Operation Epsom

Operation Epsom Part of Battle for Caen An ammunition carrier of the 11th Armoured Division explodes after it is hit by a mortar round during Operation Epsom – 26 June 1944. Date 26–30 June, 1944[1] Location West of Caen, Normandy, France[2] Result Tactically indecisive[3] Strategic Allied victory[4] Belligerents  United Kingdom  Germany Commanders Bernard Montgomery[5] Miles Dempsey[5] Richard O'Connor[6] Friedrich Dollmann[7] Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg[8] Sepp Dietrich[9] Paul Hausser[10] Willi Bittrich[7] Strength 2 Infantry Divisions[11] 1 Armoured Division[11] 1 Armoured Brigade[11] 1 Tank Brigade[11] 3 SS Panzer Divisions[9] 5 ad-hoc battle groups[12] 1 SS heavy tank battalion[13] Casualties and losses 4,020[nb 1]–4,078 casualties[nb 2] Over 3,000 casualties[nb 3] 126 tanks knocked out[nb 4] Operation Epsom Operational scope Strategic Offensive Planned by British Second Army[5] Objective Break out of the bridgehead, west of Caen, advance across the Orne River and capture the highground south of Caen near Bretteville-sur-Laize[18] Executed by VIII Corps, Second Army. Supporting attacks made by elements of XXX Corps, Second Army.[2]

v • d • e Operation Overlord (Invasion of Normandy) Neptune – British airborne landings – American airborne landings – Sword – Juno – Gold – Omaha – Utah – Pointe du Hoc – Caen – Brécourt Manor – Ushant – La Caine – Perch – Carentan – Le Mesnil-Patry – Villers–Bocage – Cherbourg – Martlet – Epsom (1st Odon) – Windsor – Charnwood – Jupiter – 2nd Odon – Goodwood – Atlantic – Verrières Ridge – Spring – Cobra – Bluecoat – Totalize – Lüttich – Tractable – Hill 262 – Falaise – Brest – Paris

Operation Epsom, also known as the First Battle of the Odon, was a Second World War British offensive that took place between 26 and 30 June 1944, during the Battle of Normandy. The offensive was intended to outflank and seize the German-occupied city of Caen, a major Allied objective in the early stages of the invasion of northwest Europe.

Preceded by attacks to secure the lines of advance, Operation Epsom was launched early on 26 June, with units of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division advancing behind a rolling artillery barrage. Air cover would be sporadic for much of the operation, as poor weather in the United Kingdom forced the last-minute cancellation of bomber support. Supported by the tanks of the 31st Tank Brigade, the 15th Scottish made steady progress, and by the end of the first day had largely overrun the German outpost line, although some difficulties remained in securing the flanks of the advance. In heavy fighting over the following two days, a foothold was secured across the River Odon, and efforts were made to expand this by capturing strategic points around the salient and moving up the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division. However, in response to powerful German counterattacks, by 30 June some of the British positions across the river were withdrawn, bringing the operation to a close.

Military historians have widely differed in their interpretations of the intention and conduct of Operation Epsom, but there is general agreement concerning its effect on the balance of forces in Normandy. Although the Germans had managed to contain the offensive, to do so they had been obliged to commit all their available strength, including two panzer divisions newly arrived in Normandy and earmarked for a planned offensive against British and American positions around Bayeux. Casualties were heavy on both sides, but unlike General Bernard Montgomery, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was unable to withdraw units into reserve after the battle, as they were needed to hold the front line. The British retained the initiative, and were able to launch further operations over the following weeks, eventually capturing Caen towards the end of July.

Background

The historic Normandy town of Caen was a D-Day objective for the British 3rd Infantry Division that landed on Sword Beach on 6 June 1944.^[19] The capture of Caen, while "ambitious", has been described by historian L F Ellis as the most important D-Day objective assigned to Lieutenant-General Crockers's I Corps.^{[nb 5]} Operation Overlord called for Second Army to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, in order to acquire airfields and protect the left flank of the United States First Army while it moved on Cherbourg.^[22] Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could itself be used as the pivot for a swing right to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River.^[23]

Hampered by congestion in the beachhead that delayed the deployment of its armoured support, and forced to divert effort to attacking strongly held German positions along the 9.3-mile (15.0 km) route to the town, the 3rd Division was unable to assault Caen in force, and was brought to a halt short of its outskirts by the 21st Panzer Division.^[24] Immediate follow-up attacks were unsuccessful as German resistance solidified; abandoning the direct approach, Operation Perch—a pincer attack by I and XXX Corps^[25]—was launched on 7 June, with the intention of encircling Caen from the east and west.^[26] I Corps, striking south out of the Orne bridgehead, was halted by the 21st Panzer Division,^[27] and the attack by XXX Corps bogged down in front of Tilly-sur-Seulles, west of Caen, in the face of stiff opposition from the Panzer Lehr Division.^[26] In an effort to force Panzer Lehr to withdraw or surrender,^[28] and to keep operations fluid, the 7th Armoured Division pushed through a recently created gap in the German front line, and attempted to capture the town of Villers-Bocage.^[29] The resulting day-long battle saw the vanguard of the 7th Armoured Division withdraw from the town,^[30] but by 17 June Panzer Lehr had themselves been forced back, and XXX Corps had taken Tilly-sur-Seulles.^[31]

