| Operation Junction City | |||||||
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| Part of the Vietnam War | |||||||
Cedar Falls/Junction City area of operations |
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Operation Junction City was an 82-day military operation conducted by United States and Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam) forces begun on 22 February 1967 during the Vietnam War. It was the largest U.S. airborne operation since Operation Market Garden during World War II, the only major airborne operation of the Vietnam War, and one of the largest U.S. operations of the Southeast Asian conflict.
Operation
Junction City was a massive search and destroy operation, conducted in hopes of clearing People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF or derogatively, Viet Cong) units from the area of War Zone C, northeast of the South Vietnamese capital of Saigon. Another goal of the operation was the possible capture or destruction of the PAVN/NLF Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). This headquarters controlled all enemy activities south of the triborder region of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.
The operation was considered largely successful by the U.S. command, although PAVN/NLF units returned to the area once allied forces withdrew. COSVN itself withdrew to the safety of Cambodian territory, where it remained for the rest of the U.S. commitment to the Southeast Asian conflict. The operation's failure in destroying the COSVN according to Major General John Hay was due to three main factors. These included the proximity of a sancutuary to reported COSVN locations, difficulty in achieving sufficient troop density to infiltrate the Viet Cong and the failure to gain complete surprise through the repositioning of U.S. troops.
The failure to gain surprise lay in discovery of the plans after NVA Col. Dinh Thi Van managed to place one of her agents in social circles that included ARVN Gen. Cao Van Vien and AUS Gen. William Westmoreland. That agent further reported one ARVN staff officer's comment of the early phase of the operation: "(The Viet Cong) seem like ghosts. All the six spearheads of our forces have been attacked while we don't know exactly where their main force is. Even in Bau Hai Vung that is considered to be a safe area, we lost one brigade. It's so strange." (Van, p.237)
References
- Summers, Harry G. Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- "Destroying the Haven". TIME. 3 March 1967. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843442,00.html. Retrieved 11 July 2007.
- "Psy-War Success". TIME. 3 March 1967. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843443,00.html. Retrieved 11 July 2007.
- Van, Dinh Thi, "I Engaged in Intelligence Work" The Gui Publishers, Hanoi, 2006.
- "The Lure of the Lonely Patrol: Forcing the Enemy to Fight". TIME. 14 April 1967. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,836945,00.html. Retrieved 11 July 2007.
External links
- Article about original 173rd jungle jacket worn by Junction City vet
- Battlefield:Timeline, PBS
- VIETNAM STUDIES CEDAR FALLS- JUNCTION CITY: A TURNING POINT by Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers
- After Action Report (Logistical)
- 1/4 Cavalvry After Action Report - JUNCTION CITY II - 26 Apr 67
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