Naval gunfire support (NGS) is the provision of heavy seaborne artillery in support of land operations. The emphasis here is on ‘heavy’, in that warships have always been able to move massive concentrations of guns more easily than land forces, particularly where roads are poor or non-existent. An early example of NGS occurred during the battle of Pinkie on 10 September 1547 when English warships in the Firth of Forth fired on Scots troops manoeuvring near the coast. The latest in a long tradition was the use of the 16 inch guns of the WW II vintage New Jersey class of battleships during the Gulf war.
The limitations have always been range, something now overcome by the deployment of cruise missiles on warships, such that the big guns of the New Jersey class have been retired, probably for the last time. But in the era of wooden ships, shore batteries could employ ship-killing heated shot, and the advent of the submarine mine was equally deterrent to the use of ironclad capital ships close inshore, as illustrated particularly at Gallipoli. But NGS remains a core element in amphibious and other maritime operations in the projection of naval power. It has long been a feature of British and US military theory, and indeed a classic illustration of the importance of NGS was when the temporary loss of control of the surrounding Chesapeake Bay led to the capitulation of the British army at Yorktown in October 1781. The threat of NG alone was used to overawe coastal states during the 19th century and NGS gave the Union a considerable unilateral advantage during the American civil war, for example in support of Federal landings on Hilton Head Island on 7 November 1861, at the siege of Vicksburg in 1862, and in operations off Charleston and in Mobile Bay in August 1864.
The same advantage was enjoyed by the western Allies during WW II. It was crucial during the Normandy campaign where German troops dreaded NGS above all other forms of bombardment. It played a vital role in US amphibious operations against Japanese-held islands such as Tarawa, Saipan, and Iwo Jima, which were in effect siege warfare with NGS providing the battering train. Artillery fire control techniques rapidly improved as front-line naval units were deployed to direct supporting fire. Targeting was refined by aerial photography, and accuracy improved to the point where fire could be brought down within yards of friendly troop positions. Offshore gunfire was complemented by close support by rocket-firing landing craft. In the case of the British, combined operations bombardment units were established in April 1941, while American forces in Europe established naval shore fire control parties.
NGS proved moderately effective in Vietnam and the Israelis used NGS in 1982 to support their advance on Sidon. The British used NGS extensively during the Falklands war, counter-attacking ahead of the ground forces and taking a psychological toll of Argentine troops out of proportion to the number of rounds fired. In September 1983 the US navy bombarded the Shouf Mountains in the Lebanon and NGS supported the invasion of Grenada a month later.
NGS retains the advantage of strategic and tactical mobility in coastal theatres of operations. The limitations remain vulnerability to air attack and fire from the shore, now extended by missiles such as Exocet and Harpoon. Submarine-launched cruise missiles provide an answer, but these weapons systems are not navy-specific.
Bibliography
- Bailey, J. B. A., Field Artillery and Firepower (Oxford, 1989).
- Heinl, R. D., ‘Naval Gunfire Support in the Pacific’, Field Artillery Journal (Oct. 1945).
- Kline, J., ‘Firepower from the Sea’, Field Artillery Journal (Mar. 1985).
- Morgan, M. J., ‘Naval Gunfire Support for Operation Corporate’, 1982 Journal of the Royal Artillery (Sep. 1983).
- Pocock, T., Battle for Empire (London, 1998)
— Jonathan B. A. Bailey