A repeated attack from the 7th Armoured Division never materialised^[32] and further offensive operations were abandoned when, on 19 June, a severe storm descended upon the English Channel. The storm, which lasted for three days, significantly delayed the Allied build-up.^[33] Most of the convoys of landing craft and ships already at sea were driven back to ports in Britain; towed barges and other loads (including 2.5 mi/4.0 km of floating roadways for the Mulberry harbours) were lost; and 800 craft were left stranded on the Normandy beaches until the next spring tides in July.^[34] Despite this setback, planning began for a second offensive^[35] codenamed Operation Dreadnought, to be launched out of the Orne bridgehead by VIII Corps to outflank Caen from the east. The operation was cancelled after negative feedback from VIII Corps commanding officer Sir Richard O'Connor, and planning for an attack towards Évrecy was then looked into. There is some controversy whether Montgomery or Miles Dempsey, commanding officer of the Second Army, cancelled the operation; Dempsey, in a post-war interview with Chester Wilmot, stated that he informed Montgomery he was going to cancel the proposed operation on 18 June.^[36]

The weather from 19–22 June also grounded Allied aircraft,^[37] and the Germans took advantage of the respite from air attacks to improve their defensive lines, strengthening infantry positions with minefields and posting approximately seventy 88 mm guns in hedgerows and woods covering the southern approaches to Caen.^[33]

Planning

On 20 June Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commanding German forces in Normandy, was ordered by Hitler to launch a counteroffensive against the Allied lines between the towns of Caumont and Saint-Lô. The objective was to cut a corridor between the American and British armies by recapturing the city of Bayeux (taken by the British on 7 June) and the coastline beyond.^[38] Four SS Panzer Divisions and one Heer Panzer Division were assigned this task. The attack was to be spearheaded by the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps, recently arrived from the Ukraine,^[39] supported by the 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions^[38] and the 2nd Panzer Division.^[40] The vast majority of the tanks used by these formations were Panzer IVs, supplemented by assault guns, Panthers and Tigers—the latter two among the most lethal and well-protected German armoured vehicles.^[41]

On 18 June General Bernard Montgomery, the commander of all Allied ground forces in Normandy, issued a directive to Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey to capture Caen^[42] by launching a new pincer attack.^[43] The initial plan called for I and XXX Corps to attack west of Caen for four days before VIII Corps would launch the main attack out of the Orne bridgehead, east of Caen, on 22 June. It was soon realised that VIII Corps would not be able to assemble within the small perimeter of the Orne bridgehead and the plan was revised on 19 June.^[42]

Operation Epsom, showing the British attacks (including those planned for I Corps) and German counterattacks.

The new plan called for a preliminary operation to take place three days before the main assault. I Corp's 51st (Highland) Infantry Division was ordered to strike south from the Orne bridgehead, pinning down elements of the 21st Panzer Division.^[42] Operation Martlet^[2] (also known as Operation Dauntless)^[44] was to commence on the day before Epsom; XXX Corp's 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division, supported by the 8th Armoured Brigade, was to secure VIII Corp's flank by capturing the high ground on the right of their axis of advance.^[2]

The main role in Operation Epsom was assigned to the newly arrived VIII Corps, consisting of 60,244 men under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O'Connor.^[45] VIII Corps would launch their offensive from the beachhead gained by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. The operation, split into four phases, intended for the Corps to advance and capture the high ground near Bretteville-sur-Laize, south of Caen.^[46] It would be supported by fire from 736 artillery pieces,^{[nb 6]} three cruisers, and the monitor H.M.S. Roberts. The Royal Air Force would additionally provide close air support and a preliminary bombardment by 250 bombers.^[48]

The 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division would lead the assault. During Phase I, codenamed Gout, they were tasked with taking the villages of Sainte Manvieu and Cheux.^[46] Phase II, codenamed Hangover, would see the division exploit forwards to capture several crossings over the Odon River, and the villages of Mouen and Grainville-sur-Odon.^[46] As a tactical alternative, should resistance during the opening phase prove light, the 11th Armoured Division would rush the bridges over the Odon River, seizing the crossings by coup de main.^[49]

During these opening two phases, the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division—to be reinforced on 28 June with the Guards Armoured Division's infantry brigade^[50]—was to remain on the start line to provide a "firm base".^[47] In Epsom's third phase, Impetigo, the 43rd Division would move forward to relieve all Scottish infantry north of the Odon.^[46] The 15th Division would then assemble across the river, expanding the bridgehead by capturing several key villages. In the operation's final phase, codenamed Goitre, elements of the 43rd Division would cross the river to hold the area taken, while the 15th Division would continue to expand their bridgehead.^[46] In addition, the 11th Armoured Division would attempt to force a crossing over the River Orne and advance on their final objective of Bretteville-sur-Laize.^[47] The 4th Armoured Brigade, although attached to the 11th Armoured Division, was restricted to operations between the Odon and Orne, both to protect the Corps flank and to be a position to attack westwards or towards Caen as necessary.^[47]

Depending on the success of VIII Corps attack, I Corps would then launch two supporting operations, codenamed Aberlour and Ottawa. The former would see the 3rd Infantry Division, supported by a Canadian infantry brigade, attack north of Caen; the latter would be a move by the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, supported by the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, to take the village and airfield of Carpiquet.^[51]

Originally planned for 22 June,^[5] Epsom was postponed until 26 June to make up deficiencies in manpower and material.^[52] The initial opposition to Epsom was expected to come from the already depleted 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend ("Hitler Youth"),^[37] along with elements of both the 21st Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr.^[53]

Preliminary attacks

A knocked out German 75mm anti-tank gun, and disabled Panther tank, in Fontenay-le-Pesnel during Operation Martlet. A knocked out Sherman is partially visible to the left of the Panther.

