Nivelle offensive (1917), named after its architect, the charismatic French Gen Robert Nivelle, who succeeded Joffre as C-in-C of the French army in December 1916. Nivelle sang a siren song to both the British premier Lloyd George and French politicians, disillusioned with static war and heavy casualties. His fluent English (learnt from his English mother) helped him persuade Lloyd George to put Haig under his command for the duration of the battle, in order to mount a diversionary attack at Arras/Vimy Ridge.
Nivelle's plan was based on tactics he had used on a much smaller scale at Verdun. It involved mass infantry attacks on a broad front, supported for the first time by tanks, and preceded by a swift, rolling artillery barrage, unlike previous assaults which had been heralded by long bombardments. He had been a good army commander and his plan might have had some chance of success—though not on the enormous scale he hoped for—had not the Germans withdrawn suddenly in the spring of 1917 to the Hindenburg Line. This move, relinquishing territory but taking up a much shorter and cunningly sited defensive line, left Nivelle's plans dangerously up in the air, but he did not change them. His tactics had been much discussed within France, and Nivelle, swept along by the tide of his own rhetoric, had championed them more vigorously than the evidence warranted. News of the threat reached the Germans, who fortuitously captured a copy of the plan. They widened their trenches in the crucial Aisne sector to confound the French tanks, built extra concealed machine-gun bunkers, posted additional artillery nearby, and circulated information which would enable them to shell French trenches at their most crowded.
The ‘lightning’ bombardment fell on a 25 mile (40 km) stretch of front between Rheims and Soissons on 5 April 1917, but the infantry attack was postponed several times due to the weather. French troops eventually slithered out of their trenches in appalling conditions on 16 April, by which time the Germans were fully alerted. The French tanks were halted and destroyed by artillery fire and the ‘creeping’ barrage moved forwards too fast for the accompanying infantry. German machine guns and artillery exploited the window of opportunity after the hurricane of shells had passed, and caused 134, 000 French casualties between 16 and 29 April, 80 per cent during the first day's fighting. Penetrations were made in some places and 11, 000 prisoners taken, but the 48 hour victory was undeliverable.
Nivelle's failure caused troops in 68 of France's 112 scattered infantry divisions to mutiny, first expressed in a refusal to return to the front by troops rotating from rear areas. Nivelle's failure was the latest in a string of costly defeats, the last straw for the war-weary poilu. The government, alarmed by the scale and consistency of the mutineers' grievances, summoned Pétain, the hero of Verdun, to take command of the army. Nivelle, sacked on 15 May, was packed off to command French forces in North Africa. Although Haig was not aware of its scale, the French breakdown reaffirmed the need for the British to take the initiative, and this played a part—though it remains impossible to be sure how much of a part—in persuading him to fight the third battle of Ypres three months later.
— Peter Caddick-Adams
