people what interests the baby, or what he or she intends (see Fig. 5). At 2 years the same baby is not only walking about, but also speaking.
Fig. 5. Basilie, one year old, co-operates. When her mother hands her the doll, saying, 'Put the man in the truck', Basilie does so immediately, then looks at her mother and grins. She understands her mother's wishes, and can use 'protolanguage' of gesture and vocal expression to influence others. Basilie is a right-hander.
9. A mind adapted for human society and for cultural learning
It would appear that, from infancy research, we are beginning to appreciate the fundamental form of human motives. We are gaining detailed evidence on how social understandings emerge in infancy, from the sensitivity of the neonate to human care and human emotions to the intelligent, talkative cooperativeness of a 2-year-old. In the process, we seem to be learning a new philosophy of mind that does not set the empiricist against the nativist, and that does not wholly segregate the material from the mental. How else can we attempt to conceptualize an inherent set of motives to share experience with others and to learn ways of communicating cultural meanings in community and through history? And, finally, we are setting a new challenge for brain science. Clearly we have to develop a theory of neural systems that seek, recognize, and learn human company, and that acquire consciousness of human-created meaning by cooperating in purposeful activity and imagination and by sympathizing with the emotions and moral feelings that evaluate a common experience and mutually supportive relationships.(Published 2004)
— Colwyn Trevarthen
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