As planned, on 23 June elements of the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division's 152nd (Highland) Infantry Brigade launched a preliminary attack.^{[nb 7]} Before daybreak and without an initial artillery bombardment, the Highland infantry advanced in silence towards the village of Sainte-Honorine-la-Chardronette. They took the German garrison by surprise and had complete control of the village before sunrise. During the morning the Highlanders were counterattacked by elements of the 21st Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe von Luck; fighting lasted all morning, but by midday the village was firmly in British hands.^[44] This success diverted German attention and resources away from VIII Corps front, as the corps prepared for further attacks out of the Orne bridgehead.^[55]

At 0415 on 25 June, the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division, supported by the 8th Armoured Brigade and 250 artillery pieces, launched Operation Martlet against elements of the Panzer Lehr and 12th SS Panzer divisions.^[33] The operation's first objective, the village of Fontenay-le-Pesnel, was fought over all day, but stubborn German resistance prevented its capture. One infantry battalion, supported by tanks, advanced around the village to the west and took the Tessel Wood, but was subjected to a series of German counterattacks. These were blunted by British artillery fire and close air support, but by the end of the day the 49th Division had failed to achieve their ultimate goal of the village of Rauray,^[56] leaving the terrain dominating the right flank of VIII Corps' intended advance still in German hands.^[57] Operation Martlet did however force I SS Panzer Corps to commit the remaining tanks of 12th SS Panzer to XXX Corps' front, for a planned counterattack the following day.^[58] During the night, the Germans in Fontenay-le-Pesnel withdrew to straighten the front line, and infantry from the 49th Division secured the village before dawn.^[59]

Main attack

26 June

Poor weather hampered the start of Operation Epsom on 26 June—both over the battlefield itself, where rain had made the ground boggy and there was a heavy mist,^[60] and over the United Kingdom during the early hours of the morning, resulting in aircraft being grounded and the planned bombing missions being called off.^[61] However, No. 83 Group RAF, already based in Normandy, were able to provide air support throughout the operation.^{[nb 8]}

The 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division resumed Operation Martlet at 0650, although without significant artillery support as this was diverted to the main operation.^[62] The Germans were able to slow the British advance, and then launched an armoured riposte.^[63] This initially gained ground, but was halted when British armour moved up, and the two sides engaged in a tank battle in the confined terrain.^[58] However, informed during the afternoon that a major British offensive was underway further east, SS-Standartenführer Kurt Meyer of 12th SS Panzer called off the counterattack, and ordered his tank companies to return to their initial positions south of Rauray.^[64] During the rest of the day the 49th Division was able to make progress, halting just north of Rauray.^[60]

Infantry of the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division, waiting at their start line on 26 June 1944 for the signal to advance.

Led by their piper, men of the 7th Seaforth Highlanders advance during 26 June.

At 0730 the 44th (Lowland) Infantry Brigade and the 46th (Highland) Infantry Brigade of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division, supported by the 31st Tank Brigade,^[65] moved off their start lines behind a rolling barrage fired from 344 guns.^{[nb 9]} The 46th Brigade initially advanced without armoured support, because in bypassing the mine and booby trap-ridden village of Le Mesnil-Patry, its tanks were forced to negotiate minefields flanking the village. The infantry advance had mixed results; one battalion^{[nb 10]} faced only light resistance while the other^{[nb 11]} ran into the grenadiers of the Hitler Youth Division, who had allowed the barrage to pass over their positions before opening fire.^[69] Reuniting with their tanks at around 1000, by midday the two battalions were fighting for control of their initial objectives; Cheux and Le Haut du Bosq.^[68]

The 44th Brigade, not facing the same problems as the 46th and advancing with their tank support, encountered little opposition until coming under machine gun fire at a small stream, following which German resistance was much heavier. Between 0830 and 0930, the two leading battalions^{[nb 12]} reached their initial objectives; Sainte Manvieu and La Gaule. After much hand to hand fighting, they believed the villages to be completely in their hands just after midday, although they subsequently discovered that some German remnants were still holding out.^[70] Tanks and infantry from the 12th SS and the 21st Panzer launched two counterattacks in an attempt to regain Sainte Manvieu, but both were beaten off with the aid of intensive artillery fire.^[71] The main German opposition in this section of their outpost line had been from elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division's 1st Battalion 26th Panzergrenadier Regiment, which had been mostly overrun, and the pioneer battalion. The Germans within Rauray, which had not been captured as planned the previous day, were able to subject the British brigades to observed artillery and indirect tank fire,^[72] causing considerable casualties and destruction, especially within the village of Cheux.^[71]

