This term covers a number of philosophical movements which draw on the ethics and psychology of the Stoics (although not their logic). Stoicism is known principally through the later accounts of other ancient philosophers: Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, Boethius, and most of all Epictetus, whose Enchiridion enjoyed an enormous vogue throughout Europe from the end of the 16th c. The revival of Stoicism has close connections with 15th-c. Florentine Neoplatonism, especially in the writings of Ficino and Pico della Mirandola. Their exaltation of human moral autonomy and celebration of the figure of Socrates as an exemplar of pagan virtue were enormously influential in northern Europe. From the beginning of the 16th c. attempts were made by Erasmus and others to reconcile Evangelical Christianity with optimistic Stoic doctrines about man's capacity to control his will, to eradicate or harness his passions, and to regulate his own happiness.
This desired reconciliation is detectable in the works of Rabelais, whose giant hero Pantagruel embodies an ideal of Christian behaviour embodying piety, moral energy, and a belief both in the possibilities of ‘right reason’ and the perfectibility of man. Pantagruelism is described in the prologue of the Quart Livre as ‘certaine gaieté d'esprit confite en mépris de choses fortuites’; the latter phrase alludes to the Stoic doctrine that man should strive to control only that which is in his power, namely his own desires. Reason is the sure guide to human moral choice and behaviour; in Rabelais's writings this is always allied to personal faith and to ‘gaieté d'esprit’ which is nurtured by human companionship. Stoic thought may also be detected at this time in the treatises setting out the ideal education for princes, among them those by Budé and Ronsard.
Another strand of Neostoicism stresses the consolation of philosophy and its strength as a bulwark for the individual against personal misfortune and a hostile social, physical, or intellectual environment. This grimmer version comes to prevail in the second half of the 16th c. It may be detected in the Latin letters of Michel de l'Hôpital; it finds expression in the plays of Garnier; Du Bellay even describes his muse as a dispenser of Stoic fortitude and consolation. By the 1580s a number of prominent scholars and writers in Europe—Cardano (De utilitate ex adversis capienda, 1561), Justus Lipsius (De constantia, 1583), Montaigne, Du Vair—came to promote Neostoic ideas in the wake of the civil and religious unrest caused by the Reformation. Their activity was complemented by new translations or adaptations of ancient Stoics such as Plutarch (translated by Amyot in 1572), Epictetus (translated by Du Vair in 1591), Seneca (translated by Goulart in 1595 and Pressac in 1598), and Boethius (translated by Malassis de Mente in 1597). Much of this material remained available throughout the 17th c.
Various versions of Neostoicism emerge by 1600: that of Justus Lipsius surprisingly accompanies an opportunistic and unprincipled view of politics, and a suggestion that those in public life can usefully abandon all notions of private integrity when acting politically. This contradicts the view expressed in the earlier part of the century that Stoic values need to be inculcated in princes. Montaigne echoes this latter judgement in the chapter of his Essais entitled ‘De l'utile et de l'honnête’, but stresses more the importance of abstaining from participation in political life. For him, Stoicism is seen as a means of anticipating and managing human suffering by the individual. At first he proposed that this could best be done by steeling oneself against future pain and evil and by suppressing one's passions, but in his later writing he comes to argue the benefits of a more relaxed attitude towards pain and pleasure. His initial identification of Stoic, acquired virtue with a moral élite gives way to an appreciation of the ‘natural’ virtue of peasants and the fortitude they display in the face of pain and death.
This populist tendency is found also in the writings of Du Vair, which are deeply influenced by Epictetus' Enchiridion; in his De la constance et consolation ès calamités publiques (published 1597) an attempt is made to ally Stoic doctrines to Counter-Reformation piety, a tendency found also in Justus Lipsius's work. Neostoicism of this last kind was strongly encouraged in Jesuit schools, and emerges as an important element in the writings of some of their most famous pupils. It may be detected in Guez de Balzac's Socrate chrétien (1652); in Pierre Corneille's early tragedies, which offer an optimistic vision of the moral autonomy of the highborn individual; and in Descartes's ethics, which are strongly reminiscent of Neostoicism. But whereas Corneille portrays virile, self-assertive heroes possessing lucidity, integrity, and moral consistency, who overcome not only their own passions but also hostile political machinations by sheer strength of character (Rodrigue in Le Cid, Auguste in Cinna, Nicomède), Descartes's Traité des passions of 1649 is less élitist in tone and argues for the ability of all human beings to master their own emotions and to manage their lives felicitously.
These optimistic accounts of human powers were undermined by the growing prestige of scepticism on the one hand and Augustinianism on the other; although the conflict between Jesuits and Jansenists did not bear on this issue only, the discussion of Stoic doctrines is a significant factor in the debates of the middle years of the 17th c. The subsequent decline of Neostoicism coincided with the rise of the absolutist state, whose repressive character was more in tune with the pessimistic Augustinian account of human mental impotence and corruption.
[Ian Maclean]
.Bibliography
- A. Levi, French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions 1585-1649 (1964)
