Nuclear Capability and Nuclear Energy

Nuclear proliferation in the greater Middle East is a central issue in international affairs.

In the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the issue of nuclear weapons in the Greater Middle East came to the fore as never before. Several developments played a role in this change: In 1998 nearby India and Pakistan almost simultaneously tested several nuclear weapons each. In 2002 these nations' ongoing conflict over Kashmir brought them close to the nuclear brink. Then came reports of the transfer of nuclear technology and materials from Pakistan to North Korea and perhaps also Iran. Other reports suggested that Pakistan considered its nuclear program to be an "Islamic bomb" enterprise that could provide extended deterrence to Israel's nuclear threat to the Arabs. Israel implied that it would use nuclear weapons if attacked by Iraq with chemical or biological weapons. Also of great concern was the proliferation of various delivery systems - ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range aircraft abetted by aerial refueling - by several states in the region that might be joined to nuclear weapons arsenals. Around the world fears grew that terrorist organizations such as al-Qaʿida might somehow acquire nuclear weapons or materials for a "dirty" nuclear weapon derived from radioactive wastes. There were also increasing fears about Iraq's acquisition of nuclear weapons - a major rationale for the U.S.-led coalition's invasion of Iraq in 2003 - and Iran's seemingly imminent development of nuclear weapons.

Israel

Israel was the first of the nations in the region to cross the nuclear threshold. But despite a growing body of writings about the history of its nuclear program, vast gaps remain in what is known about the size of its arsenal, the dates of its initial deployments, and its current command-and-control structure. It appears that the initial decisions to move toward nuclear weapons status were made shortly after the Jewish state was created. Crucial to Israel's nuclear development was its nuclear cooperation with France, which grew out of the two nations' close relations at the time of the 1956 Suez War and continued until 1967 - 1968. Israel's nuclear development was centered on the French-supplied Dimona reactor, which went into operation around 1961, and continued to produce plutonium despite remonstrances from the Kennedy administration and some limited U.S. inspections.

Israel probably began plutonium separation and the deployment of operational nuclear weapons between the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars, with the Soviet Union's active involvement in the Suez "war of attrition" (1969 - 1970) perhaps serving as a final trigger. In 1973 Israel's implicit threats to use nuclear weapons after the initial military setbacks in Sinai and on the Golan Heights appear to have impelled the U.S. arms resupply airlift after initial hesitation.

In 1979 U.S. satellites detected a flash over the southern Indian Ocean that was widely, though not definitively, attributed to an Israeli or joint Israeli-South African nuclear test. In 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, a disaffected Israeli who had worked at the Dimona reactor, leaked voluminous information and photographs that revealed the scope of the Israeli nuclear program. Those disclosures, now widely considered credible, indicated a program consisting of both fission and fusion weapons, involving up to or more than 200 weapons, mounted on delivery systems that could cover the entire Middle East. The latter delivery systems included now longer-range Jericho missiles (perhaps up to 1,500 miles), F-16 fighter aircraft with aerial refueling capability, and - perhaps - three diesel submarines purchased from Germany.

Various rationales have been offered for the Israeli nuclear program. The main rationale is that the program serves as a credible deterrent against the threat of an overwhelming Arab conventional force, which some deem inevitable. The size of Israel's program appears to imply the prospective use of tactical nuclear weapons in such a scenario, backed by a threat against cities. Other rationales for the nuclear program are that it offers increased assurance of American arms resupply during crises; it may convince Arab nations of Israel's permanence, thereby nudging them along in the "peace process"; and it may deter involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict by powerful peripheral nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the latter semi-allied to Israel.

Iraq

Iraq's initial efforts to become the second Middle Eastern nuclear power were thwarted by Israel's bombing of the Osirak reactor in Baghdad in 1981. During the subsequent decade, Iraq allegedly built a clandestine nuclear infrastructure with the aid of numerous Western suppliers of relevant technologies, most notably that of gas centrifuges. That operation apparently was vastly underestimated by Western intelligence services, and the full scope of the program was revealed only in the wake of Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War of 1991 and its subsequent submission to United Nations inspections, which appear to have resulted in the dismantling of part of Iraq's nuclear infrastructure. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, however, the status of the Iraqi nuclear program was unclear. Little evidence was found. Various analysts suggested that intelligence reports had overstated the program; that it was well hidden by the Saddam regime; or that prior to the invasion it had been dismantled or the evidence moved to Syria or elsewhere outside of Iraq.

Iran, Algeria, and Libya

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and subsequent to the Gulf War, Iran is widely believed to have embarked on an energetic effort to acquire nuclear weapons. That effort is centered on its nuclear research complex at Isfahan. Reports suggest extensive outside assistance, particularly from Pakistan and perhaps from China and Russia. There are reports of work on centrifuge technology, and on plutonium production reactors. Israel in particular dreads the possible advent of an Iranian nuclear weapons program that would include long-range missiles capable of reaching Israel.

During the latter part of the shah's reign, Iran embarked on a program to build several nuclear reactors. One was nearly completed by a West German firm. In 2003 Iran was negotiating with Russia over the building of four new reactors, plans that were fiercely opposed by the United States. One reactor, at Bushehr, is apparently under construction.

Algeria has acquired a small nuclear reactor, causing anxiety in Western Europe over the threat that Islamic fundamentalism could lead to a European-Algerian conflict. Libya reportedly has made efforts to acquire nuclear weapons or technology, but to no avail. In December 2003, Libya announced the cessation of all of its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.

Conclusion

The vast oil and gas resources of the Middle East presumably render almost superfluous the acquisition of nuclear power reactors for peaceful purposes. Statements about generating electricity appear to provide rhetorical cover for intended nuclear weapons programs.

Nuclear disarmament is unlikely to be achieved in the region in the foreseeable future. Israel clearly sees nuclear deterrence as vital to its survival. It could not conceivably abandon its stockpile unless Pakistan did so as well, which would require India also to disarm, and thus also China, the United States, and Russia. That is a daunting row of dominoes.

Bibliography

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Burrows, William E., and Windrem, Robert. Critical Mass:The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

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Cordesman, Anthony. Weapons of Mass Destruction in the MiddleEast. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003.

Feldman, Shai. Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the1980s. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

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— ROBERT E. HARKAVY