At 1250 one squadron from the 11th Armoured Division's reconnaissance regiment, deployed north of Cheux, was ordered to advance towards the Odon^[73] as the precursor to an attempt by the division's armoured brigade to rush the bridges.^[37] Owing to minefields near the village, debris blocking its streets, and German holdouts attacking the tanks, it was not until 1400 that the regiment was finally able to make progress. By 1430 the squadron arrived on a ridge south of Cheux, where it was engaged^[73] by twenty Panzer IVs (diverted by the 12th SS Panzer Division from the Rauray area), Tiger tanks from the 3rd Battalion 101st Heavy SS Panzer Battalion, and additional armour from the 21st Panzer Division.^[74] More tanks from the 11th Armoured Division arrived, but determined German resistance halted any further advance;^[73] by the end of the day the division had lost twenty-one tanks.^[75] At 1800 the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division's third infantry brigade, the 227th (Highland), was committed to the battle.^[71] However, the Highlanders became bogged down with fighting in support of the rest of the division, and only two companies from the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders made much progress. They entered the northern outskirts of Colleville by 2100, but soon found themselves cut off by German counterattacks. After heavy and confused fighting one company was able to break out and rejoin the battalion.^[73]

To stop the British offensive, during the evening Field Marshal Rommel ordered assistance from all available units of II SS Panzer Corps.^[67]

27 June

A Universal Carrier of the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division during Operation Epsom, being used to evacuate wounded.

With no further attacks forthcoming during the night, the German command believed that the British offensive had been successfully halted, so during the early hours of 27 June, II SS Panzer Corps was ordered to resume preparations for its counter strike towards Bayeux.^[76]

On the right of the British advance, the I SS Panzer Corps launched a counterattack employing 80 tanks;^[76] this was first disorganised by artillery fire before foundering on the anti-tank guns of the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division,^[77] who then resumed their attempt to secure VIII Corps flank. The village of Rauray was finally taken by the 49th Division at 1600 on 27 June, after further heavy fighting against the 12th SS Panzer Division's panzergrenadiers. German forces had been diverted from opposing VIII Corps advance,^[78] and the fall of Rauray denied the Germans an important observation point, although they remained in control of an area of high ground to the south.^[79]

Epsom was resumed at 0445 by the 10th Battalion Highland Light Infantry of the 227 (Highland) Infantry Brigade. With support from Churchill tanks, the battalion intended to make a bid for the Odon crossing at Gavrus. However, the Highlanders immediately ran into stiff opposition from elements of 12th SS Panzer, and despite heavy artillery support were unable to advance all day. Casualties were heavy on both sides.^[80]

At 0730 the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, also of the 227 (Highland) Infantry Brigade, launched an attack aimed at capturing the Odon crossing at Tourmauville, northwest of the village of Baron-sur-Odon.^[81] With the available German forces already engaged by the Highland Light Infantry, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, supported by the 23rd Hussars, were able to advance as far as Colleville with relative ease. However, the small German garrison there, supported by 88 mm guns, inflicted heavy casualties upon the British and denied them the village until the afternoon.^[80] With this last obstacle dealt with, the battalion seized the bridge at Tourmauville at around 1700, and a bridgehead was established.^[82] By 1900, two depleted squadrons of the 23rd Hussars, and a company of the 8th Rifle Brigade, had crossed the Odon into the bridgehead.^[83]

The remainder of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division was positioned around Cheux and Sainte Manvieu, and was in the process of being relieved by the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division. One battalion of the 43rd,^{[nb 13]} on moving into the outskirts of Cheux, found the Scottish infantry had already moved on and the vacated position had been reoccupied by grenadiers of 12th SS Panzer. After battling to recapture the position, at 0930 the battalion was counterattacked by six Panthers of the 2nd Panzer Division.^[80] The attack penetrated into the outskirts of Cheux, destroying several anti-tank guns before it was beaten off.^{[nb 14][82]} Further attacks by 2nd Panzer were halted,^[84] but the entire front was "a mass of small engagements".^[82] For the rest of the morning, and afternoon, the Scottish infantry along with the 4th and 29th Armoured Brigades expanded the salient north of the Odon and secured the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders' rear.^[85] During late evening, the men of the 159th Infantry Brigade (11th Armoured Division) were transported in trucks^[50] through the narrow "Scottish Corridor"^[86] to Tourville, where they dismounted and crossed the Odon on foot to reinforce the bridgehead.^[50]

During the night Kampfgruppe Weidinger, a 2,500-strong battle group from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, arrived at the front and was initially placed under the command of the Panzer Lehr Division.^[87]

28 June

During the early hours of 28 June, a battle group of the 1st SS Panzer Division–Kampfgruppe Frey—arrived at the front and was placed under the command of the 12th SS Panzer Division. At 0810^[8] General Dollmann, commanding the German Seventh Army, ordered SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser to divert his II SS Panzer Corps to counterattack south of Cheux.^[88] Hausser replied that no counterattack could be launched until the following day, as so many of his units had yet to reach the front.^[89] Before any plans could be finalised, the German command was thrown into disarray by Dollmann's sudden death;^{[nb 15]} both Field Marshals Rommel and Gerd von Rundstedt (OB West) were en route to a conference with Hitler, and out of touch with the situation.^[77] Consequently it was not until 1500 that Hausser was appointed the new commander of the Seventh Army,^[89] with Willi Bittrich, the former commander of the 9th SS Panzer Division, replacing him as commander of II SS Panzer Corps (although Hausser was advised to retain control of the Corps until the following morning). Pending the return of Rommel to Normandy, Hausser was also to assume the role of supreme commander in the invasion area.^[7] At 1700 the command structure was again redrawn; Seventh Army, under Hausser, would be responsible for the invasion front facing the American army, while General von Schweppenburg's^{[nb 16]} Panzer Group West would be responsible for the invasion front facing the Anglo-Canadian forces.^[7]

A Churchill tank of 7th Royal Tank Regiment, 31st Tank Brigade, supporting infantry of 8th Royal Scots during Operation Epsom, 28 June 1944.

