Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin

529 U.S. 344, argued 1 March 2000, decided 17 Apr. 2000 by a vote of 7 to 2; O'Connor for the Court, Breyer concurring, Ginsburg and Stevens in dissent. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin held that federal law establishing minimum requirements for safety devices installed at railroad grade crossings preempted state tort law actions alleging that those devices were inadequate.

In 1973, Congress enacted the Highway Safety Act, which offered states federal funds to eliminate railroad‐highway crossing hazards. The secretary of transportation issued regulations prescribing the adequacy of warning devices installed under the act. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Eastwood (1993), the Court declined to decide whether mere installation of devices under the regulations preempted state tort law. Norfolk Southern, however, held that while states were “free to install more protective devices,” once they “installed federally funded devices at a particular crossing,” state tort suits questioning their adequacy were preempted (p. 358).

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting, would have preempted the suit only if federal employees had specifically determined that warning devices installed in particular locations were adequate, the position adopted by some federal appellate courts.

Norfolk Southern reflects the tendency of the Rehnquist Court to invoke preemption when state law, including tort suits, would disrupt uniformity in a federal regulatory regime. This tendency is sometimes surprising considering the Court's robust enforcement of federalism to limit congressional power. Justices Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens, who often dissent from the Court's federalism decisions, frequently support states in preemption cases, arguing that Congress ought to state its intent to preempt clearly in the statute.

— Brannon P. Denning