At 0530 elements of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division, with tank support, launched a new assault to capture the village of Grainville-sur-Odon. After shelling and close quarter street fighting, the Scots secured the village by 1300 hours; German counterattacks followed, but were repulsed.^[94] At 0600 the Germans began two strong flanking attacks, with the intention of pinching out the British salient. Kampfgruppe Frey, on the salient's eastern flank, launched an attack north of the Odon supported by Panzer IVs of the 21st Panzer Division. This reached the villages of Mouen and Tourville, but the British counterattacked from the direction of Cheux, resulting in confused and heavy fighting throughout the day.^[7] Frey's battle group managed to gain control of Mouen;^[95] British counterattacks supported by tanks halted any further advance, but were unable to retake the village.^[96] Meanwhile British patrols found Marcelet partially abandoned, the German front line having been pulled back towards Carpiquet.^[97]

On the western flank, Kampfgruppe Weidinger, supported by Panthers, aimed a thrust at recapturing Brettevillette, Grainville-sur-Odon and ultimately Mondrainville.^[96] The British defenders^{[nb 17]} held their positions, launching local counterattacks to retake lost ground, and eventually the German offensive ground to a halt within 0.6 miles (0.97 km) of linking up with the lead elements of Kampfgruppe Frey.^[96]

South of the Odon, at 0900 the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders advanced out of the bridgehead with the aim of capturing a bridge north of the village of Gavrus. Heavy fighting took place into the afternoon before both village and bridge were in Scottish hands.^[97] Meanwhile infantry from the 11th Armoured Division expanded the bridgehead itself, by taking the village of Baron-sur-Odon,^[75] and the 23rd Hussars with infantry support advanced on Hill 112 (49°7′7″N 0°27′34″W / 49.11861°N 0.45944°W / 49.11861; -0.45944). Having secured its northern slope and dislodged the defenders from its crest, they were unable to advance further due to stiff resistance from forces dug in on the hill's reverse slope.^[98] Several unsuccessful counterattacks were launched by 12th SS Panzer,^[99] and the battered hussars were relieved at 1500 by the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment, but neither side was able to take complete control of the hill.^[98] The 11th Armoured Division had lost nearly 40 tanks on its slopes by the end of the day, and was surrounded on three sides, but support troops had managed to reach and reinforce the position.^[100]

29 June

With the weather improving over the United Kingdom and Normandy, Hausser's preparations for his counter stroke came under continual harassment from Allied aircraft and artillery fire, resulting in the start time being pushed back to the afternoon.^[101] From the number of German reinforcements arriving in VIII Corps' sector,^[102] and aerial reconnaissance,^[7] VIII Corps commander Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor suspected that the Germans were organising a major offensive.^[102] XXX Corps was still some way to the north, leaving VIII Corps' right flank vulnerable, so O'Connor postponed the planned attacks by I Corps and ordered VIII Corps to adopt a defensive posture.^[102] Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey, commanding the Second Army and privy to ULTRA decrypts of intercepted German signal traffic, knew of the planned counterattack and approved O'Connor's precautions.^[7]

Having moved to the defensive, VIII Corps began to reorganise in order to meet the attack when it came.^[103] Supply echelons for Hausser's divisions were located in the Évrecy–Noyers-Bocage–Villers-Bocage area, and were the focus of RAF fighter-bomber attention throughout the morning and early afternoon; the RAF claimed the destruction of over 200 vehicles.^[103] VIII Corps also launched spoiling moves. At 0800 a battalion^{[nb 18]} of the 43rd Division assaulted Mouen. Without armour, but supported by an artillery barrage, by 1100 the battalion had evicted the 1st SS Panzer Division's panzergrenadiers, following which a second battalion^{[nb 19]} moved up and dug in on the Caen–Villers-Bocage road.^[106] The 43rd Division's 129th Brigade swept the woods and orchards around Tourville-sur-Odon, before crossing the river north of Baron-sur-Odon and proceeding to clear the southern bank.^[105] Other initiatives were less successful. An attempt by the 15th Division's 44th Brigade to advance towards the Odon and link up with the force holding the Gavrus bridges failed, leaving this position isolated,^[107] and in the salient the 44th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment failed to capture Hill 113 (49°6′14″N 0°30′45″W / 49.10389°N 0.5125°W / 49.10389; -0.5125), north of Évrecy,^[108] after clashing with 10th SS Panzer and losing 6 tanks.^[109] Endeavouring to strengthen their position, elements of the 11th Armoured Division launched a failed attack to take Esquay-Notre-Dame, west of Hill 112,^[108] but a combined infantry and tank attack^{[nb 20]} on the southern slope of the hill was more successful, driving the Germans from the position.^[109]

German SS-Panzergrenadiers dug in near Hill 112.

Hausser intended for his II SS Panzer Corps' 9th SS Panzer Division—with Kampfgruppe Weidinger protecting its left flank—to cut right across the British salient north of the Odon, while the 10th SS Panzer Division was to retake Gavrus and Hill 112 south of the river.^[110] 9th SS Panzer's attack began at 1400, heavily supported by artillery. Two regiments^{[nb 21]} of the division, supported by Panthers, Panzer IV's and assault guns, attacked Grainville, le Haut du Bosq, and le Valtru, aiming for Cheux as their final objective.^[111] A British company was overrun and tanks and infantry penetrated into le Valtru, but anti-tank guns knocked out four German tanks within the village and artillery fire forced their supporting infantry to withdraw. Heavy and confused fighting, at times coming down to hand-to-hand combat, took place outside Grainville. Panzergrenadiers captured a tactically key wood, but were forced back after a British counterattack. The panzergrenadiers claimed they also captured Grainville, but no British sources support this, and by nightfall British infantry were in firm control of the village.^[111]

At around 1600^[112] the British captured an officer of the 9th SS Panzer Division^[101] who was conducting a reconnaissance mission.^[112] He was found to be carrying a map and notebook containing details of upcoming attacks.^{[nb 22]} Nevertheless, at around 1830 the Germans launched renewed strikes against the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division's right flank.^[114] One unit was in the process of relieving another, and in the confusion German tanks and infantry slipped through the British defences,^[111] with some units advancing 2 miles (3.2 km)^[115] before running into heavy resistance.^[111] By 2300, 9th SS Panzer had been stopped.^[116] Additional supporting attacks against the British eastern flank had been planned, but the German tank concentrations assembling in the Carpiquet area had been so severely disrupted by RAF fighter-bombers during the afternoon that the attacks never materialised.^[117]

The 10th SS Panzer Division launched its attack, behind schedule, at 1430. Following clashes earlier in the day the British were ready and waiting, but after five hours of intense combat the Scottish infantry defending Gavrus had been pushed back into a pocket around the bridge north of the village.^[110] An artillery bombardment caused the Germans to withdraw, but the British did not reoccupy the village.^[116] Moving towards Hill 113, elements of 10th SS Panzer ran into British tanks and infantry within Évrecy,^{[nb 23]} thwarting their attempt to occupy the hill. Dealing with this obstacle took the remainder of the day, so the division's planned attack on Hill 112 was postponed.^[119] The Germans claimed the destruction of 28 tanks, while the British record the loss of only 12.^[120]

Believing the aggressive German actions throughout 29 June indicated further major counterattacks for the following day, Dempsey reinforced the Odon bridgehead with a brigade of the 43rd division and pulled in its perimeter. The 159th Infantry Brigade, of the 11th Armoured Division, was placed under the command of the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division,^[121] and acceding to O’Connor’s wishes for additional infantry, Dempsey attached the newly arrived 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division to VIII Corps; the lead brigade arrived near the Epsom start line during the night.^[122] In order to retain possession of Hill 112, Dempsey recognised that he would also need to hold Évrecy and Hill 113; a task that, for the moment, he did not have the resources for.^[123] He therefore ordered the 29th Armoured Brigade to abandon the hill.^[121] Convinced that the key position to retain was between Rauray and the Odon,^[124] after dark Dempsey withdrew the 29th Armoured Brigade north, across the river,^[117] to be in a position to meet the expected renewed German offensive.^[125]

30 June

The town of Villers-Bocage, photographed during the bombing raid on 30 June 1944, being attacked by 256 RAF heavy bombers dropping 1,100 tons of bombs.^[126]

Willi Bittrich was greatly concerned by the failure of II SS Panzer Corps to significantly reduce the British salient, and he ordered a resumption of the offensive during the night of 29–30 June, hoping to negate Allied air support. The 19th and 20th Regiments of the 9th SS Panzer Division renewed their attacks against Grainville-sur-Odon and le Valtru during the hours of darkness, but little progress was made in the face of opposition from the tanks of the 11th Armoured Division—now in position north of the Odon—and heavy artillery bombardments.^[127] At 0120 the 10th SS Panzer Division started to move towards Hill 112 and at dawn, covered by a heavy artillery barrage, they assaulted the vacated British positions. Unaware that the British had pulled back, panzergrenadiers and tanks of the 10th SS Panzer advanced on the hill from the south and south-west, while infantry from 12th SS Panzer attacked from the east and south-east. Meeting no opposition, by noon the Germans had firmly installed themselves on the hill,^[128] but a British counterattack and artillery fire broke up a follow-up attack towards Baron-sur-Odon.^[127]

With only limited results achieved thus far, Bittrich called off further offensive action against VIII Corps.^[84] In the evening Hausser, now commanding the Seventh Army, informed Rommel's headquarters that his counterattacks had been temporarily suspended due to "tenacious enemy resistance" and intensive Allied artillery and naval gunfire.^[129] Unaware of this, and believing that more German attacks would follow, Dempsey closed down Operation Epsom.^[84] The front gradually settled down save for minor and inconclusive skirmishing, although both sides spent the remainder of the day heavily shelling one another.^[130] The battleship HMS Rodney contributed by bombarding villages suspected of containing German command centres; one was later confirmed to have housed the headquarters of the I SS Panzer Corps.^[131] With no further British offensive moves planned for the short term, during the afternoon the Gavrus bridges were given up—their Scottish defenders being withdrawn across the Odon.^[132] At 2030 the town of Villers-Bocage, a vital traffic centre for the German forces, was destroyed by 250 RAF heavy bombers. It was hoped that German troops would be caught by the bombing, but only French civilians were present at the time.^[133]

Aftermath

1 July

A Waffen-SS Soldier reloads a German 81mm mortar. German forces used mortars extensively and they allegedly accounted for 70% of British casualties in Normandy.^[92]

The II SS Panzer Corps resumed its counter offensive on 1 July, after spending most of the preceding 24 hours regrouping. Unaware that the British had ended their operation, and with overcast weather interfering with Allied air support,^[134] Bittrich believed he had an opportunity to prevent the 11th Armoured Division continuing its advance across the Orne.^[135]

Before dawn the 10th SS Panzer Division moved off, supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire.^[136] The Germans took the village of Baron-sur-Odon quickly, but a counterattack by the 31st Tank Brigade won it back by noon.^[135] Heavy shelling broke up other attacks by 10th SS Panzer from Hill 112;^[137] British patrols later found an estimated 300–400 dead panzergrenadiers on the northern slope of the hill.^[136]

The 9th SS Panzer Division spent the day attempting to force the British lines between Rauray and the Odon. Supplemented by panzergrenadiers of the 2nd SS Panzer Division and following a preliminary bombardment, tanks and infantry of 9th SS Panzer advanced behind a smoke screen and succeeded in breaking through the outer British defences. However, the assault was halted by secondary positions in front of Rauray and on high ground to the south-east,^[136] although some elements penetrated as far as Haut du Bosq.^[137] Further German attacks throughout the day were met with intense artillery fire and made no progress, and in the early evening a British counterattack, utilising Sherman and flame-throwing Churchill Crocodile tanks, restored the front line to that at the start of the day. Casualties were heavy on both sides.^[136] Thirty German tanks were claimed destroyed, mostly by the 49th (West Riding) Infantry Division; elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division had been repulsed during the morning, and artillery fire halted attacks from other formations.^[137]

Overall

Having been obliged to commit his last available strategic reserves to bring the British offensive to a halt, on 29 June Rommel requested permission from Hitler to allow the Seventh Army to begin a fighting withdrawal towards the River Seine; a move which would be mirrored by German forces in southern France to form a new front line along the Seine towards the Swiss border. This was partially endorsed by Hausser, who on 30 June proposed pulling back from Caen. However, encouraged by the outcome of the fighting in the Odon valley, Hitler stated that "we must not allow mobile warfare to develop",^[138] committing his troops in Normandy to "a policy of aggressive and unyielding defence".^[139] On 2 July, Scottish patrols produced the first evidence of this, reporting that south of the Odon the Germans were digging in. Aerial photographs taken two days later provided confirmation, showing large numbers of newly dug weapon positions, and by 8 July the German forces facing VIII Corps had fully entrenched themselves.^[17] Some local adjustments occurred as both sides sought to improve their tactical positions, with the 12th SS Panzer Division launching a successful attack to capture Fontaine-Étoupefour on 2 July.^[140]

Map showing operations close to Caen.

The serious losses sustained in maintaining an increasingly costly static defence led to fractures in the German high command. On the evening of 1 July, in a conversation with Wilhelm Keitel, von Rundstedt advised; "Make peace, you fools."^[139] Shortly afterwards, Günther von Kluge replaced him as Commander in Chief West, and due to disagreements with Hitler over how the campaign should be conducted, Heinrich Eberbach replaced von Schweppenburg as commander of Panzer Group West.^[93]

During the lull in fighting both sides made several changes to the disposition of their forces. The 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division relieved the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division in the west of the British salient,^[141] while the 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division relieved the infantry of the 11th Armoured Division, who where still holding the Odon bridgehead.^[142] The Germans moved up the 277th Infantry Division, which began to relieve the 9th SS Panzer Division^[143] and the battle group of the 2nd SS Panzer Division.^[144]

A few days later the British Second Army launched a new offensive, codenamed Operation Charnwood, to gain possession of Caen.^[145] This incorporated the postponed attack on Carpiquet, originally planned for Epsom as Operation Ottawa^[51] but now codenamed Operation Windsor.^[142] In a frontal assault the northern half of the city was captured,^[145] with the remaining portions being taken during Operations Atlantic and Goodwood in the third week of July.^[146] The fighting in the Odon Valley would continue; on 10 July Operation Jupiter was launched^[147] by VIII Corps to push back the German forces near the village of Baron-sur-Odon, retake Hill 112, and advance to the River Orne.^[148] Additionally the Second battle of the Odon was launched on 15 July to divert German attention away from the battleground Operation Goodwood would be fought on; the second battle has been called one of the bloodiest encounters of the campaign.^[149]

Battle honours

The British and Commonwealth system of battle honours recognised participation in Operation Epsom in 1956, 1957 and 1958 by the award to 34 units of the battle honour Odon, for service on and around the river from 25 June to 2 July 1944. The award was accompanied by honours for four minor actions during the operation: Fontenay le Pesnil on 26–27 June, Cheux on 26–27 June, Tourmauville Bridge on 27 June and Defence of Rauray on 29 June–2 July.^[150]

Analysis

British Sherman tanks pass a knocked out Tiger tank during the offensive. During Operation Epsom the British claimed to have knocked out 25^[17] of these irreplaceable tanks.^{[nb 24]}

VIII Corps, in battle for the first time, had broken through strongly entrenched German positions and advanced nearly six miles.^[134] The Germans however, throwing in their last available reserves,^[152] had been able to achieve a defensive success at the operational level, containing the British offensive. Just over 4,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the British Army^[15] but the German forces took more than 3,000 casualties themselves.^[16] The German commanders had been forced to commit their armoured reserves piecemeal to meet threats as they developed, and to counterattack at a disadvantage.^[10] As a result, over 120 German tanks were destroyed,^[17] the organisation of their forces was significantly disrupted, and their combat ability degraded.^[10] Furthermore, as there were few infantry divisions available to relieve them, the panzer divisions had to assume a defensive role, being forced to remain in the front line rather than pulling back into reserve.^[153]

Operation Epsom has been analysed to varying degrees by many prominent military historians and commentators. As described by Stephen Ashley Hart, these analyses have passed through a number of stages. The post-war publication of memoirs by the leading Allied generals led to rifts along partisan lines during the 1950s and 1960s, with American historians generally critical of Montgomery and the actions of the Anglo-Canadian forces, while "pro-Montgomery" historians set out to reject these criticisms. Also published during this period were the national official campaign histories, which although thoroughly researched, for the most part avoided detailed critical analysis of the 1944–45 north-west European campaign's most controversial issues. During the 1980s, historical literature underwent a revisionist phase concentrating on the deficiencies of the Allied performance, and from the late 1990s to the present, historians of the campaign have entered a post revisionist stage with two schools of thought: those attempting to expand on the revisionist work by providing a more detailed campaign analysis and those who have attempted to demonstrate that the techniques employed by the Anglo-Canadian forces were appropriate to conditions in Normandy.^[154]

According to Carlo D’Este, the most logical point for the British to have launched an attack at this stage of the campaign would have been out of the Orne bridgehead on the extreme eastern flank of the Allied lodgement.^[155] However, an attack in this area had been considered—and vetoed—by Montgomery, Dempsey and O’Connor as being unrealistic; instead, Second Army turned its attention west of Caen.^[36] One of the more contentious points amongst historians is the question of what Operation Epsom was intended to achieve. Some claim that the aim was simply to gain ground, while others have suggested that the operation had wider objectives. Andrew Williams argues that due to ULTRA intercepts, Montgomery was aware of Rommel's planned attack towards Bayeux, and Epsom was launched to pre-empt this offensive.^[35] Chester Wilmot states that the operation was intended to draw the I SS Panzer Corps and the newly arrived II SS Panzer Corps into battle around Caen,^[156] and Hart notes that Montgomery wanted to retain the initiative at the operational and strategic level, to prevent German armoured forces either being redeployed to face the Americans or being relieved and passed into reserve. The arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps acted as powerful incentive to launch Epsom, thus retaining the initiative by forcing the German command to commit the II SS Panzer Corps to battle rather than use it for their own planned attack.^[152] These views are completely dismissed by Max Hastings, who claims that "no sane commander" would mount an attack on the scale of Epsom without "every hope of breaking through the German defences, or at least of causing the enemy to make substantial withdrawals".^[157] D’Este supports this view, stating "No amount of pretence can conceal that the real object had been a short pincer movement to outflank Caen".^[158]

Lloyd Clark writes: "On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw."^[3] However, the overall result of the offensive has also seen several varying conclusions. Clark notes that examining Operation Epsom's results is difficult when there is no agreement about its intentions; although Montgomery's written orders—to advance across the Orne River and capture the high ground south of Caen—were not achieved, he argues that there were also un-stated objectives that had strategic implications, which far outweighed the simple capture of ground.^[159] Stephen Ambrose sees Operation Epsom as veering off-course from its original plan,^[160] while D'Este goes so far as to say that Epsom was "an operation of immense intentions which were not attained",^[158] calling it a "dismal failure".^[158] However, Simon Trew notes that this 'failure' "took most of six Panzer Divisions to stop Epsom short of its final objectives",^[161] with Michael Reynolds adding that, without the commitment of these six divisions, it was highly likely that the British offensive would have achieved its goals.^[162] Ian Daglish claims that, while the original concept of Epsom had failed, the British had nevertheless won a strategic victory.^[163] By withdrawing the 11th Armoured Division back across the Odon and then into reserve, the 21st Army Group had re-created the threat of a major offensive in the Caen sector,^[164] and by the end of June all German armoured forces in Normandy were concentrated on the Second Army's front.^[165][166] Milton Shulman states that, with the defeat of its second armoured counterattack during June, the German command had thrown away its most effective troops,^[167] and Reynolds concedes that while the operation was costly for the British, it also "caused grievous losses" to the German force.^[168] VIII Corps, in its final analysis, concluded that Epsom failed in its stated goal, but "when seen as part of Montgomery's series of rapid and consecutive blows against the German Army in Normandy, the importance of Epsom becomes more apparent and there is little doubt that it did play a significant part in the Allies' eventual success in the region."^[169] D'Este however dismisses any idea of wider strategic implications, claiming that the losses inflicted on the German army were "purely in terms of men and material".^[158]

Terry Copp has tried to explain the varying interpretations of Epsom by suggesting that too much emphasis has been given to analysing the offensive from a win-lose perspective, whereas a cost-benefit approach provides more useful conclusions.^[170] Describing the standard German practice of launching local counterattacks when driven from a position and thereby courting losses that could not be readily replaced, he writes: "One such counter-attack on 22 July resulted in 10SS regaining control of the Bon Repas[sic]-Évrecy road, a clear victory in a win-lose narrative but a typical German defeat in any cost–benefit analysis."^[170]

Notes

Footnotes

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Citations

References